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Water is both an essential good and a scarce resource that exhibits several 
traits that have attracted the attention of economists. On the one hand, it is a 
merit good that contributes to meeting economic, environmental and social goals 
and generates substantial externalities. On the other hand, it satisfies a basic human 
need, so universal access and affordability should be guaranteed. As an economic 
good, an optimal allocation of the resource between competing uses such as 
industry, agriculture, households and ecosystems must be ensured (OECD, 2003). 
In the scientific sphere, growing interest in water-related issues has prompted the 
emergence of several lines of research in the field of economics that aim to contribute 
to the improvement of water resources management. Broadly, these lines can be 
classified into two categories: agricultural water economics and urban water 
economics, with the latter including residential and industrial uses.  
In the residential sector, water management is expected to face several 
challenges. In the forthcoming decades, the global population is predicted to 
undergo exponential growth, going from an estimated 6 billion people at the 
beginning of the 21st century to 9 billion by 2050 (UN Population Division, 2015). 
In order to satisfy the growing needs of the population in terms of food production, 
energy generation, industry and residential demand, an unprecedented growth in 
water demand is forecast (World Bank Group, 2016). Moreover, climate change will 
reduce the availability of freshwater resources, making supply more unpredictable 
and volatile (IPCC 2015). Thus, with more than half of the global population living 
in regions suffering from at least moderate water stress by 2050 (Arnell, 1999, 2000; 
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Schlosser et al., 2014), water scarcity will likely pose a substantial risk for 
humankind in the near future (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
Likewise, urbanization trends may represent an additional pressure on urban 
water management (Biswas and Tortajada, 2009). It is predicted that by 2050 
around two-thirds of the world’s population will reside in urban areas. Moreover, 
the trend towards ever-bigger urban agglomerations also entails a potential threat 
and increased complexity for urban water services (UN Population Division, 2014; 
Biswas and Tortajada, 2009). In fact, the number of cities that are home to over 
10 million inhabitants - the so-called “mega-cities”- has almost tripled just since 
1990; and by 2030, 41 urban centres are predicted to exceed that size (UNESCO, 
2016). 
As a consequence, water management will have to cope with major challenges 
in the years to come, thus making the efficient and sustainable use of water 
resources a priority for governments and supranational institutions. 
Residential water management policies involve both supply and demand 
interventions. On the supply side, solutions often entail the construction of new 
infrastructure such as canals or desalination and wastewater recycling plants. 
However, traditional supply interventions have usually proved costly both in 
economic and ecological terms. Moreover, they have sometimes been found to 
generate a higher level of dependence in arid regions, as demand usually adapts to 
the increase in availability (World Bank Group, 2016). 
Consequently, demand-side policies have proved to be more effective. Policy 
options in this respect can be divided into two main categories: pricing and non-
pricing approaches. Pricing incentives mainly involve raising prices and designing 
appropriate pricing schemes that promote an efficient use of the resource (Olmstead 
and Stavins, 2009). Particularly, tariff schemes in the form of increasing block rates 
are widely applied to achieve the simultaneous objectives of economic efficiency, 
environmental sustainability and social equity and affordability in residential water 
management (Olmstead et al., 2007; García-Rubio et al., 2015). Non-pricing policies 
focus on, among other issues, behavioural interventions such as educational 
campaigns, rebate programmes for the installation of water-efficient technologies or 
temporary service interruptions. 
In the same vein, along with demand and supply interventions, making urban 
water services management more efficient and climate-resilient proves essential in 
order to ensure supply continuity under the increasing pressures created by a 
growing population, climate change and rising income worldwide. 
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Within this framework, this doctoral dissertation aims to address a number of 
issues related to water resources management and the provision of the service at a 
residential level. First, we analyse residential water demand policies. Second, we 
examine the design of appropriate pricing schemes and taxes that help improve 
allocation and simultaneously achieve the objectives of sustainability, equality and 
an efficient use of the resource. In third place, we address the effect of environmental 
attitudes as well as pricing and non-pricing policies on certain averting behaviours 
related to water consumption. Lastly, we cover the measurement and improvement 
of efficiency in residential water management.  
The four essays included in this dissertation share the common feature of 
using Spanish data for empirical purposes. However, it should be noted that the 
conclusions and policy implications are intended to be of general interest for a wide 
variety of settings and institutional backgrounds. The following paragraphs briefly 
describe the Spanish water sector, paying special attention to the main 
characteristics of its institutional and regulatory framework. 
Spain is one of the highest-ranking European Union countries in the water 
exploitation index1 (EEA, 2012), and most of its territory is subject to water stress 
or severe water stress. Moreover, precipitations are expected to decrease (Jacob et 
al., 2014) and droughts to become more prevalent in the near future (OECD 2011). 
Nevertheless, it is one of the countries with the highest per capita consumption 
(Suárez-Varela et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, it should be noted that in Spain, there is currently little 
possibility of increasing the availability of freshwater by building new hydraulic 
infrastructures (OECD, 2011). Thus, demand-side policies have taken a prominent 
role in the past few decades. In this regard, the EU Water Framework Directive 
(WFD henceforth), which came into effect in 2000, highlights the importance of 
economic and pricing tools as a means to achieve an efficient allocation of water 
resources. Since then, pricing has thus been the focus of particular attention.  
In Spain, town councils (municipal governments) are responsible for urban 
water management, i.e. they must organize the provision of the service.  Town 
councils must choose between in-house management or outsourcing water 
management. If they opt for outsourcing, local governments may choose to do so 
with a publicly-owned company, to a private company or to a public-private 
partnership (see García-Valiñas et al., 2013, for further information on the legal 
framework governing outsourcing). It should be noted that only the management 
can be privatized, as the assets and infrastructures must remain public property. 
																																								 																				
1 Ratio of total water abstraction per year to total long-term renewable resources  
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Furthermore, in the absence of a legal framework or formal regulatory body that 
establishes certain criteria and common guidelines for urban water tariffs, town 
councils are also ultimately in charge of price-setting decisions, control and 
monitoring (García-Valiñas et al. 2013).  
As a consequence, there is an extraordinary range of tariff systems (González-
Gómez et al., 2012), with two-part tariffs (i.e., including both a fixed and a variable 
component) and variable structures in increasing blocks being the most common 
(AEAS-AGA 2013; AEAS, 2013). Despite the efforts made in recent years 
(European Environmental Agency, 2013), water prices in Spain still do not reflect 
either the full cost of providing the service or the associated environmental and 
resource costs (AEAS-AGA, 2013; García-Rubio et al., 2015), as would be expected 
following WFD implementation. Moreover, the fact that water distribution 
networks currently suffer from substantial underinvestment, are old and in poor 
conditions, with non-revenue water exceeding 25% (García-Rubio et al. 2015) may 
represent an additional pressure to gradually raise prices over time. These features, 
along with the particular institutional background and regulatory framework that 
will be discussed in more detail below, make Spain an interesting setting for the 
study of the issues addressed in this doctoral thesis.  
In what follows, we present a brief outline of the four chapters of this PhD 
dissertation, devoting special attention to the aim and contributions of each. 
 
 
Essay 1: Estimation of residential water demand. Accounting for substitution 
patterns and non-linear income effects’. 
 
The first essay of this doctoral dissertation focuses on the modelling of 
residential water demand. As mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, 
pricing policies are expected to play a prominent role in dealing with the challenges 
posed by greater water scarcity in the near future. In this respect, the success of 
pricing policies depends on precise estimates of demand patterns and elasticities. In 
the residential water demand literature, most estimations of income and price 
elasticities rely on single-equation models that are implicitly based on assumptions 
of weak separability of water consumption – i.e. residential water demand does not 
depend on the price of other goods consumed within the household - and linear 
income effects – i.e. an increase in income has the same effect on water consumption 
independently of the part of the income distribution to which the household belongs. 
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Recognizing those limitations, in this paper we propose a more flexible system of 
demand estimation, the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System, or QUAIDS 
(Banks et al. 1997). Among other unique features, it offers two main advantages 
over previously-used specifications. First, it estimates demand as a system of 
equations, thus accounting for possible substitution and complementarity patterns 
and allowing the estimation of cross-price elasticities. Second, quadratic terms in 
the logarithm of expenditure are included, thus taking into account the likely 
curvature of the Engel curves for the goods considered in the system. Moreover, it 
satisfies the fundamental principles of demand – i.e. adding up, integrability. 
Consequently, it is expected to offer richer and more accurate estimates of demand 
patterns, as well as enabling the analysis of the welfare effects of certain public 
policies related to price and taxes.  
Our analysis is implemented using the Spanish Consumer Expenditure Surveys 
for the period 2006-2012, a rotating panel of 151,000 households (between 19,000 
and 23,000 per year), which constitutes a representative sample of the Spanish 
population and contains information on household consumption of up to 489 goods. 
Information on prices is taken from the Consumer Price Index statistics, while the 
average price for water is derived from the sample. For modelling purposes, we 
assume households follow a two-stage budgeting procedure in which they first 
decide how to allocate their total expenditure among durable and non-durable goods 
and then allocate their total expenditure on non-durables among several composite 
commodities – food and beverages, water, energy, households expenses other than 
water and energy, and all other goods. Estimation is performed through an iterative 
linear least-squares estimator (ILLE) proposed by Blundell and Robin (1999) and 
the likely endogeneity of total expenditure and the price for water is dealt with 
using a non-linear instrumental variable approach also proposed by Blundell and 
Robin (1999) and the augmented regression techniques of Hausman (1978) and 
Holly and Sargan (1982).	
Our results are as follows: We obtain long-run price and income elasticities of 
-0.974 and 0.108 respectively, implying that water is a normal good, a necessity and 
relatively price inelastic. Moreover, our sample showed the existence of non-
linearities in Engel curves for residential water demand as well as substitutability 
and complementarity with other groups of commodities. Conversely, water demand 
was not found to have good substitutes among non-durable commodities. In this 
context, most commonly-used functional specifications – i.e. linear, log-linear and 
double-log - seem to impose rigid restrictions on demand estimation, whereas 
QUAIDS is expected to be more consistent with consumer behaviour. In a last 
stage, we compare QUAIDS with the abovementioned common specifications. The 
evidence seems to suggest that the predictions of demand yielded by QUAIDS are 
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both closer to the observed data than the other specifications and better fit the 
asymmetry of the real distribution for water demand.  
Therefore, water demand should be estimated in conjunction with the rest of 
the goods consumed in the household and more theory-compatible models should 
be employed. Moreover, the model proposed in this paper could be used jointly with 
representative Household Budget Surveys that are available in many countries, in 




Essay 2: A proposal for the analysis of price escalation in water tariffs. The impact 
of the Water Framework Directive in Spain 
 
In order to achieve the simultaneous objectives of efficiency, equality, 
sustainability and affordability, tariffs in the form of increasing block rates are 
becoming more widespread (Olmstead et al. 2007). These tariff schemes implicitly 
introduce a certain level of escalation or progressivity in the price for water –i.e. 
the price per cubic metre rises as consumption increases. However, despite its 
extensive use, no metric has been developed to measure the degree of escalation in 
water tariffs. In the second chapter of this dissertation, we propose a metric that 
aims to measure the level of progressivity embedded in water tariffs at the level of 
the water service management unit (in our study, the municipality), independently 
of the specific tariff scheme applied (i.e. regardless of the presence of free-allowances, 
the number and size of the price blocks, and the existence and size of the fixed 
component), and that allows full comparability among municipalities. 
Specifically, we propose two indicators: one that accounts for the influence of 
the fixed component of the tariff; and another that only accounts for the variable 
price structure. Moreover, in order to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed 
measures, we analyse the evolution of Spanish tariffs following the implementation 
of the WFD as well as the political, business and environmental factors influencing 
that evolution. To that end, we use a sample of 952 municipalities in Spain for 2000 
and 2014, that is, before and after the entry into force of the WFD. In Spain, in 
order to properly implement the WFD, the main advisory bodies recommended that 
municipalities should change from previously existing tariff schemes – e.g. flat or 
volumetric rates - to tariffs in the form of increasing block rates (IBRs), and should 
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increase the level of escalation in the tariffs (AEAS, 2014). Thus, an increase in the 
level of escalation should have been expected. 
Our results seem to suggest that despite the formal efforts made by local 
governments to increase price escalation by implementing steeper price increases 
for higher consumption levels, the main price hikes were applied to the consumption 
ranges with a smaller share of consumers. We also find that, when only the variable 
component is accounted for, although tariffs are on average progressive before and 
after the implementation of the WFD, there has been a decrease in the level of price 
escalation during that period, contrary to what would have been expected as a 
result of the WFD implementation.  However, when the analysis also takes the fixed 
component into account, tariffs are found to be regressive on average, albeit less so 
in 2014 than in 2000. Besides, we find that some factors related to water stress, 
ideological factors, socioeconomic characteristics, tourist activity and the ownership 
of the management company may affect the probability of adopting more 
progressive tariffs. 
These summary metrics are intended to assist policy makers in conducting 
sound policy analysis when assessing efforts made by countries and/or 
municipalities to increase the price escalation of tariffs or performing comparative 
analysis between jurisdictions. 
 
 
Essay Chapter 3: The role of environmental attitudes in averting behaviour 
with negative environmental externalities: A double-hurdle approach to bottled water 
demand 
 
The motivation for the third chapter lies in the fact that urban water 
management policies may also have an influence on other decisions taken within 
the household. For instance, poor quality tap water, as well as some other factors 
related to the management of urban water services, may prompt households to 
adopt certain averting behaviours such as installing water filters or consuming 
bottled water. In this context, our objective in this chapter is threefold. First, 
because consuming bottled water is an averting behaviour that poses significant 
negative environmental externalities and can be substituted by other more 
environmentally-friendly alternatives (e.g. filtering water), we investigate the role 
of environmental attitudes and behaviours in the decision to adopt averting 
behaviours that create negative environmental externalities. Moreover, we 
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distinguish between the two categories of pro-environmental actions identified in 
the literature according to the level of individual effort required: one-shot or 
efficiency behaviours –e.g. installing certain resource-saving devices- and 
curtailment behaviours –i.e. daily habits or sacrifices to save resources.  Second, 
given that bottled water and tap water could be either complementary or 
substitutes, we aim to explore the possible impact of several pricing and non-pricing 
policies applied in many urban centres around the world regarding bottled water 
consumption. In third place, we propose an empirical strategy for modelling 
averting behaviours that addresses the problems stemming from a large percentage 
of zero consumption records.  
For this purpose, we use a representative sample of 592 households from the 
towns of Baza and Guadix located in the southern Spanish province of Granada, 
from the year 2014. Spain is the ninth largest per capita consumer of bottled water 
in the world and the fourth among European countries. Moreover, as Baza and 
Guadix are in an area suffering from severe water stress (European Environmental 
Agency, 2012), numerous water conservation policies are being applied in the region, 
making it an interesting setting for this work. A double-hurdle approach is proposed 
to cope with the large percentage of zero consumption records. This allows us to 
model averting behaviours without departing from any particular hypothesis 
regarding the reasons why households do not adopt said behaviours –i.e. non-
participation vs. corner solutions- and to test the underlying distributional 
assumptions in order to choose among specifications. 
 Our results seem to suggest that commonly implemented pricing and non-
pricing policies for managing water demand, such as increases in tap water price 
and supply cuts could result in an increased demand for bottled water, thus leading 
to unintended consequences in terms of negative environmental impacts. We also 
find that fostering pro-environmental habits could prove very successful in limiting 
averting behaviours that create negative environmental externalities. Additionally, 
we find that failing to properly address problems stemming from the large 
percentage of zero consumption records when modelling averting behaviours could 
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Essay 4: Ownership and performance in water services revisited: Does private 
management really outperform public? 
 
The last essay in this dissertation aims to revisit the relationship between 
ownership and performance in water utilities. Although there has been intense 
debate ever since the 70s on which form of ownership of urban water services 
management - public or private - is more efficient, after more than three decades 
the literature still remains inconclusive. In this study, our aim is to shed some light 
on the ongoing debate by using a novel empirical strategy based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which combines two methodological approaches: 
directional distance functions and metafrontiers.  
Our contribution is twofold. On the one hand, using metafrontiers allows us to 
discern whether differences in performance between private and public decision-
making units are due to either different capabilities of the managers -managerial 
efficiency- or the different production technologies available to public and private 
utilities - ownership efficiency. This is an important distinction, as there are reasons 
to believe that public and private units face different technological restrictions - i.e. 
legal and institutional frameworks. On the other hand, the use of directional 
distance functions offers the advantage of enabling a performance evaluation at the 
level of the different inputs involved in the production process. Since technological 
restrictions may affect the performance of particular production factors differently, 
the combination of these two approaches has the potential to provide new insights 
in comparison to previous studies that have used either metafrontiers or directional 
distance functions separately. 
The analysis focuses on a sample of 70 Spanish municipalities of under 50,000 
inhabitants with data from the year 2013. In 37 of these municipalities, provision 
of urban water services is managed in-house – by the city council itself- or has been 
outsourced to a public company. In the remaining 33 cases, the service has been 
outsourced either to a private company or a public-private partnership (PPP). 
Performance is assessed through the concept of technical efficiency, with the 
production process characterized by two outputs and three inputs. The two outputs 
are water delivered and population served, while of the three inputs, one is fixed – 
the length of the delivery network - and two are variable - labour and operational 
costs. The analysis is input-oriented, that is, it evaluates the ability to reduce inputs 
while maintaining the same level of outputs.  
Our results are as follows: In the conventional scenario in which efficiency is 
assessed in a direction that reduces all variable inputs proportionally - radial 
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efficiency- no significant difference is found between public and private operators, 
in line with most studies in the field. However, our combined methodological 
approach offers a rather different picture. On the one hand, mainly because of a 
technological advantage, private operators are found to be superior in the 
management of labour input. Nevertheless, public management units are shown to 
be more efficient in the management of operational costs. These results can be 
explained by the fact that public managers face more restrictive labour regulations 
and higher levels of absenteeism (Meier and O'Toole 2011), as well as by other 
institutional and political factors specifically related to this type of ownership. 
Conversely, private operators may face greater difficulties in managing operational 
costs as they have usually been found to operate in more complex environments 
(González-Gómez et al., 2011). Furthermore, public utilities are able to share some 
of the operational costs with the rest of the services provided by the same public 
administration, especially under in-house public provision. 
In summary, our results suggest that our approach proves successful in 
uncovering some insights that were hidden to more conventional measures of 
performance. This has important policy implications, as it can provide a useful tool 
for a number of relevant stakeholders –from managers of utilities, to regulatory 
bodies and policymakers–, enabling them to make more informed decisions on which 
practices and regulations benefit the industry. Moreover, it contributes to the 
abovementioned debate on the relationship between ownership and efficiency in 
































































Como bien esencial y recurso escaso, el agua ha gozado habitualmente de 
especial atención por parte de numerosos sectores de la sociedad. Múltiples son las 
características que concurren en este hecho.  De un lado, el agua es un bien de 
mérito que contribuye simultáneamente a la consecución de objetivos económicos, 
medioambientales y sociales, y que, además, genera considerables externalidades. 
De otro, el agua satisface una necesidad humana básica, de forma que se debe 
garantizar el acceso universal a precios asequibles para la población. Asimismo, 
como bien económico que es, es necesario asegurar una distribución óptima de este 
recurso entre usos rivales: industria, agricultura, hogares y ecosistemas (OCDE, 
2003).  
La consecución de los múltiples objetivos a los que debe obedecer la gestión de 
este recurso demanda necesariamente la implementación de políticas públicas 
ambiciosas, que permitan alcanzarlos de forma simultánea. En su condición de 
ciencia social, la Economía no ha permanecido ajena a este fenómeno. 
Particularmente en el ámbito científico, el creciente interés en el estudio de los 
problemas relacionados con la gestión del agua ha motivado la aparición de diversas 
líneas de investigación en Economía. Estas líneas, que se enmarcan dentro de la 
Economía del Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales y, más específicamente, dentro 
de la Economía del Agua, pueden clasificarse en dos categorías principales 
dependiendo de los sectores a los que dirigen su atención. Estas son: Economía del 
agua agraria, y economía del agua urbana, incluyendo esta última tanto usos 
residenciales como industriales.  
En el caso del sector residencial, centro de interés en esta disertación, las 
tendencias que afectan a su evolución son de muy diversa índole y plantean 
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importantes retos a largo plazo. De un lado, las predicciones indican que la 
población mundial experimentará un crecimiento exponencial en las próximas 
décadas, pasando de los 6.000 millones de personas a principios de siglo XXI hasta 
los 9.000 millones hacia el año 2050 (UN Population Division, 2015). Satisfacer las 
crecientes necesidades de dicha población, tanto en términos de demanda de 
alimentos como de actividades industriales, generación de energía y demanda 
residencial, implicará un incremento sin precedentes en la utilización de recursos 
hídricos (World Bank Group, 2016). De forma paralela, se espera que el cambio 
climático reduzca la disponibilidad de agua dulce, convirtiendo su suministro en 
más impredecible y volátil (IPCC, 2014). Como consecuencia, a mediados del siglo 
XXI más de la mitad de la población residirá, previsiblemente, en regiones con 
estrés hídrico moderado o severo (Arnell, 1999, 2000; Schlosser et al., 2014). Así 
pues, la escasez de agua constituirá uno de los principales riesgos para la humanidad 
en el futuro (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
Las tendencias de desarrollo urbano pueden representar una presión adicional 
para la gestión urbana del agua (Biswas and Tortajada, 2009) dado que se espera 
que, en torno a 2050, aproximadamente dos tercios de la población resida en zonas 
urbanas. Además, la propensión a la formación de aglomeraciones urbanas de mayor 
tamaño implicará una creciente complejidad en la gestión de los servicios urbanos 
de agua (UN Population Division, 2014; Biswas and Tortajada, 2009). De hecho, 
desde 1990 el número de ciudades con más de 10 millones de habitantes - las 
denominadas “megaciudades” - casi se ha triplicado, y para el 2030 se prevé que 41 
centros urbanos superen dicho tamaño (UNESCO, 2016). Como consecuencia de las 
tendencias señaladas, cabe esperar que la gestión de servicio urbano de agua afronte 
grandes desafíos en los próximos años. Así pues, la gestión eficiente y sostenible de 
este servicio debe ser un objetivo prioritario para gobiernos e instituciones 
supranacionales. 
En términos generales, las soluciones de política pública destinadas a evitar o 
paliar los efectos de estas previsiones a nivel residencial pueden agruparse en 
políticas de demanda y políticas de oferta. Por el lado de la oferta, las intervenciones 
han pasado tradicionalmente por la construcción de nuevas infraestructuras, tales 
como embalses, desalinizadoras o plantas de reciclaje de aguas residuales, con el fin 
de incrementar la disponibilidad del recurso. Sin embargo, estas soluciones de oferta 
se han revelado habitualmente excesivamente costosas, tanto desde un punto de 
vista económico como ecológico. Además, se ha constatado que, en regiones áridas, 
éstas terminan derivando en una mayor dependencia de este recurso, dado que la 
demanda tiende a ajustarse a la mayor disponibilidad del mismo (World Bank 
Group, 2016). 
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En consecuencia, las políticas de demanda han adquirido en las últimas décadas 
una creciente popularidad. Entre las categorías incluidas en las opciones de política 
pública por el lado de la demanda se encuentran principalmente dos: políticas 
tarifarias, y el resto de políticas -denominadas genéricamente como no tarifarias. 
Por un lado, los incentivos tarifarios se dirigen principalmente a incrementar el 
precio del agua y, también, al diseño de esquemas de precios que promuevan un uso 
eficiente del recurso (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009). En particular, las estructuras 
de precios en forma de bloques crecientes, que permiten alcanzar simultáneamente 
los objetivos de eficiencia económica, sostenibilidad medioambiental y equidad 
social, son actualmente las más recomendadas (Olmstead et al. 2007; García-Rubio 
et al. 2015). Las políticas no tarifarias, por su parte, a menudo se concentran en 
intervenciones que persiguen modificar la conducta de los usuarios del servicio. 
Entre ellas cabe citar las campañas educativas, los descuentos en la adquisición de 
dispositivos ahorradores de agua o las interrupciones temporales del servicio. 
Una tercera vía de adaptación a las previsiones demográficas y 
medioambientales observadas, son las políticas destinadas a mejorar la provisión 
del servicio urbano de aguas. Ante las crecientes presiones derivadas del cambio 
climático y la concentración de la población en centros urbanos, la continuidad en 
el suministro de agua pasa necesariamente por una gestión más eficiente del servicio 
y una adecuada financiación de las redes e infraestructuras. A fin de conseguir este 
objetivo, resulta imperativa la implementación de políticas que propicien 
sustanciales mejoras en la gobernanza del servicio urbano de aguas.  
En este contexto, la presente tesis doctoral tiene por objeto abordar una serie 
de aspectos relacionados con la gestión de los recursos hídricos y la provisión del 
servicio a nivel residencial. En primer lugar, se analiza el efecto y adecuación de las 
políticas de demanda de agua anteriormente comentadas. En segundo lugar, se 
estudia la influencia de factores medioambientales, políticos y económicos en los 
procesos de fijación de precios y gobernanza en la provisión del servicio. Por último, 
se aborda la problemática relativa a la valoración y mejora de la eficiencia en la 
gestión del servicio urbano de agua.  
Con este propósito, la presente tesis se compone de cuatro capítulos que 
comparten un mismo contexto geográfico e institucional para fines empíricos: la 
prestación del servicio urbano de agua en España. No obstante, las conclusiones e 
implicaciones de política pública pretenden ser de interés general para una gran 
variedad de entornos y contextos institucionales. 
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Con uno de los índices de explotación hídrica2 más elevados de la Unión 
Europea (EEA, 2012), España se encuentra actualmente sometida a un estrés 
hídrico elevado o severo en la mayor parte de su territorio. Además, se espera que 
en el futuro se produzca una reducción sustancial en el volumen de precipitaciones 
(Jacob et al. 2014), con el consiguiente aumento en la prevalencia de sequías 
(OCDE, 2011). Sin embargo, contrariamente a lo que cabría esperar, en lo que a 
demanda de agua para uso residencial se refiere, España sigue siendo uno de los 
países europeos con mayor consumo per cápita (Suárez-Varela et al. 2015). A estas 
circunstancias ha de sumarse que el potencial para incrementar la disponibilidad de 
agua dulce mediante la construcción de nuevas infraestructuras hidráulicas se 
encuentra actualmente muy limitado (OCDE, 2011). Por tanto, las políticas de 
demanda han adquirido un papel destacado en los últimos años. Entre ellas, han 
sido en particular las políticas de precios las que han recibido especial atención. 
Esto se debe en gran medida a que la Directiva Marco del Agua de la Unión Europea 
(DMA), que entró en vigor en el año 2000, otorga una vital importancia a las 
políticas económicas y tarifarias como medio para alcanzar un reparto eficiente de 
los recursos hídricos. 
En lo que respecta a la gobernanza en la gestión urbana del agua, cabe destacar 
que el nivel de administración responsable de la provisión del servicio es el 
municipio, si bien se contemplan diversas fórmulas legales de gestión. En primer 
lugar, el municipio puede elegir gestionar el servicio dentro del propio 
ayuntamiento, o externalizarlo. En el segundo caso, el gobierno local puede optar 
por utilizar una empresa pública, una privada, o una empresa mixta o de 
colaboración público-privada (véase García-Valiñas et al. 2013 para una descripción 
más detallada del marco legal referente a la externalización). Hay que señalar que 
únicamente puede ser privatizada la gestión, puesto que la propiedad de los activos 
debe permanecer, en todo momento, en el dominio público. Además, en ausencia de 
un marco legal u organismo regulador que establezca ciertos criterios y directrices 
comunes en relación a las tarifas de agua urbana, los ayuntamientos son, en última 
instancia, los encargados de la toma de decisiones tanto por lo que se refiere a la 
fijación de precios, como por lo que respecta a los sistemas de control y 
monitorización del servicio para asegurar unas adecuadas condiciones de suministro 
(García-Valiñas et al. 2013). 
La elevada descentralización en la toma de decisiones ha derivado en la 
actualidad en una extraordinaria diversidad de sistemas tarifarios (González-Gómez 
et al., 2012), siendo los más comunes aquellos que distinguen en la tarifa un término 
fijo y un componente variable con estructuras de precio crecientes según bloques de 
																																								 																				
2 Ratio entre la abstracción anual de agua con respecto a los recursos renovables a largo plazo. 
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consumo (AEAS-AGA 2013; AEAS, 2013). Cabe asimismo señalar que, a pesar de 
los esfuerzos realizados por las Administraciones Públicas en los últimos años 
(European Environmental Agency, 2013), los precios en España continúan sin 
reflejar el coste total de provisión del servicio, los costes de uso y los costes 
medioambientales asociados al recurso (AEAS-AGA, 2013; García-Rubio et al., 
2015), como sería de esperar de la implementación de la DMA. Por otro lado, el 
hecho de que las redes de distribución se encuentran notablemente infrafinanciadas, 
envejecidas y en pobres condiciones de mantenimiento -con niveles de agua no 
contabilizada que superan el 25% (García-Rubio et al. 2015)- puede suponer una 
presión adicional para el aumento progresivo de los precios a lo largo del tiempo. 
Estos rasgos, así como el contexto institucional específico y el marco regulatorio 
español, que será recogido de forma más exhaustiva a lo largo de la presente tesis 
doctoral, lo convierten en un marco interesante para el estudio de las cuestiones 
abordadas en esta disertación. 
A continuación se presenta un breve resumen de los cuatro capítulos que componen 
esta tesis doctoral; se presta especial atención al objetivo y las contribuciones de 




Capítulo 1: Estimación de la demanda residencial de agua. Consideración de los 
patrones de sustitución y efectos no lineales en el ingreso. 
 
El primer capítulo de esta tesis doctoral tiene por objeto contribuir a la  
modelización de la demanda de agua residencial. Tal como se ha mencionado 
anteriormente en esta introducción, las políticas de demanda y, en especial, de 
precios, se han revelado esenciales a la hora de lidiar con los retos de futuro 
derivados de la creciente escasez hídrica. Dado que el análisis de sus efectos pasa 
necesariamente por una adecuada modelización, la obtención de estimaciones 
precisas de elasticidades y patrones de demanda ha recibido una amplia atención 
por parte de los economistas medioambientales.  
En la literatura de la demanda de agua residencial, la mayor parte de las 
estimaciones de elasticidad precio e ingreso se han venido apoyando en la utilización 
de modelos uniecuacionales, basados implícitamente en los supuestos de 
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separabilidad débil del consumo de agua – i.e., la demanda de agua no depende del 
precio de los bienes consumidos por el hogar – y en la existencia de efectos lineales 
con respecto al ingreso – i.e., un incremento en el ingreso ejerce el mismo efecto 
sobre el consumo de agua, independientemente de la parte de la distribución de 
ingreso en la que se sitúe el hogar.  
Dichos supuestos teóricos introducen ciertas limitaciones en la estimación de la  
demanda; sin embargo, su validez no se ha verificado con anterioridad. En este 
contexto, el objetivo de este ensayo es proponer un sistema de estimación de 
demanda más flexible, el Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) 
(Banks et al. 1997) que, entre otras particularidades, presenta dos ventajas 
principales frente a las especificaciones funcionales empleadas con anterioridad. En 
primer lugar, dado que la demanda se estima a través un sistema de ecuaciones, 
permite tener en cuenta posibles patrones de sustitución y complementariedad entre 
los bienes consumidos en el hogar, y estimar las elasticidades cruzadas. En segundo 
lugar, incorpora un término cuadrático en el logaritmo del gasto, lo que permite 
considerar la existencia de curvatura en las curvas de Engel de los bienes incluidos 
en el sistema. Asimismo, puesto que este modelo satisface los principios 
fundamentales de la demanda - i.e., aditividad e integrabilidad-, es de esperar que 
ofrezca estimaciones más precisas de los efectos de las políticas públicas relacionadas 
con precios e impuestos.  
En el análisis empírico de este trabajo, la información sobre gasto se obtiene de 
la Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPS) de España para el periodo 2006-
2012, un panel rotatorio de 151.000 hogares (entre 19.000 y 23.000 por año) que 
constituye una muestra representativa de la población española y contiene 
información de hasta 489 bienes. Por su parte, la información sobre la evolución de 
los precios, desglosados a nivel provincial y al mayor nivel de desagregación posible 
(en 44 subgrupos de bienes), se obtiene de las estadísticas de los Índices de Precios 
al Consumo (IPC), mientras que el precio medio del agua pagado por el hogar 
proviene de la muestra de hogares de las EPS referida anteriormente. Con fines de 
modelización, se supone un proceso de asignación presupuestaria en dos etapas: los 
hogares primero eligen cómo distribuir su gasto total entre bienes duraderos y no 
duraderos y, en una segunda etapa, reparten este último entre diversos tipos de 
bienes no duraderos compuestos – comida y bebida, agua, energía, resto de gastos 
del hogar y otros bienes. Las estimaciones se obtienen utilizando el Estimador 
Mínimo Cuadrático Iterado (EMCI) propuesto por Blundell y Robin (1999); la 
posible endogeneidad de las variables gasto total y precio del agua se aborda 
mediante técnicas de instrumentación no lineales propuestas por los mismos autores 
y el enfoque de regresión aumentada de Hausman (1978) y Holly y Sargan (1982). 
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Los resultados obtenidos apuntan a que el agua es un bien normal, una 
necesidad (con una elasticidad ingreso a largo plazo de -0.974) cuya demanda es 
relativamente inelástica al precio (con elasticidad precio a largo plazo 0.108). 
Además, se desvela la existencia de no linealidades en las curvas de Engel para la 
demanda residencial de agua, así como relaciones de sustitución y 
complementariedad con otros grupos de bienes no duraderos, si bien, el agua no 
parece tener buenos sustitutos. 
De este modo, las especificaciones funcionales que se han venido utilizando de 
forma habitual –i.e. lineal, logarítmica y doble logarítmica-, estarían imponiendo 
importantes rigideces en la estimación de la demanda de agua. Por tanto, cabe 
esperar que QUAIDS ofrezca estimaciones más consistentes con los patrones 
observados en la muestra. Para finalizar se ofrece una comparación de QUAIDS con 
las especificaciones funcionales más habituales mencionadas anteriormente. La 
evidencia empírica apunta a que las predicciones obtenidas con QUAIDS se 
asemejan más a los datos observados (mejor bondad del ajuste) y, además, recogen 
mejor la asimetría apreciada en la distribución de la demanda de agua, lo que supone 
una notable mejora frente a otras especificaciones.  
Por tanto, de nuestros resultados se concluye que la demanda de agua debería 
estimarse de forma conjunta con el resto de bienes consumidos en el hogar, 
utilizando modelos más compatibles con la teoría económica del comportamiento 
del consumidor. Asimismo, la utilización del modelo propuesto en este artículo junto 
con la información de las Encuestas de Presupuestos Familiares, disponibles 
actualmente en un gran número de países, permitiría obtener predicciones 
nacionales y regionales capaces de informar de forma más precisa las decisiones de 
política pública adoptadas respecto a la gestión de los recursos hídricos. 
 
 
Capítulo 2: Una propuesta para el análisis del escalado de precios en las tarifas 
de agua. El impacto de la Directiva Marco del Agua en España. 
 
Las tarifas en bloques crecientes, en las que el precio por m3 se incrementa con 
el nivel de consumo, son utilizadas en la gestión del servicio de agua urbana cada 
vez con mayor frecuencia. El objetivo de estas estructuras de precios es introducir 
un cierto nivel de escalado o progresividad en el precio del agua que permita la 
consecución simultánea de los objetivos de eficiencia, igualdad, sostenibilidad y 
asequibilidad en la gestión del agua urbana (Olmstead et al. 20017). Sin embargo, 
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a pesar de su extendido uso, hasta el momento no se ha desarrollado una métrica 
que permita evaluar el nivel de escalado introducido en una determinada estructura 
de precios. El objetivo de este trabajo es cubrir dicha laguna al proponer una 
métrica, que permita medir y comparar el grado de progresividad en las tarifas de 
agua a nivel de la unidad de gestión pertinente, el municipio en este caso. La medida 
propuesta debe ser capaz de evaluar el nivel de progresividad de la tarifa 
independientemente de la estructura de precios empleada - es decir, de la presencia 
de mínimos exentos, número y tamaño de los bloques, y la existencia y magnitud 
del componente fijo de la tarifa-, y permitir, además, una total comparabilidad entre 
las jurisdicciones. 
En particular, se proponen dos indicadores; uno tendría en cuenta la influencia 
del componente fijo de la tarifa, mientras que el otro incluiría únicamente la parte 
variable. Adicionalmente, con el fin de ilustrar la utilidad de la medida propuesta, 
se realiza un análisis de la evolución de las tarifas de agua en España tras la 
implementación de la DMA, así como de los factores políticos, medioambientales y 
empresariales que han marcado dicha evolución. Con este propósito, se utiliza una 
muestra de 952 municipios en España, para los años 2000 y 2014, es decir, antes y 
después de la implementación de la DMA.  
Tras la entrada en vigor de la DMA, los principales órganos asesores españoles 
recomendaron a los municipios la implementación de tarifas en forma de bloques 
crecientes como las anteriormente descritas. Asimismo, se incentivó que se 
incrementara el nivel de escalado o progresividad en las tarifas. Como consecuencia, 
sería de esperar que se hubiera producido un aumento en la progresividad de las 
tarifas aplicadas.  
De hecho, los resultados de este capítulo parecen sugerir que los gobiernos 
locales trataron de incrementar la progresividad de las tarifas a través de aumentos 
de precios más acusados en los niveles de consumo más elevados. Sin embargo, se 
encuentra que los principales aumentos tuvieron lugar en aquellos rangos de 
consumo que presentaban una menor proporción de consumidores, siendo, por 
tanto, de efecto limitado. No obstante, se observa que, contrariamente a lo que 
cabría esperar de la implementación de la DMA, se ha producido una caída en el 
nivel de progresividad introducido en la parte variable de la tarifa. Además, cuando 
se toma en consideración el efecto del componente fijo, se observa que las tarifas en 
España son, en media, regresivas en el consumo – el precio por metro cúbico es 
decreciente-, si bien es cierto que eran menos regresivas en 2014, tras la 
implantación de la DMA, que en el año 2000. Asimismo, los resultados obtenidos 
sugieren que algunos factores políticos e ideológicos, las características 
  Introducción                                                         
	47 
socioeconómicas del municipio, su actividad turística y la propiedad del gestor del 
servicio, afectan a la probabilidad de adoptar tarifas más progresivas. 
Finalmente, se confía en que las métricas propuestas en este ensayo pongan a 
disposición de los responsables de políticas públicas las herramientas necesarias para 
efectuar un sólido análisis que permita evaluación de los esfuerzos llevados a cabo 
por países y municipios en relación a la mejora de las políticas tarifarias. 
 
 
Capítulo 3: El papel de las actitudes medioambientales en los comportamientos 
defensivos que implican externalidades medioambientales negativas: Una 
aproximación de doble valla aplicada a la demanda de agua embotellada. 
 
La motivación del tercer capítulo surge del hecho de que ciertas políticas de 
gestión urbana de agua podrían estar afectando, en última instancia, a otras 
decisiones tomadas en el hogar. Por ejemplo, una insuficiente calidad del agua del 
grifo, así como otros factores relacionados con la gestión de los servicios urbanos de 
agua, podrían resultar en la adopción de ciertos comportamientos defensivos, tales 
como la instalación de sistemas de filtrado o el consumo habitual de agua 
embotellada.  
El consumo de agua embotellada es un comportamiento defensivo que implica 
significativas externalidades medioambientales, y que cuenta con sustitutos más 
respetuosos con el medio ambiente (e.g. dispositivos de filtrado). En este contexto, 
el presente ensayo tiene un triple objetivo. En primer lugar, se investiga el papel 
que juegan las actitudes y comportamientos medioambientales de los sujetos, en la 
decisión de llevar a cabo comportamientos defensivos que conlleven este tipo de 
externalidades. Para ello, además, consideramos las dos categorías de 
comportamientos pro-medioambientales diferenciados en la literatura de acuerdo 
con el nivel de esfuerzo que exigen por parte del individuo: comportamientos 
puntuales (efficiency behaviors)– i.e., instalar ciertos dispositivos ahorradores de 
agua- y comportamientos continuados (curtailment behaviors) – i.e., hábitos diarios 
que implican sacrificios con el objeto de ahorrar recursos. En segundo lugar, dado 
que el agua de botella y la del grifo podrían ser bienes complementarios o 
sustitutivos, se explora el posible impacto sobre la demanda de agua embotellada 
de ciertas políticas tarifarias y no tarifarias relacionadas con la gestión residencial 
del agua que actualmente están siendo aplicadas en numerosos centros urbanos en 
el mundo. En tercer y último lugar, la intención de este ensayo es proponer una 
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estrategia empírica para modelizar adecuadamente aquellos comportamientos 
defensivos que presenten problemas derivados de una elevada proporción de 
consumos nulos (respuestas cero). 
Con este propósito, se utilizan datos, para el año 2014, de una muestra 
representativa de 592 hogares de las ciudades de Baza y Guadix, localizadas en la 
provincia española de Granada. España es el noveno país del mundo en términos 
de consumo per cápita de agua embotellada y el cuarto entre los países europeos. 
Además, dado que el área en la que se encuentran Baza y Guadix sufre actualmente 
de estrés hídrico severo (European Environmental Agency, 2012), es habitual que 
se lleven a cabo múltiples políticas de conservación del recurso en la región, 
convirtiéndolo en un interesante contexto para este estudio. Con el objetivo de lidiar 
con el elevado porcentaje de registros nulos, se propone un enfoque metodológico 
de doble valla. Esto posibilita modelizar el comportamiento defensivo sin partir de 
ninguna hipótesis particular sobre las razones por las que los hogares no llevan a 
cabo dichos comportamientos – i.e, no-participación vs solución de esquina-. 
Asimismo, este enfoque permite examinar a través de tests estadísticos los supuestos 
distribucionales que subyacen a las mismas, con el objeto de elegir entre 
especificaciones. 
Los resultados obtenidos sugieren que ciertas políticas de demanda, tarifarias y 
no-tarifarias, tales como incrementos en el precio del agua corriente e interrupciones 
en el suministro, podrían derivar en un incremento en la demanda del agua 
embotellada y generarían, por tanto, consecuencias no deseadas sobre el medio 
ambiente. También se concluye que promover ciertos hábitos pro-medioambientales 
puede ser muy eficaz para evitar comportamientos defensivos que provoquen 
externalidades medioambientales negativas. Por último, el análisis sugiere que no 
abordar de forma adecuada los problemas derivados de la elevada ocurrencia de 
registros de consumo nulos en la modelización de comportamientos defensivos puede 
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Capítulo 4. Revisandola relación entre titularidad del gestor y el desempeño en 
la prestación del suministro de agua: ¿Realmente supera la gestión privada a la 
pública?. 
 
El último ensayo de esta tesis doctoral tiene por objeto revisar la relación entre 
la titularidad del gestor y el desempeño en la prestación del servicio. Desde los años 
70 del siglo pasado, se viene produciendo un intenso debate acerca de qué forma de 
titularidad del servicio (pública o privada) se muestra superior en términos de 
eficiencia. Sin embargo, la literatura no ha sido hasta el momento capaz de 
mostrarse conclusiva al respecto. En este trabajo se pretende arrojar algo de luz a 
este debate a través de la utilización de una nueva estrategia metodológica basada 
en un Análisis Envolvente de Datos (DEA), que combina dos aproximaciones 
empíricas: las funciones de distancia direccionales y las metafronteras. 
La contribución del trabajo es doble. En primer lugar, el uso de metafronteras 
permite discernir si las diferencias de rendimiento encontradas entre la gestión 
pública y la privada se deben a diferentes capacidades de sus directivos –eficiencia 
de gestión- o a la existencia de distintas tecnologías productivas afrontadas por las 
unidades públicas y privadas – eficiencia de propiedad. Esta distinción es 
importante en la medida en que existen razones para creer que la gestión pública y 
privada difieren respecto a las restricciones tecnológicas a las que se enfrentan – 
i.e., marco institucional y legal. En segundo lugar, el uso de funciones de distancia 
direccionales tiene la ventaja de permitir la evaluación del desempeño a nivel de los 
distintos factores productivos involucrados en el proceso de producción. Dado que 
las restricciones tecnológicas pueden afectar de forma diferencial a los distintos 
factores de producción, la combinación de estos dos enfoques muestra un mayor 
potencial a la hora de ofrecer nuevas perspectivas frente a estudios previos que han 
utilizado separadamente metafronteras o funciones distancia direccionales. 
El análisis empírico en este trabajo se basa en una muestra de empresas de 
agua que prestan el servicio en 70 municipios españoles de menos de 50.000 
habitantes en el año 2013. En 37 de estos municipios, la provisión del servicio 
urbano de agua la realiza el propio ayuntamiento o bien una empresa pública, 
mientras que en el resto de municipios este servicio ha sido externalizado a una 
empresa privada o de colaboración público-privada. El desempeño en la gestión se 
evalúa en términos de eficiencia técnica. El proceso productivo se caracteriza por la 
obtención de dos productos finales (outputs) – agua suministrada y población 
servida – a partir del uso de tres factores productivos (inputs); uno fijo – la longitud 
de la red de distribución - y dos variables – trabajo y costes operativos. El análisis 
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se orienta al input, es decir, analiza la capacidad de la empresa de reducir sus 
factores productivos manteniendo el mismo nivel de producción. 
Los resultados obtenidos son los siguientes. Cuando se considera el escenario 
convencional, utilizado en la mayoría de estudios previos, en que la eficiencia se 
evalúa en una dirección en la que se reducen de forma proporcional todos los inputs 
- eficiencia radial-, no se observan diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el 
desempeño de operadores públicos y privados. Sin embargo, al utilizar la 
aproximación metodológica propuesta en este trabajo, se obtiene una perspectiva 
sustancialmente distinta. Por una parte, los resultados sugieren que la tecnología 
de los operadores privados es más eficiente en la gestión del factor trabajo, mientras 
que la tecnología de las unidades públicas lo es en la gestión de los costes operativos. 
Estos resultados se explican por diversos factores. En primer lugar, por el hecho de 
que los gestores públicos afrontan habitualmente marcos laborales más restrictivos 
y mayores niveles de absentismo (Meier and O'Toole 2011), así como por otros 
factores políticos e institucionales específicamente relacionados con este tipo de 
gestión. Por su parte, en lo que respecta a los costes operativos, las unidades de 
gestión pública tienden a compartir dichos costes con el resto de servicios provistos 
por la misma administración pública, especialmente cuando el servicio lo gestiona 
el propio ayuntamiento. Además, los operadores privados suelen afrontar mayores 
dificultades en la gestión de los costes operativos como consecuencia de que 
habitualmente operan en ambientes de gestión más complejos (González-Gómez et 
al., 2011). 
En síntesis, los resultados obtenidos apuntan a que la estrategia empírica 
propuesta resulta satisfactoria a la hora de desvelar ciertos aspectos que 
permanecían ocultos a las medidas de desempeño utilizadas convencionalmente. 
Esto tiene importantes implicaciones para el diseño de políticas públicas, ya que 
propone una herramienta de gestión útil para un elevado número de grupos de 
interés – desde directivos hasta organismos reguladores -, capacitándolos para tomar 
decisiones más informadas acerca de qué prácticas pueden resultar favorables para 
la industria. Asimismo, este trabajo contribuye al debate, anteriormente 
mencionado, sobre la relación entre propiedad del gestor y eficiencia de los servicios 
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Essay 1:                   
Estimation of residental water 
demand. Accounting for 
susbstitution patterns and non- 




Most estimations of income and price elasticities for residential water are 
based on single-equation models that rely on assumptions of the separability 
of water from other goods and linear income effects on water consumption, 
whether linearities in Engel curves or income elasticities that are constant for 
every level of income. In this paper, we relax these assumptions by using a 
more flexible system of demand estimation, the Quadratic Almost Ideal 
Demand System (QUAIDS) (Banks et al., 1997) and reveal the existence in 
our sample of substitution and complementary patterns as well as non-
linearities in Engel curves for water consumption. Moreover, in this context 
the QUAIDS functional specification is expected to be more consistent with 
observed consumer behavior. Our results seem to confirm this expectation; 
when compared to the linear, log-linear and double-log models commonly used 
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in water demand estimation, QUAIDS seems to produce a better overall fit 
and a better fit to the asymmetric shape of the real distribution of water 
consumption. Therefore, in order to avoid bias in the estimates, and when the 
necessary information is available, water demand should be jointly estimated 
with the rest of the goods consumed in the household and higher order income 




Water scarcity is expected to pose a major challenge in the near future. In fact, 
it is predicted that by 2050 more than half of the global population will live in 
regions suffering from at least moderate water stress (Arnell, 1999, 2000; Schlosser 
et al., 2014). Furthermore, by that time, the population is predicted to have risen 
from the current 7.3 billion people to 9.7 billion (UN Population Division, 2015). 
This unprecedented exponential population growth, along with rising incomes and 
economic development, is forecast to increase global water needs for residential uses 
and food production. Likewise, demand for energy generation and industry is also 
projected to undergo substantial growth. Increases of between 50 and 70% are 
estimated for industrial uses and up to 85% for energy production (World Bank 
Group, 2016). Moreover, with a predicted 66% share of the world’s population 
residing in urban areas by 2050 (UN Population Division, 2014), urbanization 
trends represent an additional pressure on urban water management (Biswas and 
Tortajada, 2009). 
Water supply is expected to be affected as well. As a consequence of rising 
temperature levels and of increasingly extreme and variable rainfall, both droughts 
and floods are projected to become more common (IPCC, 2014). Furthermore, rising 
sea levels could result in the salinization of aquifers, leading to a decrease in 
available freshwater. Consequently, a supply diminished by climate change, 
becoming more volatile and increasingly difficult to predict, will further exacerbate 
water availability problems. In economic and social terms, the costs of water 
scarcity could reach 6% of GDP in some regions, as well as triggering large-scale 
migration flows and civil conflicts (World Bank Group, 2016; World Economic 
Forum, 2016). In this context, efficient and sustainable management of water 
resources emerges as a paramount issue. 
Traditionally, water shortage problems have been addressed by increasing 
supply. The most common solutions include building infrastructure such as dams 
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or canals, recycling wastewater or, more recently, desalination. On their own, 
however, supply interventions are not enough to solve the problem. Moreover, when 
such measures are implemented without adequate economic incentives for water 
conservation, they have often proved to induce new demand (World Bank Group, 
2016), resulting in faster resource depletion. With little margin on the supply side, 
demand-side policies are thus revealed as the most effective means to address water 
scarcity. Of these3, pricing has been found to be the most cost-effective tool for 
promoting water conservation (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009). 
In this sense, accurate estimates of demand patterns prove crucial to undertake 
precise diagnoses about the effectiveness and consequences of certain commonly 
used water pricing policies. Accordingly, the literature on estimating residential 
water demand is vast, and numerous theoretical specifications have been used, with 
the linear, log-linear and double log being the most common. However, despite the 
considerable attention that this subject has attracted, there has been little debate 
on which specification is best in terms of fit and performance (European 
Commission, 2015). 
Moreover, most estimations of income and price elasticities for residential water 
are based on single-equation models that rely on assumptions of weak separability 
of water consumption from other goods—i.e. assuming that household water 
consumption does not depend on the price of other goods— (European Commission, 
2015) and the existence of linear income effects on water consumption. The usual 
underlying argument for imposing separability is that it is feasible given that there 
are no good substitutes for indoor water and both household habits and the stock 
of durables related to water consumption are unlikely to change in the short term 
(Arbués et al., 2003). However, those arguments have never been tested against 
empirical evidence, probably because there have been relatively few databases to 
date that contain information on water consumption and consumption of other 
goods at the household level. Furthermore, the abovementioned arguments do not 
take into account several features of residential water demand. Besides indoor 
consumption, domestic water also includes some outdoor uses. In addition, although 
normally treated as a homogenous good, water is in fact a composite commodity 
that satisfies different needs. In this vein, while water for drinking, cooking or 
personal hygiene can be considered a basic need, water for filling swimming pools 
or watering gardens could be regarded as a type of luxury good. Other uses, such 
as those related to laundry and car washing would fall into an intermediate 
																																								 																				
3 Demand-side policies include both pricing policies and non-pricing policies (such as rationing, 




category. Thus, whereas there may be no substitutes for some water uses (mainly 
the basic and some intermediate uses), consumption surpassing a certain threshold 
is more easily substitutable. Moreover, residential water may be a substitute for 
other commodities and activities. In addition, water could be complementary to the 
consumption of other goods, even at the basic consumption levels. In summary, 
beyond the basic threshold required to satisfy basic needs, water demand may 
reflect a reaction to changes in the prices of other goods and, conversely, 
consumption for other goods may vary in accordance with the price of water. With 
respect to the treatment of income, as is explained more thoroughly in next section, 
patterns displayed in the most typically used models are also rather simple and 
most often not compatible with basic assumptions of consumer theory (e.g. the 
adding-up restriction). 
In this paper, we use a less restrictive system of demand estimation, the 
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) (Banks et al., 1997). As 
opposed to most common models, QUAIDS displays several advantages. First, 
QUAIDS does not impose separability, thus incorporating all the information on 
income and substitution effects (stemming from variations in relative prices) 
contained in cross-price elasticities. Moreover, it accounts for the curvature of Engel 
curves4 by including quadratic terms in the logarithm of expenditure. This has 
important implications in the sense that income effects are now allowed to vary 
across the income distribution. Therefore, this paper’s use of QUAIDS allows us to 
make several contributions. On the one hand, we can test empirically whether, as 
usually assumed, water consumption is independent of relative changes in the prices 
of other goods consumed within the household. On the other hand, we can also test 
for non-linear income effects. Moreover, it displays two main advantages that can 
contribute to enhance the effectiveness of water demand policies. First, it satisfies 
the fundamental principles of consumer theory, so it is expected offer improved 
estimates of demand. Moreover, since it satisfies integrability5, it allows to ascertain 
accurately the welfare effects of policies affecting prices and taxes in terms of issues 
such as economic efficiency, effectiveness (whether it would actually reduce 
consumption) and social and equity concerns (i.e. water poverty).  
For this purpose, we use data from the Spanish Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(EPF or “Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares” in Spanish), a rotating panel of 
151,068 observations (between 19,000 and 23,000 households per year) 
																																								 																				
4 In microeconomics, the Engel curve (Engel, 1895) describes the relationship between 
commodity expenditure and income. 
 
5 The capacity of retrieving the cost function from the estimated demand system. 
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representative of the Spanish population for the period 2006-2012. Given that this 
dataset includes household expenditures for up to 489 goods, the interaction of water 
demand with all other goods can be explored. 
In Spain, the average annual per capita water consumption in the period under 
study is 43.2m3, representing an average of 118 liters per person per day6. According 
to WHO/UNICEF (2008), the basic or "lifeline" level of domestic water use, 
covering drinking and strictly subsistence level sanitation and personal hygiene, 
stands at between 15 and 25 liters per person per day. Other authors such as Gleick 
(1996) recommend a minimum amount of 50 liters to adequately cover requirements 
relating to drinking, hygiene, sanitation and food preparation. Compared to that 
basic level, Spanish average consumption is more than double the recommended 
amount, suggesting that it may be satisfying other higher-level uses more 
susceptible to relative changes in price. 
Our results suggest that, as indicated by some authors (Arbués et al., 2003), 
water has no good substitutes among non-durable commodities; however, it does 
seem to be a substitute for and a complement to other goods consumed within the 
household. Moreover, evidence suggests that Engel curves for water are not linear. 
In this context, it would seem that previously used models and specifications impose 
implausible restrictions on water demand. Conversely, QUAIDS is expected to be 
more consistent with consumer theory, thus offering a richer picture of consumers’ 
expenditure behavior. As a final step, we estimate the linear, log-linear and double-
log models with our data and compare the results to those of the QUAIDS 
specification. The fact that, as shown at the end of the paper, QUAIDS displays 
better overall fit and a significantly better fit to the shape and asymmetry of the 
real distribution for water consumption, seems to confirm our supposition that this 
system can better approximate the consumption patterns observed in the data. 
Thus, our results appear to indicate that, in order to avoid bias in the estimates, 
and when the necessary information is available, water demand should be estimated 
in relation to the demand for the other goods consumed in the household, and non-
linear behavior with respect to income should also be accounted for. With the 
increasing availability of country-representative household budget surveys in many 
countries of the world, as well as detailed microdatasets on household expenditures, 
the model proposed in this paper could be used to further exploit those datasets, as 
																																								 																				
6 This amount is obtained from our own database, which is a representative sample of the 
Spanish population. However, the figure is not very different from the consumption estimated 
by other organizations that produce statistics on water consumption in Spain. The most widely 
cited, the annual Spanish Association of Water Supply and Sanitation survey, reported an 
average of 126 liters per person per day in 2012 (AEAS-AGA, 2012). 
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well as to obtain country and regional prospects necessary to inform long-run policy 
decisions aimed at addressing water scarcity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2. reviews the 
literature on residential water demand, while section 1.3. outlines the model and 
data used in the paper. Finally, section 1.4. presents and discusses the main results 
and conclusions are drawn in section 1.5. 
 
1.2. Modeling residential water demand 
 
Analysis of water demand has long been a focus of study. An accurate 
measurement of water consumption patterns is essential in order to assess the 
effects of certain public policies aimed at controlling demand. Consequently, there 
is an extensive body of literature on this subject, which discusses a significant 
number of issues and approaches. In fact, numerous attempts have been made to 
synthesize the information, including some reviews (see Arbués et al., 2003; Nauges 
and Whittington, 2010 and Worthington and Hoffman, 2008) and a few meta-
analyses (Dalhuisen et al., 2003; Sebri, 2016; Espey et al., 1997). Some of the issues 
addressed in the literature that we cover here range from demand and price 
specification to simultaneous determination of prices and quantities, particularly in 
the case of block tariffs. 
Concerning functional specifications, although some more complex functions 
such as Stone-Geary (Al-Quanibet and Johnston, 1985; Gaudin et al., 2001; 
Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges, 2004; Madhoo, 2009; Dharmaratna and Harris, 
2010) have been applied, the bulk of studies on water demand estimation rely on 
single-equation models that assume linear, log-linear or double logarithmic forms 
(Arbués et al., 2003; European Commission, 2015). The drawback of these 
functional specifications is that they impose implausible restrictions on water 
demand. On the one hand, linear models are often criticized on the grounds that 
marginal effects (that is, the change in quantity demanded as a consequence of a 
unit change in price) are assumed to be constant, indirectly yielding price 
elasticities that are smaller for lower price levels (Arbués et al., 2003). Moreover, 
the fact that water is an essential good needed for survival seems to be at odds 
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with a negative linear relationship between quantity and price (Al-Quanibet and 
Johnston, 1985) 7. 
Another common specification, the double log model, also presents some 
shortcomings. Although the simplicity of interpreting the estimated coefficients 
directly as elasticities have made it the most widely-used model in water demand 
estimation (European Commission, 2015), price elasticities are assumed to be 
constant at every price level. Moreover, the fact that it violates the adding-up 
restriction8 deriving from the existence of a budget constraint makes it inconsistent 
with consumer theory, leading to important distortions in the prediction of demand 
patterns (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b). Likewise, regardless of the functional 
form, the use of a single equation in most studies relies on the non-empirically tested 
assumption that water demand is weakly separable. This implies ignoring the 
existence of income and substitution effects deriving from changes in relative prices 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b), which also generates bias in consumption pattern 
estimates. On the other hand, the few existing studies that use the more complex 
Stone-Geary function (Al-Quanibet and Johnston, 1985; Gaudin et al., 2001; 
Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges, 2004; Madhoo, 2009; Dharmaratna and Harris, 
2010) offer the advantage that elasticities are allowed to vary across price (non-
constant price elasticities) and to some extent across quantities9. However, this 
function still imposes some severe restrictions such as strong separability and 
positive budget elasticity10 (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b; Stone, 1954). 
With respect to income, the typical linear and double log models display rather 
simple income patterns, imposing constant marginal effects of income on water 
consumption or constant income elasticities, respectively, and, as mentioned above, 
violating the adding-up restriction. Even the more sophisticated functional forms 
such as the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a), which 
has proved more consistent with utility theory (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a 
and Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b and for more details), still assume that the 
																																								 																				
7 Note that under this shape, demand will eventually intersect the price axis leading to a point 
at which there is no demand at all for water. 
8 Under the adding-up condition, consumers have an exogenous budget to be allocated among 
the different goods that they purchase, such that the total sum of the amounts spent on each 
of the goods does not exceed the total budget at their disposal. 
9 By modeling a minimum amount that is assumed to be insensitive to prices (Stone, 1954; 
Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges, 2004). 
 
10 This last assumption should not be very problematic, as residential water demand is usually 




shares of total expenditure devoted to different goods (also known as budget shares) 
are linear in the log of total expenditure. As shown by empirical studies (see for 
example, Atkinson et al., 1990; Blundell et al., 1993; Hausman et al., 1995; 
Hildenbrand, 1994; Lewbel, 1991), those income patterns do not fully capture 
consumer behavior as they do not account for the existence of non-linearities in the 
Engel curves for some goods. Higher income terms are thus required to offer an 
adequate picture of consumption patterns (Banks et al., 1997). 
As opposed to these models, the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
(QUAIDS) we use in this paper offers several advantages. First, it does not impose 
separability, thus allowing for the possible impact of changes in relative prices. 
Moreover, a quadratic term in the logarithm of expenditure is included to test for 
the likely curvature of Engel curves. This implies that income is now allowed to 
vary across income groups, making it more consistent with empirically observed 
consumption patterns (Banks et al., 1997) 11. In addition, QUAIDS uses total 
expenditure instead of income itself. For a number of practical as well as theoretical 
reasons, economists generally prefer information on total expenditure (when 
available) rather than income (see Deaton and Zaidi, 2002 p.11-13 for further 
clarification on this issue). Finally, although not directly relevant to this study, 
QUAIDS satisfies integrability conditions, which enables the analysis of the welfare 
effects of certain public policies related to price and taxes. As a consequence of all 
these properties, QUAIDS exhibits much sounder theoretical foundations and 
provides a more realistic picture of consumer behavior as compared to previously 
used models. 
Price specification and endogeneity are also among the main concerns in the 
residential water demand literature. There is a general trend in water management 
to introduce non-linear tariffs in the form of Increasing Block Rates (IBRs 
henceforth) (Olmstead et al., 2007), which involve marginal price increases in blocks 
corresponding to different ranges of consumption. Particularly in Spain, where the 
data for our empirical implementation comes from, the use of IBRs has become 
increasingly widespread in the last decade (AEAS-AGA, 2013). The modeling of 
water demand specifications under this type of tariff has generated a great deal of 
debate in the literature. In the presence of perfect information and facing the non-
linear budget constraint arising from a block pricing structure, standard economic 
theory predicts that consumers will optimize their consumption in accordance with 
																																								 																				
11 Contrary to the abovementioned models that assume linearities in Engel curves or income 
elasticities that are constant for every level of income. 
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the actual marginal price structure of the tariff they have to pay12. Under this 
assumption, common practice in early studies involved the use of marginal price as 
the price variable to which the consumer should be responding. Taylor (1975) was 
the first to suggest that a sole marginal price may not be enough to capture demand 
decisions made by consumers, proposing instead that both average and marginal 
prices should be accounted for simultaneously (Taylor, 1975). A year later, building 
on Taylor’s work, Nordin (1976) proposed that if the changes in consumer surplus 
as a result of block pricing were to be accounted for, it was more appropriate to 
include marginal price along with a difference variable to control for the income 
effect of consumers moving from one block to another. 
However, although these specifications have been widely used, empirical 
evidence shows that most information on tariff structure is far from perfect 
(Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989; Nataraj and Hanneman, 2011; Pérez-Urdiales et 
al., 2015), and even if it were, consumers find it difficult to understand complex 
pricing and non-linear structures (Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989; De Bartolome, 
1995). The existence of unexpected shocks to both income (Saez 1999, 2010) and 
demand (Borenstein, 2009) that are beyond the consumer’s control, reinforces the 
difficulty in assuming perfect optimizing behavior. In this context, it seems more 
logical to assume that consumers will respond to the price they perceive. Indeed, 
some theoretical models have attempted to accommodate deviation from standard 
economic theory. For instance, Saez (1999, 2010) and (Borenstein, 2009) predicted 
that when random shocks to income and demand, respectively, are allowed, 
consumers are predicted to respond not to the actual marginal price, but rather to 
the expected marginal price (Saez, 1999; Borenstein, 2009) or even less precise 
information about marginal price (Borenstein, 2009). Alternatively, Liebman and 
Zeckhauser (2004) relax the assumption of consumers’ perfect understanding of the 
nature of multiple block tariffs, finding that if consumers cannot be assumed to be 
perfect optimizers, the perceived price corresponds to the average price at their 
consumption level. 
Ultimately, the shape of the perceived price will diverge according to the 
assumptions made about consumer behavior. In recent years, discussion has mostly 
focused on whether to use the average or marginal price as the price variable. 
Empirical literature is also inconclusive as to which price specification should be 
																																								 																				
12 Consumer behavior under structures of this type is of interest not only in the water demand 
literature; non-linear schedules are also very common in taxes and other markets such as 
electricity, natural gas and mobile phones. Therefore, some of the studies cited here may be 




used under non-linear structures. While numerous empirical (Shin, 1985; Liebman 
and Zeckhauser, 2004), pseudo-experimental (Ito, 2014; Wichman, 2014) and 
experimental studies (De Bartolome, 1995) provide evidence that consumers 
respond to the average price, others support marginal price as the consumer 
response variable (Nataraj and Hanneman, 2011; Baerenklau et al., 2014). 
Finally, non-linear pricing is also at the core of another key empirical debate 
in water demand estimation. In block pricing, simultaneity bias may arise from the 
fact that quantities are affected by prices, which in turn are dependent on the 
quantity consumed. The most common ways of addressing this issue involve using 
either the Discrete Continuous Choice (DCC) Model proposed by Hewitt and 
Hanemann (1995) or econometric techniques such as instrumental variables (IV), 
two-step least squares (2SLS) or three-step least squares (3SLS), and the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Olmstead, 2009). More recently, some 
authors have also used quasi-experimental designs as a means to address 
endogeneity. 
Estimates of price elasticity have almost unanimously proved residential water 
consumption to be price inelastic, with the most usual range being from 0 to 0.5 in 
the case of short-run elasticities and from -0.5 to -1 for their long-run counterparts 
(Worthington and Hoffman, 2008). This is because, in the long run, durable water-
saving equipment can be adjusted following a change in water prices, making 
demand more price responsive. Moreover, the price elasticities obtained are 
supposedly independent of the functional specification (i.e. linear, log-linear, etc.) 
or the estimation technique (Worthington and Hoffman, 2008), although some 
models such as the DCC have been found to yield higher elasticities (Sebri, 2016; 
Dalhuisen et al., 2003). With respect to income, reported elasticities are usually 
positive and lower (in absolute terms) than price elasticities (Worthington and 
Hoffman, 2008). 
 




The model we estimate is a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (see Banks 
et al. (1997) for a comprehensive description), an extension of the Almost Ideal 
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Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b) , which incorporates a quadratic 
term in the log of total expenditure to account for non-linearities in Engel curves. 
As is standard practice in demand systems estimation (see Blundell, 1988), we 
assume consumers follow a two-step budgeting procedure in which households first 
decide the budget they allocate to leisure, savings and durable and non-durable 
goods, and then total expenditure on non-durables is divided among several groups 
of non-durable commodities13. 
To derive the QUAIDS for the N non-durable goods consumed by the 
household, we first define the indirect utility function of a household h as follows: 
	






where m is total expenditure in goods i, j= 1, ..., N; ln a(p) and b(p) are 
price indexes from the AIDS model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a). 
ln 𝑎 𝑝 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼. ln 𝑝. +
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13 Durable commodities are excluded from the analysis for several reasons. Although 
expenditures on durable goods are recorded in a given period, the goods themselves are in fact 
consumed over a longer period of time, which has important implications. As consumption 
does not coincide with recorded expenses, it cannot be proxied by current expenditure. 
Moreover, by their nature, durable commodities exhibit a substantial proportion of zero 
expenditures, which has severe implications for estimation. Concerning water demand 
estimation, water might be expected to have some substitutes and complements among 
durable commodities. For instance, faced with an increase in the price of residential water, 
households may decide to adapt their durable equipment in the long-run by adopting some 
water-saving technologies such as low-flow taps or dual-flush toilets. Also, water demand can 
depend on whether the household has certain complementary goods such as washing machines. 
Unfortunately, our database does not contain information on expenditures on durable 
commodities related to water consumption. Therefore, including non-durable commodities in 
the analysis would give rise to the abovementioned complications without significantly 




and l (p) is an homogeneous function of degree zero in prices p. 
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Applying Roy’s identity, budget shares can be written as: 
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where m is total expenditure on all goods in the demand system and 𝑤. is the 
budget share for good i . lna(p), b(p) and l (p) have already been described above. 
 
Economic theory also imposes some restrictions on the parameters of the model. 
Adding-up requires 𝛼. = 1, 𝛽. = 0, 𝛾./ = 0 and 𝜆. = 0. Homogeneity is 
satisfied when 𝛾./ = 0  and symmetry is given by 𝛾./ = 𝛾/. Moreover, the 
diagonal elements of the Slutsky or substitution matrix must be nonpositive 
(Negativity). 
The price and budget elasticities of interest to this study are obtained by 
differentiating equation (6) with respect to ln m and ln pj respectively. 
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where 𝛿./ is the Kroneker delta (equal to 1 when i=j and 0 otherwise) and 
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Finally, demographic variables are introduced into the model using the 
translating method (Pollak and Wales, 1978, 1981). With this technique, the 
intercept is allowed to depend on certain household characteristics that are expected 
to affect household preferences, by expressing ai parameters as linear functions of 




The data we use in this paper comes from the Spanish Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (EPF or “Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares” in Spanish), an annual 
rotating panel comprising a representative sample of the Spanish population. This 
survey presents a comprehensive record of household expenditures on up to 489 
different goods reported on an annual basis. Furthermore, it contains information 
on a number of other socioeconomic and household characteristics, as well as some 
Chapter 1	
	 70 
information regarding the location14 of the household and quantities purchased in 
physical units for some of the goods (e.g. water). More detailed information about 
the variables included and sampling procedure can be found in INE (2012). 
The data are pooled for the period 2006-2012, providing a sample of 151,068 
observations (between 19,000 and 23,000 households per year). Moreover, the fact 
that, unlike in other countries, the Consumer Expenditure Survey is conducted 
every year in Spain, prevents problems relating to insufficient micro data and price 
variation from hindering the identification of demand patterns and elasticities 
(Pashardes et al., 2014; Nichele and Robin, 1995). As is standard practice in 
household demand system estimation (see for instance Tiezzi (2005) or Labandeira 
et al. (2006) for the case of energy demand estimation15), non-durable goods are 
aggregated in broad categories: 1) food, beverage and tobacco (for simplicity, 
hereafter referred to as ‘food’), 2) water supply16 3) energy17; 4) household expenses 
other than water and energy18 and 5) all other commodities. In our model, both 
energy and other household expenses are separated from food and all other expenses 
because they are believed to be more closely linked to water demand. In fact, a 
number of previous papers have explored the link between energy prices and water 
consumption (Escrivá-Bou et al. 2015; Hansen, 1996). Moreover, Section 1.5. shows 
that this particular aggregation choice does not affect the elasticity estimates and 
results are robust to different aggregations of goods. Although it would be desirable 
to study some other goods, such as bottled water, as a distinct category, the 
available price information is unfortunately not sufficiently disaggregated. 
As for the demographic variables influencing demand, we control for numerous 
household characteristics that have been found to affect consumer behavior, 
particularly in terms of demand for water. Those include demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics such as the size of the household (nmembers), number 
																																								 																				
14 Unfortunately, given that the municipality code is hidden in order to guarantee the anonymity 
of the households, this information is not as precise as one would like in order to determine the 
marginal price for water paid by the household. 
15 In water demand estimation, to our knowledge only Hajispyrou et al. (2002) have used the 
QUAIDS functional form, but they do not estimate demand as a system, so it cannot be cited 
as reference here. 
16 It should be noted that, opposite to other surveys, in Spanish Consumer Expenditure Surveys 
expenditures on water supply are separated from expenditures on water sanitation or wastewater 
services, which allows us to calculate the average price for this service without the usual 
measurement error derived from the joint consideration of both services.  
17 This category includes electricity, natural gas, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), solid fuels, 
heating and central hot water consumed within the household. 
18 Some of the items included in this category are house and garage rent, house maintenance or 
waste and wastewater services. 
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of children aged between 0 and 4 years old (nchildren1) and between 5 and 15 
(nchildren2), age of the household head (age) and dummies for the household head’s 
level of studies—basic or no education at all (BasicEduc); lower secondary 
education (SecondEduc1); upper secondary education (SecondEduc2); or higher 
education (HigherEduc). 
Some characteristics of the household residence that may influence demand for 
the differ-ent composites are also incorporated into the model, such as the number 
of rooms (nrooms) and size of the dwelling in square meters (superf), whether the 
household has hot water (hotwater)19, type of tenancy or ownership-owned house 
with financial obligations (Tenreg1), owned without financial obligations (Tenreg2), 
rented (Tenreg3), rented with some allowance (Tenreg4), cession for low payment 
(Tenreg5) and cession free of payment (Tenreg6)-, type of building-detached house 
(buildingtype1), semi-detached house (buildingtype2), apartment in a building with 
fewer than 10 households (buildingtype3), apartment in a building with 10 or more 
households (buildingtype4), other types of dwellings (buildingtype5)-, location of the 
household -rural (rural), village (village) or urban (urban)20 - and a dummy 
indicating whether the residence is under 25 years old (Hhold.lessthan25). Finally, 
as in other studies (see for example Labandeira et al., 2006), we include interactions 
between both level of studies and household location and the variable total 
expenditure, as well as with year dummies, in order to control for any trends that 
may affect the demand for the different expenditure groups. 
To estimate our model, we consider only the expenses incurred in the primary 
residence21. In order to avoid measurement errors and outliers we exclude 
observations with zero expenditures on food and beverage and on water, as well as 
those households reporting no water consumption in unit terms (zero cubic meters). 
Moreover, we eliminate the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of water 
consumed in cubic meters, unit prices and expenditures in the four groups 
considered. 
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics before and after data cleaning. We 
can observe that averages have not changed substantially, however, the data 
																																								 																				
19 This may have a particular effect on the relationship between price for energy and water 
demand that we explore in our model. 
 
20 We use common thresholds to distinguish between rural (fewer than 10, 000 inhabitants), 
village (between 10,000 and 50,000) and cities (more than 50,000). 
 
21 As noted by Labandeira et al. (2006), including homes other than the primary residence 
may lead to distortions stemming from contract overheads. 
Chapter 1	
	 72 
cleaning process seems to have succeeded in eliminating extreme implausible values 
(see Table 1) and zero expenditures. Such values can arise from several sources, 
including non-participation, corner solutions, infrequency of purchase or 
misreporting. Given that expenditures on durables, which are purchased less 
frequently, are excluded from the analysis and all the figures are expressed on an 
annual basis, zero expenditure in our sample is more likely to be related to 
misreporting than to other sources22. In any case, Table 2 shows that the percentage 
of households exhibiting zero expenditure in each group of commodities is extremely 
low, so excluding them should not lead to bias in the estimates. 
As depicted in Table 1, average household consumption in Spain is 122m3 per 
year for the period under study, with an average price of 1.205 per m3 23. As is 
usually the case in developed countries, the water bill represents only a small fraction 
of family expenditure, amounting to around 0.6% of the total24. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of residential water consumption in Spain for the period 2006-2012. As 
we can observe, water demand in our sample is left skewed, a shape that has also 
been reported in other studies (see for instance Pérez-Urdiales et al. (2015)). 
 
	
Figure 1: Distribution of annual water consumption in Spain 2006-2012. 
																																								 																				
22 Recall that water, energy and food are basic needs, and household expenses and other expenses 
are rather broad categories. Therefore, non-participation, corner solutions and infrequency of 
purchase can be reasonably ruled out. 
 
23 Total water supply bill divided by the number of cubic meters consumed by the household. 
 
24 This is in line with other studies like Olmstead et al. (2007) which reports a budget share of 
0.5%. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics before and after the data cleaning process. 
	
  Before   After   
  N=151,068   N=133,729   
VARIABLES Mean SD Min Max 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
 
  
Household income 23,912 15,807 0 386,364  23,667 14,690 0 304,488  
Total expenditure (non-
durables) 27,026 15,649 248.2 406,300  26,293 13,075 4,299 86,230  
Total expenditure on food 5,252 3,452 0 253,578  5,149 2,823 386.9 15,645  
Total expenditure on water 142.0 122.8 0 4,623  139.3 91.05 0.141 577.5  
Total expenditure on energy 1,057 792.5 0 36,836  1,022 645.0 12.12 3,815  
Total exp. rest of goods 12,357 10,888 0 377,223  5,149 2,823 386.9 15,645  
Total exp.other household 
exp. 8,218 5,333 0 118,965  11,904 9,152 0 63,026  
Water demand in m3 124.5 150.1 0 33,996  122.0 77.86 0.100 530  
Average price for water 1.168 0.639 0 62.62  1.205 0.433 0.0650 2.466  
Nmembers 2.826 1.279 1 18  2.824 1.243 1 18  
Nchildren1 0.487 0.810 0 11  0.491 0.805 0 10  
Nchildren2 0.519 0.845 0 12  0.521 0.837 0 10  
Age 53.61 15.26 16 85  53.48 15.17 16 85  
Nrooms 5.175 1.237 0 8  5.154 1.197 1 8  
Rural 0.251 0.434 0 1  0.239 0.426 0 1  
Village 0.259 0.438 0 1  0.260 0.439 0 1  
Cities 0.490 0.500 0 1  0.501 0.500 0 1  
Basic Educ 0.276 0.447 0 1  0.270 0.444 0 1  
SecondEduc1 0.305 0.460 0 1  0.309 0.462 0 1  
SecondEduc2 0.161 0.368 0 1  0.164 0.370 0 1  
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HigherEduc 0.258 0.437 0 1  0.257 0.437 0 1  
Tenreg1 0.527 0.499 0 1  0.530 0.499 0 1  
Tenreg2 0.309 0.462 0 1  0.322 0.467 0 1  
Tenreg3 0.0997 0.300 0 1  0.0944 0.292 0 1  
Tenreg4 0.0124 0.110 0 1  0.0104 0.101 0 1  
Tenreg5 0.0255 0.158 0 1  0.0253 0.157 0 1  
Tenreg6 0.0258 0.159 0 1  0.0178 0.132 0 1  
Buildingtype1 0.117 0.321 0 1  0.0942 0.292 0 1  
Buildingtype2 0.248 0.432 0 1  0.248 0.432 0 1  
Buildingtype3 0.182 0.386 0 1  0.185 0.388 0 1  
Buildingtype4 0.451 0.498 0 1  0.472 0.499 0 1  
Buildingtype5 0.00196 0.0442 0 1  0.00126 0.0354 0 1  
Hhold.lessthan25 0.365 0.481 0 1  0.367 0.482 0 1  
Hotwater1 0.996 0.0648 0 1  0.997 0.0514 0 1  
BasicEduc*expenditure 5,513 10,943 0 327,071  5,375 10,366 0 82,215  
SecondEduc1*expenditure 7,791 13,871 0 406,300  7,746 13,218 0 84,955  
SecondEduc2*expenditure 4,724 12,313 0 238,674  4,665 11,698 0 85,134  
HigherEduc*expenditure 8,998 17,810 0 307,261  8,507 16,131 0 86,230  
Rural*expenditure 6,242 13,163 0 406,300  5,783 12,010 0 82,950  
Village*expenditure 6,946 13,994 0 214,682  6,793 13,162 0 84,407  
Cities*expenditure 13,838 18,097 0 327,071  13,716 16,646 0 86,230  
Budget share for water 0.00640 0.00618 0 0.169  0.00634 0.00508 6.96e06 0.08076  
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Table 2: Number and percentage of zeros in the dependent variables. 
	
Variables Zeros Percentage 
Food 455 0.3% 
Water 5791 3.8% 
Energy 1314 0.87% 
Other household expenses 196 0.1% 
Other non-durable commodities 10 0.001% 
 
Figure 225 shows the relationship between expenditure shares and the natural 
log of expenditure for the composite commodities included in the analysis. As often 
reported in the literature (Arbués et al., 2003), the expenditure share devoted to 
water decreases with income. A preliminary assessment of the shape of the Engel 
curve for residential water demand (see Figure 2) also reveals some curvature. 
However, divergence from non-linear behavior is not entirely evident, so further 
examination is needed to determine whether higher income terms are necessary to 
fully capture the shape of the Engel curve for this particular good. As for the rest 
of the composites, budget shares for food and beverage, energy and all other goods 
exhibit clear non-linear behavior with respect to total expenditure. With respect to 
other household expenditures, this behavior is less apparent at first glance. It seems 
that for lower levels of income, as households become richer, they can afford more 
(or better quality) food, beverage, tobacco and energy. After a certain income 
threshold at which needs related to these goods are satisfied, a smaller share is 
spent on those goods and an increased share on other household expenditures, (e.g. 
renting a bigger or better located house). 
																																								 																				
25 Non-parametric kernel regression. We use an Epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth is 
chosen, according to the ROT method of bandwidth selection, as the one that minimizes the 
conditional weighted mean integrated squared error. The shape of the curve does not vary 





Figure 2: Non-parametric Engel curves (solid gray line) and 95% confidence 
intervals (dashed lines). 
	




As explained in previous sections, we estimate a QUAIDS model (see Banks et al. 
(1997) for a comprehensive description). Specifically, we assume a two-step budgeting 
procedure as described in section 1.3.1. and use the following aggregation of non-durable 
goods in the second step: 1) food and beverage, 2) water, 3) energy, 4) household 
expenses other than water and energy and 5) all other goods. When goods are 
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aggregated to create a single composite commodity, the Hicks-Leontief Composite 
Commodity Theorem (Hicks, 1939; Leontief, 1936) asserts that prices of the goods in 
the group should move proportionately. Typically, this assumption does not hold in 
most aggregations, so in order to avoid problems derived from the Composite 
Commodity Theorem not holding in our aggregation, we decided to use household-
specific price indexes as proposed by Pashardes et al. (2014). 
 
ln 𝑝.ℎ = 𝑤.;ℎ −  𝑤<;
0
;=1





where wikh is the share of the total budget spent by a particular household h on 
each component k of composite commodity i in the current period; 𝑤.; and 𝑤0<; 
are average shares of each component k within the composite i to which it belongs 
for the current and base period, respectively; and lnrik is the natural logarithm of 
the price of this good k in the current period. The first term 𝑤.;ℎ −
0
;=1
 𝑤<; 𝑙𝑛 𝑟.; takes into account differences in preferences across households, while 
the second term is a Tornqvist index that captures the substitution effects within 
the composite commodity. 
There are two advantages to using these indexes over fixed price indexes such 
as Laspeyres or Paasche. First, substitutions between the items included within 
each composite are accounted for, as budget shares are allowed to vary with the 
relative prices of those goods, thus making them valid even if the Composite 
Commodity Theorem is not satisfied in the aggregation. Moreover, demand patterns 
can be better identified, as price indexes are specific for each household (they vary 
according to the specific preferences of each household) and preference 
heterogeneity across households is incorporated into the price index. See Pashardes 
et al. (2014) for more details. 
Data on prices used to compute the household-specific price indexes are 
obtained from the Consumer Price Index statistics published by the Spanish 
National Institute of Statistics. These indexes are disaggregated at the level of the 
17 Spanish autonomous communities and 2 autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) 
and for each year considered in the sample. Therefore, they contain temporal as 
well as regional variability. Moreover, instead of using a single deflator for each of 
the composite commodities, we have used deflators for the different components 
included in each composite. Since each household consumes different proportions of 
those component goods and we have deflators for each, applying price indexes such 
as those in equation (1) allows us to account for individual preferences, thus 
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increasing variability across households. With respect to prices for water, Consumer 
Price Index statistics are not sufficiently disaggregated to isolate changes in prices 
of this particular item. However, since the EPF contains information on cubic 
meters of water consumed by the household, price indexes for water are built using 
unit or average prices derived from the sample26. It should be noted that, although 
this is standard practice, the fact that unit prices not only reflect variation in 
market prices, but also depend on the quality of the goods chosen by the household 
(and therefore, on consumer tastes), may represent a source of endogeneity (Deaton, 
1988). However, this is not expected to be an issue in our case: given that the 
residential water supply sector in Spain is a local natural monopoly, the choice of 
supplier is limited and therefore households cannot choose the quality of their tap 
water. 
Estimations are performed using the iterative linear least-squares estimator 
(ILLE) proposed by Blundell and Robin (1999). Although they belong to the non-
linear group of demand models, QUAIDS (and AIDS) parameters are linear 
conditional on a series of functions of the parameters themselves and a set of 
explanatory variables. Exploiting this conditional linearity allows consistent 
estimates of the model parameters using iterations of linear moment estimators such 
as Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) or Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) until 
convergence is achieved27. The resulting estimator has been shown to be 
asymptotically equivalent to the non-linear three-stage estimator (NL3S), but it 
offers the advantage of being more computationally efficient (see Blundell and 
Robin (1999) for further clarification). In order to avoid a singular error variance-
																																								 																				
26 Information on the utility serving the household is missing from our database, meaning that 
only average price can be used. However, in our opinion it is unlikely that this represents a 
source of misspecification. In Spain, utilities must publish new tariffs in an official gazette, 
either at the provincial or autonomous community level; they are not, however, obliged to 
publish this information either on their website or in the invoice sent to consumers, both of 
which are far more accessible than official gazettes. Finding out the tariffs may therefore 
require thorough examination of the information about water prices published in the official 
gazettes, a task that entails a great deal of time and effort on the part of the consumer. As 
opposed to marginal price, average price can be easily computed. In this case, only the total 
billing amount and quantity consumed is needed -information that can be easily found in a 
standard water bill-. Moreover, the only study conducted in Spain that contains information 
on consumer knowledge of water tariffs reports that most admit to not knowing the rates they 
pay (Pérez-Urdiales et al., 2015). 
 
27 In a first stage in the estimation, a Stone Price index is used as an initial value for a(p), and 
b(p) is assumed to be the unit vector. 
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covariance matrix, one of the equations has to be dropped28. The adding-up 
restriction is automatically satisfied and both homogeneity and symmetry are 
imposed. Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) and Banks et al. (1997), a0 
takes a value below the minimum of the natural logarithm of total expenditure in 
our sample. However, as shown in Section 1.5., results are robust to the choice of 
different values for a0. 
Another issue that must be addressed is endogeneity in both total expenditure 
and price for water. Endogeneity of total expenditure may arise from measurement 
errors or the fact that total expenditure, as the sum of the expenditures on 
individual purchased commodities, may be jointly determined with the expenditure 
shares of those commodities. Therefore, as is common practice, we use total income 
as an identifying instrument for total expenditure. Moreover, as explained in Section 
1.1., there is also serious concern that price may be endogenous in the model. Given 
that our database does not include information on the utility serving the household, 
the methods usually employed to address price endogeneity (described in the 
previous section) cannot be applied. However, we can take advantage of the wide 
regional variability in our sample and instrument price using a jackknife instrument 
for average price proposed by Grafton et al. (2011) also in the context of water 
demand estimation under block pricing (see Appendix for further information). 
In our model, as proposed by Blundell and Robin (1999), endogeneity is dealt 
with using a two-step technique involving a non-linear IV approach and the 
augmented regression techniques of Hausman (1978) and Holly and Sargan (1982). 
First, reduced forms of the endogenous variables in our model (that is the log total 
expenditures and the vector of prices for the N goods) are regressed on all the 
exogenous explanatory variables and the set of instruments. Independent variables 
in this first stage include sociodemographic variables and trend dummies, the log 
of prices and log total expenditure when exogenous, and, as identifying instruments, 
the jackknife instrument for water price and log of household income to deal with 
endogeneity of total expenditure. 
In a second step, the vector of estimated residuals from these first reduced-form 
regressions 𝑣ℎ  are retrieved and used to "augment" the demand system estimation 
by including them as additional regressors in the budget share equations. In the 
context of this augmented regression, the SUR estimator is equivalent to the 3SLS 
																																								 																				
28 The estimator has been shown to be invariant to the choice of the equation that is dropped 





and significance tests for the components of the vector of residuals in the system 




Table 3 presents estimated budget shares and total non-durable expenditure 
and own-price elasticities evaluated at sample means. The estimated budget share 
for water is highly significant and similar to the actual observed value (see Table 1 
above). The own-price elasticity of -0.948 and income (budget) elasticity of 0.108 
are also found to be significant and their magnitude is in line with the range of 
values previously found in the literature (Worthington and Hoffman, 2008; Arbués 
et al., 2003). Therefore, according to our results, water is a normal good and a 
necessity, and demand is found to be relatively price inelastic. It should be noted 
that the elasticities reported here are long-run elasticities, as the seven year time 
span considered in the study is long enough to allow some adjustments in durable 
equipment (such as dishwashers, washing machines and other water-saving 
appliances) in response to a change in water price. With respect to the rest of the 
composite goods, food, energy and other household expenditures are normal goods 
and necessities, while the aggregate of all other goods is found to be a luxury. Those 










29 See for example the seminal paper by Banks et al. (1997), Brännlund and Nordström (2004) 
and Tiezzi (2005) for the case of energy estimation with similar grouping approach, and 
Andreyeva et al. (2010) for a review on food demand elasticities. 
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Table 3: Estimated budget shares and total non-durable expenditure and own-price 








own-price elasticities  
Food 0.222*** 0.599*** -1.162***  
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.024)  
Water 0.006*** 0.108** -0.948***  
 (0.000) (0.049) (0.031)  
Energy 0.044*** 0.577*** -2.143***  
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.017)  
All other of non-durable 
household expenses 
0.324*** 0.810*** -1.021***  
(0.000) (0.011) (0.022)  
All other non-durable 
commodities 
0.404*** 1.431*** -0.789***  
(0.000) (0.010) (0.017)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 report cross-price elasticities30 and the main results relating 
to the income terms, respectively. The high significance of most cross-price 
elasticities in the model implies that substitution patterns do exist in our sample. 
Particularly in relation to water, Table 4 shows that water demand is affected by 
changes in the price of all other non-durable composite goods purchased by the 
household, as opposed to what was indicated by previous models. Although, as 
already proposed in some studies (Arbués et al., 2003), water has no good substitutes 
among non-durable commodities, it is found to be a substitute for food and beverage 
and all other non-durable commodities. Contrary to previous studies on the issue by 
Hansen (1996) and Escrivá-Bou et al. (2015) that found a negative, although small, 
cross-price elasticity, energy is found to be a substitute for water. In Spain it is not 
																																								 																				
30  A positive cross-price elasticity between two goods implies that an increase in the price of one 
of them leads to an increase in the demand for the other good (substitute goods), while the 




uncommon for households in an apartment block to have central hot water31 
provided by the building’s residents’ association. Central hot water comprises a 
mixture of expenditure on both water and energy, but as they are jointly included 
in the residents’ association invoice issued to the household, it is not possible to 
isolate the expenditure on water. Since the energy to heat the water is usually much 
costlier than the water itself, in Consumer Budget Surveys this good is usually 
included in the energy category, which may explain why they appear as substitutes. 
Finally, as expected, expenditure on tap water is complementary to other household 
expenditures32. 
 







All other non-durable 
commodities  
Food and beverage 
-1.162*** 0.010 0.054*** 0.526*** -0.023  
(0.024) (0.017) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023)  
Water 0.483*** -0.948*** 0.344*** -0.437*** 0.446***  
(0.050) (0.031) (0.022) (0.051) (0.053)  
Energy 0.277*** 0.044 -2.143*** 1.269*** -0.023  




0.311*** -0.012 0.162*** -1.021*** -0.252***  




-0.198*** -0.001 -0.040*** -0.403*** -0.789***  
(0.018) (0.012) (0.008) (0.019) (0.017)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: * , ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
																																								 																				
31 It should be noted that besides affecting the relationship between water and energy 
consumption, this fact may further entail a source of measurement error in water consumption 
for these households. Unfortunately, we do not have information in the sample on which 
households rely on central hot water as to correct for it. 
 
32 Recall that some of the items included in this category are house and garage rent, household 
maintenance or waste and wastewater services. 
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With respect to the income terms, Table 5 shows that both the log of total 
expenditure and its square are highly significant in the budget share equations. 
Thus, the quadratic term is needed in all the estimated equations and the non-
linear behavior with respect to income first identified in the kernel regressions 
depicted in Figure 2 is confirmed. This departure from linearity in the shape of the 
Engel curve also applies for the case of water and other household expenditures, 
whose kernel representations were not so clear cut. The Wald test of joint 
significance of the quadratic income term across the system reinforces the need to 
include this term (see Table 5), supporting the use of the QUAIDS specification 
over the AIDS model (in which similar assumptions are made, but the quadratic 
income term is not considered). 
 
Table 5: Estimated budget or income effects 
 Ln of total expenditure Ln of total expenditure squared  
Food -.0879*** -.0432***  
             (.0030) (.0009)  
Water -.0054*** .0012***  
            .0002 (.0000)  
Energy -.0186*** -.0012***  
             (.0010) (.0003)  
All other non-durable -.0621*** .0285***  
household expenses            (.0037) (.0011)  
All other non-durable .1740*** .01472***  
commodities              (.0040) (.0012)  
Joint significance 𝜒4
2  = 3383.81 p-value = 0.0000  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: * , ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
With respect to endogeneity correction, Table 6 shows reduced-form estimates 
of the endogenous regressors in the model (i.e. total expenditure and price for 
water). Table 6 displays a highly significant partial correlation between total income 
and total expenditure, implying that it represents a suitable instrument. As 
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presented in Table 6, price indexes for water also exhibit highly significant partial 
correlation with the jackknife-type variable intended to instrument it. 
 
Table 6: Reduced-form parameters for ln of total expenditure and log of water prices 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
Although they are not reported here for the sake of simplicity, 33 demographic variables and trend 
dummies were also accounted for. Recall that one of each type was excluded from the analysis to avoid 
perfect collinearity. 
Notes: * , ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
As noted in Section 1.4.1., the tests for significance of the coefficients for the 
components of the vector of estimated residual (𝑣ℎ) from the reduced-form 
regressions of the endogenous regressors in the augmented system become tests for 
endogeneity. Tests for the endogeneity of total expenditure are reported in Table 
7. Exogeneity is rejected for all the composite commodities except water. However, 
the need to control for expenditure endogeneity is confirmed by the rejection of the 
null of the joint test on log of total expenditure being exogenous across all the 
budget share equations (see bottom of Table 7). The test for the endogeneity of the 
 Log total expenditure Log of water prices 
Log of food prices -.0019*** -.0001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) 
Jackknife instrument for water price -.0017*** .0100*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Log of Energy prices -.0017*** .0004*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log of price for other household expenses -.0011*** -.0012*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Log of price for all other goods .0030*** -.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Ln of total income .1708*** -.0013*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0004) 
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water price in the water equation is also strongly rejected33. The validity of the 
instruments is discussed above. 
 
Table 7: Tests for the endogeneity of total expenditure for all the equations in the 
demand system. 
 
Test for the endogeity 
of total expenditure  
Food 123.36***  
Water 0.92  
Energy 23.50***  




All other non-durable  
commodities   
Joint 𝜒42 = 282.39  
significance p-value = 0.0000  
  Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,    5%,  
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
With respect to the demographics in our model, it can be observed (see Table 
8 that many of them are significant in the water share equation. The number of 
rooms in the household appears negatively correlated to water demand. It also 
seems that rural households and those located in villages consume less water than 
their urban counterparts, probably because they have easier access to sources of 
water other than the tap, such as fountains and wells. Households in a rented 
residence, with (regten4) or without rental assistance (regten3), and in residences 
that are owned but with financial obligations (regten2), are reported to devote a 
higher proportion of their total non-durable expenditure to water than the ones 
with tenancy under a cession free of payment (reference), or those living in houses 
under 25 years old and with greater total area. With respect to the number of 
household members, this seems to be positively correlated with water demand. 
Conversely, the more children aged either between 0 and 5 (nmiem7) or between 5 
																																								 																				
33 𝜒"#  =50.24. p-value =0.000. 
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and 15 (nmiem3), the less the proportion of total expenditure devoted to residential 
water consumption34. In a reference household in which the household head has 
completed only lower secondary education, household water demand seems to be 
smaller than for households in which any other education level has been completed. 
Finally, as expected, water consumption is shown to be higher for detached and 
semi-detached houses, which usually have more water-dependent amenities such as 
gardens and swimming pools. 
 
Table 8: Parameter estimates for the demographics in the model in the water budget 
share equation	
 Coefficient Standard error 
Nrooms -.0002*** (0.0000) 
Size (m2) 5.71e-06*** (0.0000) 
Hotwater .0008*** (0.0002) 
Buildingtype1 .0008** (0.0003) 
Buildingtype2 .0009*** (0.0003) 
Buildingtype3 -.00004 (0.0003) 
Buildingtype4 -.0004 (0.0003) 
Tenreg1 .00002 (0.0001) 
Tenreg2 .0003*** (0.0001) 
Tenreg3 .00174*** (0.0001) 
Tenreg4 .0008*** (0.0002) 
Tenreg5 .0001063 (0.0001) 
Hhold.lessthan251 .0002*** (0.0000) 
Year2006 .0006*** (0.0001) 
Year2007 -.0002*** (0.0001) 
																																								 																				
34 It has been found that the presence of individuals belonging to vulnerable populations (e.g. 
young children, elderly people or individuals with poor health) in the household can generate 
risk aversion, sometimes triggering the decision to consume bottled water (Zivin G. et al., 2011; 
Yoo and Yang, 2000). Therefore, it is more likely that these household are using bottled water 
to cover some of their water needs, such as drinking and cooking, and are thus spending a lower 
proportion of the household budget on tap water. 
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Year2008 -.0004*** (0.0001) 
Year2009 .0000151 (0.0001) 
Year2010 -.0001169** (0.0001) 
Year2011 -.0002*** (0.00004) 
Age -1.56e-07 (0.0000) 
Nmembers .0008*** (0.00002) 
Nchildren1 -.0001** (0.00002) 
Nchildren2 -.0002*** (0.00002) 
BasicEduc .0003*** (0.0002) 
SecondEduc2 .0004** (0.0002) 
HigherEduc -.0003** (0.0001) 
Rural -.00392*** (0.0001) 
Village -.0007*** (0.0001) 
Basic*expenditure -6.40e-09 (0.0000) 
SecondEduc2*expenditure -1.11e-08* (0.0000) 
HighEduc*expenditure 7.04e-09 (0.0000) 
Rural*expenditure 5.37e-08*** (0.0000) 
Village*expenditure -1.05 e-09 (0.0000) 
Constant .0041*** (0.0004) 
 
Note: One dummy from each group of socioeconomic characteristics is excluded from the analysis in order 
to avoid perfect collinearity. The household considered as the reference has the following characteristics: 
Located in Andalucia, in a city, in 2012, without hot water, tenancy with cession free of payment, in 
"other type of dwellings", residence over 25 years old and household head with lower secondary education. 
 
1.5.1. Robustness checks 
 
Robustness checks have been performed using different aggregations of goods, 
different initial values for  a0 and changing the demographics included in the model. 
They show that our results are robust to other choices that could have been made 
with respect to these particular issues. Results for the price and income elasticities 
Chapter 1	
	 88 
for residential water demand under different a0 displayed in Table 9 show only 
slight variations in the price elasticity estimates. Moreover, in our model, some of 
the goods (energy and other household expenditures) were separated from the rest 
of the goods. Table 10 and Table 11 show that this particular choice does not affect 
estimates for cross-price elasticities. 
 
Table 9: Price and income elasticities for residential water demand under different 
values of a0 
 Elasticities 
 Income Price 
   a0= 2.75 -0.108** -0.950*** 
   a0= 4.125 -0.108** -0.955*** 
0   a0= 4.95 -0.108** -0.948*** 
 
a0= 5.5 
(Baseline) -0.108** -0.948*** 
 a0= 6.05 -0.108** -0.947*** 
 a0= 8.2 -0.108** -0.944*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
Elasticities are reported at sample means. 
Notes: Values for a0 included here 
correspond to, respectively, 10%, 20% and 
50% increases and decreases from the 
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Table 10: Uncompensated cross-price elasticities at sample means under different 
aggregations (I). 
	
 Food and beverage Water Energy 
All other non-durable 
commodities  
Food -1.072*** 0.01 0.112*** 0.367***  
 (-0.024) (-0.017) (-0.011) (-0.027)  
Water 0.480*** -0.965*** 0.281*** 0.125*  
 (-0.049) (-0.031) (-0.021) (-0.059)  
Energy 0.554*** 0.035 -2.042*** 0.825***  
 (-0.035) (-0.025) (-0.016) (-0.041)  
All other commodities -0.016* -0.005 0.027*** -1.163***  
 (-0.007) (-0.005) (- 0.003) (-0.008)  
Standard errors in parentheses 








Food and beverage Water 
All other non-durable 
commodities 
Food -0.967*** 0.01 0.405*** 
 (-0.023) (-0.017) (-0.024) 
Water 0.487*** -0.966*** 0.514*** 
 (- 0.049) (-0.031) (-0.053) 
All other commodities -0.013* -0.003 -1.120*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.005) (-0.007) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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1.5.2. Model performance and comparison with other functional 
specifications         
 
As a final step of the empirical analysis, we estimate different functional 
demand specifications and compare them in terms of performance. Specifically, we 
estimate the linear, log-linear and double-log models, which are the most common 
specifications in the water demand literature. Moreover, we include in the analysis 
the AIDS model, as it is based on similar behavioral assumptions as QUAIDS, but 
excluding the quadratic income term from the specification. 
Table 12 reports the results of the IV regressions for the linear, log-linear and 
double log models, using the jackknife instrument proposed by Grafton et al. (2011) 
as an instrument for water price (see Section 1.4.1. for a more detailed description) 
and accounting for trend dummies and the 27 demographic characteristics35 










35 After excluding one dummy of each type in order to avoid perfect collinearity, 27 demographic 
controls are included in the final estimations. 
 
36 The first stage of the IV estimations are also included in Table 14 in the Appendix. Following 
Bound et al. (1995), we report the R2 of the first stage when included instruments are partialled 
out (Partial R2) as well as an F-test of excluded instruments. Relevance of the jackknife-type 
instrument is confirmed by the high Partial R2 of the excluded instrument and the rejection of 
the F-test of excluded instruments in all the estimated models. Validity is discussed in Section 
1.4.1. In addition, Hausman tests for endogeneity are rejected for every estimated model, 
underscoring the suitability of Instrumental Variables estimation. 
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Table 12: IV estimates of different functional specifications for water demand. 
	
 Water demand models  
 Linear model Log-linear 
Double-
log  
Average price -46.45*** -0.378***   
 (0.470) (0.00386)   
Income -7.02e-06 -8.66e-09   
 (1.79e-05) (1.47e-07)   
Log of average price   -0.400***  
   (0.00420)  
Log of income   0.00365  
   (0.00376)  
Controls included a Yes Yes Yes  
N 133, 598 133, 222 133, 222  
R2 0.160 0.167 0.165  
Wald test of 728.31 764.83 749.45  
joint significance cb (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Hausman testc 7, 897.67 10, 416.33 11, 062.65  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. Elasticities are 
reported at sample means. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
a The same 33 demographic variables and trend 
dummies included in the QUAIDS model were 
included in these models as controls. 
 
b It follows a distribution of 35 degrees of freedom c P-




Table 13 shows the price-elasticities yielded by the different model 
specifications. All the reported elasticities are in line with the values reported in 
related studies (see Arbués et al. (2004) and Worthington and Hoffman (2008)), 
although the estimates for linear, log-linear and double-log models are slightly below 
the lower limit of the usual range for long-run elasticities37. We can observe that 
the price elasticity yielded by the QUAIDS and AIDS models are higher than those 
produced by the rest of the models. The only previous application of QUAIDS to 
water demand estimation (Hajispyrou et al., 2002) also reported relatively high 
elasticities, but that study is not directly comparable to ours, as the authors assume 
separability of water consumption, and thus do not estimate water demand through 
a system of equations but rather with a single equation. Moreover, although 
QUAIDS models have been widely applied in the energy literature (Pashardes et 
al., 2014; Labandeira et al., 2006; Tiezzi, 2005), no studies to date have attempted 
to make comparisons with alternative demand specifications so as to determine 
whether the differences found in the estimated elasticities are systematic.  
 
Table 13: Price elasticities of demand. 
	
  Water demand models    
 QUAIDS AIDS Linear Log-linear Double-log  
Price elasticity -0.948*** -0.906*** -0.459*** -.456*** -.4003*** 
        
N 133, 598 133, 598 133, 598 133, 222 133, 222  
R2 0.2945a 0.2904a 0.160 0.167 0.165  
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. Elasticities are reported at sample means. 
aThis R2 corresponds to the water equation. 
 
With respect to the goodness of fit, QUAIDS offers the highest R2 of all the 
estimated models. Moreover, Figure 3 shows the real distribution for water demand 
as well as pairwise comparisons of the predicted distributions using the different 
estimated models and QUAIDS. We can see that QUAIDS is not only closer to the 
																																								 																				
37 The usual reported range for these elasticities is between -0.5 to -1 (Worthington and Hoffman, 
2008). 
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observed data than the other functional specifications (implying better overall fit), 
but it also shows a better fit to the asymmetric shape of the real distribution. 
	
Figure 3: Distribution of annual residential water demand (m3) in Spain 2006-
2012 (histogram). Distribution of the predicted value using QUAIDS model (solid 




Accurate estimates of demand patterns are crucial to the implementation of 
policies that adequately address growing water scarcity and help to achieve a better 
management of water resources. Consequently, the related body of literature is 
extensive and covers a significant number of issues and approaches. Several 
theoretical specifications have been used in demand estimation, with the linear, log-
linear and double log being the most common. However, despite the considerable 
attention that this subject has attracted, there has been little debate on which 
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specification is best in terms of fit and performance (European Commission, 2015). 
Most estimations of income and price elasticities for residential water are based on 
single-equation models that rely on assumptions of weak separability of water 
consumption from other goods (i.e. assuming that household water consumption 
does not depend on the price of other goods) and linear income effects on water 
consumption. 
In this paper, we relax these assumptions by using a less restrictive system of 
demand estimation, the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS), and 
we compare it with the alternative functional forms most commonly used in the 
literature. Employing a rotating panel of 151.068 observations representative of the 
Spanish population for the period 2006 2012, we find that the long-run price and 
income elasticities yielded by the QUAIDS model are -0.974 and 0.108, respectively, 
indicating that water is a normal good, a necessity and relatively price inelastic. 
Moreover, this study reveals the existence in our sample of non-linearities in 
Engel curves for residential water demand, as well as substitution and 
complementary patterns deriving from changes in prices relative to other groups of 
commodities. In this context, the use of single-equation models such as the linear, 
log-linear and double-log specifications seems to impose implausible restrictions on 
water demand. Conversely, QUAIDS can be said to offer a richer picture of 
consumer expenditure patterns, as it is shown to be more consistent with consumer 
behavior. The higher R2 reported for this model as opposed to single-equation mod-
els and the fact that, as shown in Figure 3, QUAIDS models are both closer to the 
observed data than the other specifications and shows a better fit to the asymmetric 
shape of the real distribution for water demand, would seem to confirm our 
supposition. 
Therefore, our results suggest that, in order to avoid bias in the estimates, and 
when the necessary information is available, water demand should be estimated in 
relation to the demand for the rest of the goods consumed in the household and 
non-linear behavior with respect to income should also be accounted for. Moreover, 
our findings call for a more in-depth debate as to the preferred form of estimation, 
in order to provide policy makers with models that better reflect consumer behavior 
and that are more consistent with utility theory. According to our study, QUAIDS 
could provide a better understanding of water demand than previously used models. 
With the increasing availability of detailed microdatasets on household 
consumption and expenditures, the model proposed in this paper could be used to 
further exploit the information contained in those databases, leading to more 
accurate estimates of the expected impact of water management policies. In 
addition, given that Consumer Expenditure Surveys comparable to those used in 
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this paper are available in many countries, similar analyses could be conducted to 
predict national and regional demand, thus helping to address the future challenges 









In Grafton et al. (2011), the jackknife grouping approach by Angrist et al. 
(1999) is used to obtain an instrument for price. The instrument for household h is 
computed as follows: 
 
𝑧ℎ ≡  
𝑁 ln 𝑝<ℎ − 𝑙𝑛 𝑝.ℎ
𝑁 − 1  
(12) 
                                                      
where ln 𝑝<ℎ is the mean of the water price indexes for households within a 
particular group lnp or cluster of households, and N is the number of households 
within each group. 
 
To define the clusters, households are classified according to several location 
characteristics described in the database that have been found to affect water prices 
(Martínez-Espiñeira et al., 2009) including population density, range of total 
population, region (i.e. Spanish Autonomous Communities), and whether the 
municipality is the capital of the province in which it is located. Note that the 
instrument takes different values for each household and the computation excludes 
the price paid by that same household, considering only the average of the rest of 
the households belonging to the same group. As argued by Grafton et al. (2011), 
the average price for all households other than the one considered each time is by 
definition uncorrelated with any endogenous consumption decision taken by the 
household, thus making this ’leave-one-out’ jackknife-type instrument a valid 
instrument for price. Moreover, the characteristics determining the grouping 
approach are supply-side determinants of price, and are therefore not expected to 
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 Table 14: First stage of the IV estimates and related test statistics. 
 Water demand models 
 Linear model Log-linear Double-log 
    
Income -5.91e-08 -5.91e-08  
 (8.55e-08) (8.55e-08)  
Jackknife-type instrument 0.998*** 0.998***  
 (0.00416) (0.00416)  
Log of income   -0.00171 
   (0.00207) 
Jackknife-type instrument for log of 
price   0.997*** 
   (0.00495) 
Controls included a Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 133, 598 133, 598 133, 222 
F-test of joint significance b 2057.41 2052.74 11062.65 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.3503 0.3504 0.3479 
Partial R2 0.2926 0.2925 0.165 
F-test of excluded instrumentsab 55236.7 55069.4 54376.67 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. Elasticities are reported at sample means. Standard errors 
in parentheses. 
a Follows a distribution of 35 degrees of freedom  
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Essay 2: A proposal for the 
analysis of price escalation 
within water tariffs. The impact 
of the Water Framework 
Directive in Spain. 
	
Abstract 
During the last few decades, numerous international organizations have 
emphasized the role of pricing policy as a tool to achieve objectives of efficiency, 
environmental sustainability, and cost-recovery in the management of water 
resources. Incorporating a certain level of price escalation within water tariffs by 
adopting increasing block rates (IBRs) is commonly advocated as a key element for 
controlling water demand and fulfilling these objectives. However, despite its 
widespread use, there exists no established procedure to measure the levels of price 
escalation embodied in water tariffs. We propose a measure of price escalation 
within water tariffs at the level of the water supply management unit (the 
municipality, in our study). In order to illustrate the usefulness of our measure, we 
analyse the evolution of price escalation in residential water tariffs between 2000 
and 2014 in a sample of 952 Spanish municipalities and examine the factors 
influencing this evolution. 
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2.1. Introduction  
 
Water scarcity is expected to be one of the most critical challenges for 
humankind in the near future (UN-Water 2006, p. 4). According to the World 
Economic Forum (WEF 2016), water crises are the 9th global risk in likelihood of 
occurrence and the third in terms of potential impact. Consequently, the efficient 
and sustainable use of water resources will become paramount in the agenda of 
global leaders and international organizations in the forthcoming decades. Policy 
development in this area aims at the formulation of pricing schemes that can 
simultaneously accommodate several objectives, which can be synthesized as the 
generation of enough revenue to achieve cost recovery, while pursuing equity, 
efficiency, and sustainability goals (Rogers et al. 2002). First, water is considered a 
basic need, so universal access to a certain level of consumption must be guaranteed 
(Bovis 2005). Among other issues, that implies the need for adopting affordable 
prices (Van de Walle 2008, Martins et al. 2013a, 2016). On the other hand, pricing 
policies are expected to play a more prominent role in helping achieve full recovery 
of the cost of the service and making a more efficient and sustainable use of the 
resource.  
Reconciling multiple objectives in a single instrument represents a difficult 
challenge, particularly if only linear tariff structures are applied (Wichelns 2013; 
Farolfi and Gallego-Ayala 2014; Schoengold and Zilberman 2014). For this reason, 
two-part tariffs that include a fixed fee –per connection- and a variable or 
volumetric fee – related to the level of consumption- have become widespread 
(OECD 2010; GWI 2014; IWA 2014; Dinar et al. 2015). The fixed part of the fee is 
supposed to provide financial stability to the utilities by guaranteeing an amount 
of revenue sufficient to cover at least part of the cost of the service, while the 
variable component is expected to help meet the other objectives. Increasing block 
rates (IBRs henceforth) are usually recommended (European Commission 2000) for 
the latter, as a better means to reconcile the objectives of affordability, efficiency, 
and sustainability. Although water demand is relatively inelastic to price, there is 
evidence to suggest that substantial water savings can be achieved with increasing 
block rates (Olmstead 2007; Baerenklau et al. 2014). Grafton et al. (2011) conclude, 
for instance, that households that do not face increasing block prices use around a 
third more water than similar households in a volumetric pricing framework. 
Besides, water price elasticity has been found to increase with consumption, 
especially when it is intended for recreational purposes, such as gardening and 
maintaining swimming pools (European Environmental Agency 2012).  
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In this article, we quantify the results of efforts to enhance price escalation 
within water tariffs. To this end, we define a measure that permits full 
comparability among jurisdictions regardless of the specific tariff structure they use 
(i.e. regardless of the number and size of price blocks, presence and size of fixed 
components, and price levels included in the tariff). We also illustrate this approach 
by analysing empirical evidence for the Spanish case, specifically examining the 
evolution between 2000 and 2014 in 952 Spanish municipalities of the two indicators 
of price escalation38  we propose. In addition, we discuss the environmental, political, 
and business factors that influence those changes in the degree of price escalation 
in the tariffs between 2000 and 2014. Our results allow to identify the scenarios 
most suitable for the implementation of changes in tariff policy, as well as typical 
scenarios in which regulators would be expected to face more resistance and require 
more effort to promote water tariff reforms. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the 
first work that proposes an evaluation of the change of the level of price escalation 
of the water tariffs for residential uses.  
The article is organized as follows. While Section 2.2. provides a review of the 
relevant literature on the influence of pricing schemes on demand, Section 2.3. 
outlines the construction of the proposed measure. In Section 2.4. an empirical 
implementation of the indicators is conducted. Finally, Section 2.5. reports and 
discusses our results, before our concluding in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2. Literature review. 
	
2.2.1. Price variable.  
 
The way block pricing affects water demand is not straightforward. The 
modelling of water demand under block pricing has generated a long-standing 
debate during the last few decades. Consumer theory predicts that, under perfect 
information and faced with the piecewise budget constraint that corresponds to a 
block pricing structure, consumers optimise their consumption by responding to the 
actual marginal price structure of the tariff they confront. In fact, some papers have 
																																								 																				
38 It should be noted that price escalation should not be understood here as the increase in time 
of the price level. Our notion of price escalation refers to individuals being charged a higher 




found that consumers do respond to marginal price (Nataraj and Hanneman, 2011; 
Baerenklau et al., 2014).  However, since under block pricing consumers do not face 
a single price but a complete tariff scheme, Taylor (1975) first suggested that the 
sole marginal price could not be enough to capture their demand decisions. Instead, 
he proposed using both a marginal and an average price. Building on Taylor’s work, 
Nordin (1976) introduced what is known as Nordin’s difference variable,39 in an 
attempt to account for the income (or intramarginal) effect resulting from 
consumers moving from one block to another.  In the 1990s, the discrete-continous 
choice (DCC) framework (Hewitt and Hanemman, 1995) was applied to water 
demand, allowing to take into account the existence of a piecewise budget constraint 
under a block pricing structure. 
However, consumption decisions are most often made in the absence of perfect 
information. In fact, empirical evidence has shown that consumers are not always 
perfectly informed about the tariff structure (Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989; 
Nataraj and Hanemann 2011; Perez-Urdiales et al. 2015) and that the cognitive 
effort to understand complex pricing and non-linear structures is usually substantial 
(Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989; De Bartolome 1995). Random shocks to consumers’ 
demand (Borenstein 2009) or income (Saez 2010) may be another source of 
suboptimizing consumption behaviour.40 Consequently, economic theory has long 
attempted to provide guidance on how best to identify or proxy the price perceived 
by consumers under imperfect information. For instance, Saez (1999, 2010) and 
Borenstein (2009) relax the assumption of perfect information by allowing the 
existence of random shocks to income and demand, respectively. They predict that 
consumers will respond to the expected marginal price or even less precise 
information about marginal price (Borenstein 2009). In turn, Liebman and 
Zeckhauser (2004) introduce in their model the assumption that consumers are not 
perfect optimisers (since they do not fully understand the nature of block tariffs) 
and find that the price they perceive corresponds to the average price at their 
consumption level.  
Our objective with this paper is to work with a price escalation metric that 
reflects the suitability of a tariff to promote water conservation. While reacting to 
marginal prices requires that consumers be perfectly informed about the price 
																																								 																				
39 That is, the difference between the actual water bill paid by consumers and the amount they 
would have paid had all units consumed been charged at the same price as the marginal unit. 
 
40 For example, a heat wave that increases water needs or unexpected bonuses and dividends 
for income earners may prevent them from determining their income in advance and optimise 
consumption. 
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structure they face, reacting to average prices requires much less information. In 
the latter case, only information about the total bill and quantity consumed, readily 
accessible from any standard bill, is needed. Since in practice most consumers 
usually admit to not knowing their tariffs (Pérez-Urdiales et al. 2015), we choose 
to use average price as the price variable of reference with which to construct our 
proposed index of price escalation. Moreover, this theoretical prediction about the 
average price being the price perceived by consumers has been confirmed by 
numerous empirical (Shin 1985; Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004; Ito 2014) and 
experimental studies (De Bartolome 1995). 
 
2.2.2. Two additional considerations. 
 
Before further considering the analysis of price escalation, two more concerns 
must be addressed: the effects of a fixed component and the choice of the importance 
that should be attached to each of the price averages considered under the nonlinear 
tariffs. 
 
2.2.2.1. Treatment of the tariff’s fixed component 
	
The adoption of two-part tariffs, including both a fixed fee and a variable or 
volumetric fee, is increasingly common (OECD 2010; GWI 2014; IWA 2014; Dinar 
et al. 2015). However, although necessary for the utilities’ financial stability, the 
fixed component introduces a regressive element in the tariff. With a fixed fee, the 
effective average price per cubic metre will be relatively high and decreasing for the 
lowest levels of consumption, until the counterbalancing effect of the escalation 
embedded in the block prices makes it rise again. The overall degree of price 
escalation in the tariff effectively involves the combined effect of both tariff 
components, fixed and variable, so it is important to account for the fixed 
component in the proposed analysis.41 
																																								 																				
41 The treatment of the fixed fee in the calculation of the price escalation index is one of the 




2.2.2.2. Considering proportions of users per block when dealing with IBRs. 
	
When using aggregate data (usually collected at the municipality level), as it 
is the case in our study, water demand functions must be estimated by regressing 
average consumption against a measure of the price faced by the consumers in each 
jurisdiction. However, since most often water tariffs are non-linear, it is not obvious 
what the relevant price should be.42 Under these conditions, using an average of the 
different marginal prices in the tariff weighted by the proportions of users 
consuming in each corresponding block has been acknowledged as the most 
theoretically correct specification for the analysis of the effects of IBRs on demand 
when only aggregate data is available (Schefter and David 1995; Martínez-Espiñeira 
2003).43  
As explained in Section 2.1, in our analysis the average price is more relevant. 
However, as our proposed measure of price escalation is intended as an aggregate 
indicator of the level of price escalation in water tariffs, we do follow a strategy 
analogous to the one described above, namely weighing the degree of escalation 
built into the different ranges of consumption by the proportion of users that 
consume within each particular range. This way, the degree of escalation embedded 
in each of the intervals is given an importance in accordance with its frequency of 
occurrence. 
 
2.3. Measuring price escalation in water tariffs 
	
The comparative analysis of the degree of price escalation in water tariffs 
requires the development of synthetic indices that provide a common metric to help 
those in charge of designing and assessing water pricing policies. However, to our 
knowledge, no such indices have been developed. The recent contribution by Suárez-
Varela et al. (2015) is the only attempt in this regard. We build on their work, 
proposing a new variant of their suggested measure that incorporates in its 
calculation widely available additional relevant elements. For the purposes of this 
paper, we define price escalation as the increase in the average price per cubic metre 
																																								 																				
42 See, for example, Martínez-Espiñeira (2002) and Arbués et al. (2003) for further details on 
this issue and other difficulties associated with the estimation of water demand functions. 
 
43 See Worthington and Hoffman (2008) for further details in the history of water demand 
specification. 
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as consumption increases. Hence, in order to measure price escalation, we must 
measure the average price that the tariff in use in each jurisdiction yields at different 
levels of consumption.  
Water is consumed to satisfy different types of needs and wants, so it can be 
viewed differently from an equity perspective, all the way from being seen as a basic 
good to a luxury good, depending on the amount consumed. In order to account for 
the different uses of water (basic, intermediate, and luxury), we work out from each 
tariff the average price of water for a number of different levels of consumption and 
attach different weights to each, before incorporating them into our measure of 
price escalation. Following Martínez-Espiñeira et al. (2012), we consider the average 
variable price per cubic metre (excluding fixed costs) corresponding to a 
hypothetical bill of 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50 cubic metres (which we denote billc). 
Then, as formally explained below, we calculate the differences between the average 
prices in subsequent levels of consumption. We then weight these differences by the 
proportion of users within the range of consumption included between the two 
relevant consumption levels and finally we sum them up. By weighting the elements 
of the summation, our objective is that the resulting variable reflect the real effect 
of the price escalation embedded in the tariff in containing demand. For instance, 
a sharp escalation might be embedded in the price difference between two blocks, 
but if no consumers fell within that range, the impact of that price escalation on 
water conservation would indeed be effectively much weaker, if not null. The value 
yielded by the previous computations is also normalized employing the average 
price per cubic metre at 25 m3 (that is, the middle point of the range considered). 
This normalization corrects the effect of a higher average level of prices in a 
municipality, which would systematically lead to higher values of the outcome 
variable, unduly distorting the comparison of price escalation across jurisdictions. 
 
In summary, the suggested measure is obtained as follows: 
𝐸𝑆𝐶 =









𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐 = 3𝑚3, 5𝑚3, 10𝑚3, 15𝑚3, 20𝑚3, 25𝑚3, 50𝑚3 




Finally, a thorough analysis of the level of price escalation in the tariffs must 
also include the influence of the size of the fixed component. Therefore, a parallel 
measure of price escalation, analogous to the previous one, is proposed. In this case, 
average unit prices are computed including also the fixed component in the total 
estimated bill (totbill). 
 
𝐸𝑆𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑥 =









𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐 = 3𝑚3, 5𝑚3, 10𝑚3, 15𝑚3, 20𝑚3, 25𝑚3, 50𝑚3  
𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑤G/(G−1) 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓  𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐 − 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐 
 
The previously depicted measures are intended to be complementary. As 
explained above, in a two-part tariff scheme, the variable component targets 
efficiency, sustainability, and equity goals. However, the fixed part is expected to 
ensure the financial stability of the utility, contributing to cost recovery goals. 
Given that the fixed component introduces a regressive element within the first 
levels of consumption, its inclusion attenuates the value of the measure.44 Therefore, 
the escalation measure that includes only the variable component (ESC) is expected 
to reflect the efforts made to promote water conservation habits and to meet the 
objectives related to the variable component, while ESCfix illustrates the effective 
overall degree of price escalation embedded in the tariff after the specific goals of 
this component45  are  accomplished. 
Finally, it should be noted that the two measures proposed yield different 
values depending on the nature of the pricing scheme that underlies the tariff. In 
the case of tariffs based on decreasing block rates or flat rates, average price is 
decreasing in consumption. Therefore, differences between average prices at 
																																								 																				
 
44 Recall that, in this case, differences between average prices in subsequent levels of 
consumption is negative until the counterbalancing effect of the escalation embedded in the 
variable part turns it into positive. Therefore, the negative differences may be compensated by 
the positive ones, attenuating the value of the measure. 
 
45 It must be noted that the cost recovery goal is paramount in many regulatory regimes (i.e. 
Water Framework Directive in Europe). 
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subsequent levels of consumption are negative, leading to negative values for both 
measures and indicating that those tariffs are in fact regressive on consumption. 
For volumetric proportional rates, a constant average price makes differences 
between subsequent ranges of consumption null, thus leading to a null value for the 
measure as well. And finally, those in IBRs present a positive value for the indexes 
and its size will increase with the degree of price escalation embedded in the tariff. 
 
2.4. The analysis of price escalation in water tariffs. 
An empirical implementation for Spain. 
 
Spain is a Southern European country subject to water stress46 or severe water 
stress throughout most of its territory. In fact, it is the third country of the 
European Union with the highest water exploitation index47 and the incidence of 
droughts is expected to increase in the near future (OECD 2011). Regarding 
domestic supply, Spain is also one of the countries with the highest per capita 
consumption (Eurostat), although significant efforts have been made to reduce it 
during the last decade (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2014).  
In Spain water prices are set at the municipal level, since each municipality has 
jurisdiction over the management of its water service. There does not exist a legal 
framework or regulatory body that establish common guidelines for the 
determination of water tariffs, so municipalities are left with the decision about how 
to design their own price schedules. Therefore, tariff systems are fairly diverse 
(González-Gómez et al. 2012). In the absence of a formal regulatory body, the 
Spanish Association of Water Supply and Wastewater (AEAS), which is financed 
by both private and public utilities and public institutions and is the Spanish 
representative member of the International Water Association (IWA) and the main 
advisory body in the Spanish water sector, elaborates the main statistics and 
indicators related to the performance of the water sector, as well as some  
recommendations for the design of water tariffs (e.g. AEAS 2014). 
Regarding the regulatory framework, the Water Framework Directive (WFD 
henceforth) that came into effect in 2000 places special emphasis on the 
																																								 																				
46 According to the European Environmental Agency (EEA 2012, p. 40), a location is “water 
stressed” if its Water Exploitation Index (WEI) – defined as the ratio of annual freshwater 
abstraction to long-term water availability- is higher than 20%. 
 
47 The ratio of total water abstraction per year to total long term renewable resources. 
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maintenance and improvement of the quality of water bodies and the sustainable 
use of water resources, which confers a marked ecological and environmental 
character to this regulation (Petersen et al. 2009). More specifically, the use of 
economic instruments is highlighted as the main tool for the attainment of these 
objectives (Unnerstall 2007). According to Article 9 of the WFD, pricing policies 
should be granted a more prominent role in national policies addressed at covering 
the cost of the service and making a more efficient and sustainable use of the 
resource. In response, a volumetric tariff with a certain degree of escalation is 
usually recommended, justified mainly because it helps promote economic efficiency 
and sustainability goals (European Commission 2000; AEAS 2014). Nevertheless, 
according to the European Environmental Agency the efforts made by Member 
States in terms of pricing policy reform have been limited in practice to meeting 
the requirement of recovering supply costs, but "generally speaking, the WFD did 
not result in a change in water pricing policy" (European Environmental Agency 
2013, p.9). Only in recent years have some countries, such as the Netherlands and 
Spain, implemented some changes in response to the WFD (European 
Environmental Agency 2013).  
In Spain, according to AEAS, between 2002 and 2012 water supply tariffs 
experienced an increase of 7% (AEAS 2013).48 Nevertheless, there is no information 
available about the changes made to the structure of the tariffs and its potential 
contribution to moderating consumption. In this context, we wonder whether the 
necessary changes in the structure of water pricing schemes have followed the rise 
in average water prices and whether price escalation has increased. 
We will use the synthetic indexes proposed in Section 2.3. to evaluate the 
degree of price escalation in water supply tariffs in the years 2000 (when the WFD 
came into effect) and 2014, as well as the main factors affecting changes in price 
escalation during that period. That will allow us to assess the degree of 
implementation of the guidelines proposed by the WFD and identify the common 
characteristics of those municipalities that embedded a higher degree of escalation 
into their water tariffs. 
																																								 																				
48 This weak increase as compared to other European countries may explain the abovementioned 
paradox that, despite being one of the countries of the European Union with a higher water 
exploitation index, Spain is also one of the countries with higher per capita consumption.  
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2.4.1. Data and Sample 
 
This study uses data from the 2000 and 2014 water tariffs applied in 952 
Spanish municipalities. This sample includes 11.91% of Spain’s municipalities and 
covers around half (48.58%) of its total population. Together with this information 
on water tariffs, information on other variables that affect the degree of price 
escalation within each tariff and its evolution was added to the database. Table 21 
in the Appendix contains a comprehensive description of the variables and data 
sources. All the variables refer to 2000 and 2014, except for those about water stress, 
as they reflect averages for longer periods. The prices that refer to 2014 have been 
deflated to their 2000 equivalents. 
We expected water stress to be a main driver of price escalation in water tariffs, 
so we gathered information on the percentage of occupancy of reservoirs in the 
relevant river basin (Occup), August temperatures (Temp) and annual rainfall per 
square metre (Pluv), all expressed in averages for the periods 1990-1999 and 2010-
2013. We also include a proxy for the level of economic activity (Econ) in the form 
of the index of municipal economic activity calculated by La Caixa (2014). Likewise, 
tourist activity was deemed to be a relevant factor for two reasons. First, because 
it increases the seasonality of demand, so to meet peak demands it is necessary to 
maintain excess capacity at other times. Second, because tourism in Spain is highly 
linked to water use, for example to fill pools or water golf courses. To proxy for it, 
we use the Tourist Activity Index (Tourism), also calculated in the 2014 edition of 
La Caixa’s Yearbook (La Caixa 2014).  
The literature on public local services also points out that ideological and 
political factors can interfere with the management of those services, so they must 
be considered (Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2012). Left-wing parties are expected to be more 
committed to social and environmental causes, and therefore more likely to adopt 
a higher degree of escalation in their tariffs.  In Spain, the centre-right is occupied 
by Partido Popular (PP), while the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) 
represents the centre-left, and Izquierda Unida (IU) is a party located further to 
the left than PSOE in the political spectrum. Moreover, these national parties 
coexist with some other smaller parties with a more regional character. To test for 
the influence of ideological factors, we include binary indicators for the main parties 
in Spain (variables PP, PSOE and IU), taking value 1 if the party dominated the 
local government during the last three four-year ruling periods.49 Also included as 
																																								 																				
49 That implies that the party has ruled with majority for at least 12 out of the 14 years period 
considered in our sample. 
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factors related to political determinants, we include the degree of public support 
garnered by the ruling party (variable Majority) in each municipality is considered. 
This binary indicator equals 1 if during the previous three ruling periods the most 
voted party obtained over 50% of votes. 
Additionally,50 the type of ownership of the water service supplier may be a 
cause of heterogeneity among local utilities and, more precisely, in the water supply 
sector (Renzetti and Dupont 2009). Spanish law stipulates that the municipality is 
responsible for the management of water supply services but the local government 
has the authority to outsource the management to private companies and public-
private enterprises. Therefore, we included a binary indicator of the type of 
ownership of the water utility serving the municipality (Private), with value of 1 if 
the utility is privately managed.  
We also include several socioeconomic characteristics that serve both as 
controls and to test several of our hypotheses. These include indicators of 
population (Population), population density (Density), average household size 
(HouseholdSize) and unemployment rates (Unemp).  Finally, and in order to 
account for the rest of components of the tariff, we gathered information on the 
number of blocks (Blocks) and the size of the fixed component of the tariff (Fixed).  
Table 15 contains selected descriptive statistics.  
 
Table 15: Summary statistics. 
	
VARIABLES N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Fixed_2014   1,001 3.659 2.161 0 17.50 
Fixed_2000 1,001 3.227 2.206 0 12.82 
Blocks_2014 1,001 2.954 1.239 1 7 
Blocks_2000 1,000 2.801 1.251 0 15 
																																								 																				
 
50 Other factors, such as the percentage of water losses and the presence of economies of scale 
and scope are sometimes considered as factors influencing water prices (Carvalho and Marques 
2013). However, in our study, the influence of the price level itself is offset by our normalizing 
of the measure of price escalation (as explained in Section 2.3.), so that the municipalities with 
a higher average level of price do not unduly yield systematically higher values of the proposed 
escalated measures. 
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Occup_2000_2013 1,001 69.56 16.92 0 90.36 
Occup_1990_1999 1,001 57.13 18.32 0 83.09 
Pluv_2000_2013 1,001 639.6 248.5 279.9 1,512 
Pluv_1990_1999 1,001 627.0 251.6 265.1 1,418 
Temp_2000_2013 988 22.87 2.468 17.94 26.39 
Temp_1990_1999 1,001 22.67 2.134 17.88 26.12 
Density_2014 994 0.629 1.873 0.001 24.55 
Density_2000 994 0.513 1.591 0.001 17.75 
Population_2014 1,001 25.39 127.0 0 3,234 
Population_2000 1,001 21.91 114.8 0.021 2,883 
Tourism_2014 1,000 46.14 407.4 0 9,400 
Tourism_2000 992 39.44 372.4 0 9,497 
Unemp_2014 1,000 10.80 7.372 0 28.30 
Unemp_2000 1,000 3.743 2.876 0 14.80 
Econ_2013 1,000 58.176 414.45 0 10,488 
Econ_2000 992 55.77 388.0 0 9,639 
Householdsize_2014 961 2.515 0.276 1.493 3.769 
Householdsize_2000     965 2.808 0.296 1.533 3.769 
Private_2014 1,001 0.239 0.427 0 1 
Private_2000 1,001 0.262 0.440 0 1 
PP_2000_2014 994 0.202 0.402 0 1 
PP_1988_2000 1,001 0.248 0.432 0 1 
PSOE_2000_2014 994 0.0996 0.300 0 1 
PSOE_1988_2000 1,001 0.383 0.486 0 1 
IU_2000_2014 993 0.00806 0.0894 0 1 
IU_1988_2000 1,001 0.0340 0.181 0 1 
Majority_2000_2014 994 0.347 0.476 0 1 




2.4.2. The impact on the WFD on water tariffs and price 
escalation. 
	
In this section, the two proposed indexes are used to conduct an analysis of the 
degree of price escalation in Spanish water tariffs in 2000 and 2014, as well as to 
assess the evolution showed by these indicators between those two reference points. 
First, we calculated the total variable cost and the total bill (that is including 
the fixed component of the tariff) corresponding to the hypothetical monthly bills 
for consumption levels of 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50 cubic metres.51 Table 16 shows 
the main descriptive statistics related to these variables, as well as Fixed and Blocks 
for the two years considered, together with the percentage change in their mean 
values between 2000 and 2014. 
 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics of variables Fixed, Blocks, Billc and Totbillc. 
	
Variable Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max % Increase in 
mean values 
Fixed 
2000 3.27 2.23 0 12.82 13.76% 
2014 3.72 2.18 0 17.50 
Blocks 
2000 2.82 1.24 0 15.00 4.96% 
2014 2.96 1.22 1 7 
Bill3 
2000 1.02 1.00 0 6.41 6.86% 
2014 1.09 0.79 0 8.28 
Bill5 
2000 1.81 1.85 0 19.99 2.21% 
2014 1.85 1.25 0 7.50 
Bill10 
2000 4.25 3.73 0 33.13 2.82% 
2014 4.37 2.68 0 20.00 
Bill15 
2000 7.30 5.76 0 54.64 8.49% 
2014 7.92 4.53 0 32.50 
																																								 																				
 
51 We refer to section 2.3. for further information on the choice of these particular amounts. 
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Bill20 
2000 10.99 7.99 0 76.15 12.10% 
2014 12.32 7.20 0 45.00 
Bill25 
2000 15.29 10.93 0 97.66 14.72% 
2014 17.54 10.63 0.95 60.90 
Bill50 
2000 40.77 29.55 0 243.49 20.55% 
2014 49.15 30.51 4.50 180.14 
Totbill3 
2000 4.30 2.56 0.34 14.33 11.86% 
2014 4.81 2.35 0.56 17.92 
Totbill5 
2000 5.08 3.04 0.34 21.43 9.65% 
2014 5.57 2.58 0.74 18.20 
Totbill10 
2000 7.52 4.50 0.72 33.99 7.58% 
2014 8.09 3.54 1.05 26.26 
Totbill15 
2000 10.57 6.34 0.72 55.50 10.12% 
2014 11.64 5.23 1.64 38.76 
Totbill20 
2000 14.26 8.50 0.72 77.01 12.48% 
2014 16.04 7.81 2.09 51.26 
Totbill25 
2000 18.56 11.35 0.72 98.52 14.55% 
2014 21.26 11.15 2.54 64.94 
Totbill50 
2000 44.04 29.98 0.72 246.08 20.03% 
2014 52.86 31.15 4.79 182.56 
 
Then, as explained in Section 2.3., average prices at each level of consumption 
were computed based on both the total variable cost (Bill) and the total bill 
(Totbill) before the differences between subsequent thresholds were summed, 
weighted by the proportion of consumers falling within each consumption range. 
These weights rely on information about the number of users consuming water 
within each range. Ideally, these proportions should be obtained at the municipal 
level. Municipal civil servants and statistical agencies interested in implementing 
these measures should request information to utilities so that they reflect real 
proportions in the municipality or management unit being analysed. Unfortunately, 
in Spain this information is rarely available to researchers and we could not obtain 
it. Therefore, to illustrate the use of the measure, we use a rough approximation. 
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In Spain, the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (Consumer Budgets Survey)52 
conducted by the Spanish National Statistical Service (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística 2006-2012) gathers information about the number of cubic metres 
consumed by each household. This can, therefore, be used to obtain the distribution 
of users per range of consumption. We can introduce added variability in these 
proportions, since households can be classified in 570 groups53 or clusters according 
to the characteristics of their place of residence; including population density, range 
of total population, region (which one of Spanish Autonomous Communities), and 
whether the municipality is a capital of a province or not. That allows us to simulate 
the proportions of consumers per consumption range and impute them to the 
municipalities in our database, based on those aforementioned characteristics that 
are included in both databases. The proportions of users within each range of 
consumption in our sample are shown in Table 17. Finally, the normalization 
explained in Section 2.3. is applied to both ESC and ESCfix. Table 18 shows 
descriptive statistics for the two indicators of price escalation in the two considered 
periods. The absolute differences in the indicators are also shown in the table 
(Diffprog and Diffprogfix respectively). 
 






















52 Consumer budget surveys are developed in many countries and they are intended to constitute 
a representative sample of the households within the scope of the survey. Therefore, these 
surveys could constitute a good source of information for our analysis as they can provide a 
rough approximation in cases in which information on proportions of users is not easily available. 
 
53 In our calculations, we rely on data from around 151,000 households.  It should be noted that 
the Spanish Consumer Budget Surveys gather information about the number of cubic metres 
consumed by each household. In these surveys, the identifier of the municipality is masked in 
order to guarantee the anonymity of the households, so we could not estimate the proportion of 
consumers falling within each block on a municipal basis using a sample. 
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Table 18: Evolution of price escalation indices between 2000 and 2014. 
	
Variable Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
ESC 
2000 0.08686 0.08618 -0.16238 0.89383  
2014 0.08656 0.08844 -0.76116 0.55577  
ESCfix 
2000 -0.24941 0.23050 -1.37185 0.58351  
2014 -0.24537 0.20324 -1.50048 0.42608  
Diffprog  -0.0039 0.09277 -0.88849 0.45054  
Diffprogfix  0.0404 0.20528 -1.42663 1.19306  
 
With respect to the impact of the WFD, Table 16 allows us to analyse the 
impact on the water tariffs themselves. Our figures show that, after the 
implementation of the WFD and following the guidelines of the main advisory 
bodies,54 the municipalities have significantly increased the fixed component, as well 
as the number of blocks (13.76% and 4.96% respectively) in their tariffs. We also 
find that the variable price of water has increased, on average, for every 
consumption level considered in our study. Moreover, the consumption levels that 
have experienced a greater price increase are those above 20 m3, and the higher the 
consumption level, the higher the percentage increase, being 50 m3 the one that has 
experienced the sharpest price increase. It should also be noted that, contrary to 
expectations, the prices at 3 m3 have also increased substantially, as opposed to 
subsequent consumption levels. After the implementation of the WFD and under 
the recommendation of the main advisory body in Spain,55 many municipalities 
decided to eliminate free allowances, as they were regarded as counterproductive in 
promoting an efficient and sustainable consumption of the resource. In our sample, 
the number of municipalities including these free allowances actually decreased from 
196 in 2000 to 139 in 2014. Thus, our results seem to suggest that local governments 
have made a substantial effort after the enforcement of the WFD to increase price 
escalation by increasing prices more sharply in the higher levels of consumption, 
while some regressivity was introduced as a consequence of the elimination of the 
free allowances. 
																																								 																				
54 See AEAS (2014) for these and other recommendations. 
 




Nevertheless, despite the formal efforts made to increase price escalation in the 
tariff schedules, as shown by Table 17, the main increments in water tariffs took 
place in those ranges of consumption with lower proportions of consumers. Thus, 
when the actual distribution of consumption is considered, the picture we obtain is 
rather different.  
Our proposed measures provide a synthetic index of the degree of price 
escalation with which to study the level of price escalation in each period, as well 
as the evolution between different periods. The figures in Table 18 lead us to 
highlight two facts. First, if we only take into account the variable component and 
once the distribution of consumers is accounted for,56 tariffs have on average a 
positive degree of escalation embedded, both before and after the implementation 
of the WFD (the values of ESC are positive). However, if we include the effect of 
the fixed component, tariffs are regressive in consumption on average (as revealed 
by the negative mean value of ESCfix). Interestingly, we can also see that, 
accounting for both the fixed and variable components, some progress has been 
made to increase price escalation (the differences in ESCfix are positive on average), 
while there has actually been a decrease in the degree of price escalation in the 
variable component of the tariffs between 2000 and 2014. This would be the 
opposite of what would have been expected from the implementation of the WFD. 
 
2.4.3. Determinants of the evolution of price escalation in water 
tariffs. 
 
The second purpose of our empirical analysis is twofold. First, we analyse the 
determinants of the evolution of price escalation in water tariffs from 2000 to 2014. 
Second, we try to identify the characteristics of the municipalities that have more 
successfully increased, in line with the guidelines set by the WFD, the degree of 
price escalation. We, therefore, focus on the changes in price escalation levels 
brought about the coming to effect of the WFD.  
Moreover, several of the variables introduced in Section 2.4.1.  as relevant 
explanatory factors of price escalation are expressed in terms of differences 
																																								 																				
56 Recall that in our proposed measure of price escalation the differences between the average 
prices in subsequent levels of consumption were weighted by the proportion of users within that 
range of consumption in order to reflect the real effect of the price escalation embedded in the 
tariff in containing demand. 
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between the two periods considered (before and after the implementation of the 
WFD). That is the case of DFixed DBlocks, DOccup, DPluv, DTemp, DDensity, 
DPopulation, DTourism, DUnemp, DEcon, DHsize, Privthroughout, Continuity 
and Table 22 and Table 23 include further details about the definition and 
summary statistics of these variables.  
 
2.4.3.1.  Methodology 
	
After calculating the degrees of price escalation before (that is, in 2000) and 
after (2014) the water pricing policy reforms introduced by the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD), a variable measuring the differences for each municipality 
between those two time periods was constructed.  
A difference between two continuous variables, the resulting variables was itself 
continuous too, so the simplest way to analyse it would be to use an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator. However, a simplified version of the original dependent 
variable (DiffESC) was constructed by turning it into a trichotomous categorical 
variable (policychoice) that reflects the three possible general choices available to 
the municipalities. That is, each jurisdiction could have increased the level of price 
escalation, maintained it at the same level or even decreased it during the period 
considered. This variable was, therefore, obtained at the expense of sacrificing some 
of the information contained in the data but allowed us to uncover more significant 
relationships between the explanatory factors and the three resulting ordinal values 
of policychoice (indicators of a decrease, no change, and an increase in price 
escalation). Table 19 shows the frequency distribution of this variable. 
 
Table 19: Frequency distribution of variable policychoice. 
 Absolute frequency Percent Cum. 
    
“Decreasing” 312 31.17 31.17 
“Unchanged” 262 26.17 57.34 
“Increasing “ 427 42.66 100.00 
    
TOTAL  1,001        100.00  
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We note that DiffESC was simplified into policychoice after substituting by 
zero those values of the DiffESC that were smaller than 0.001 in absolute value. 
Otherwise, only one municipality would have the value zero, suggesting, spuriously, 
that only that municipality had experienced no changes in price escalation between 
2000 and 2014. This adjustment was needed because, during the considered period, 
a key change occurred in the European Union. From 2002, the euro became the 
official currency in several European countries. Therefore, when we were 
constructing the price variable, we had to perform a currency conversion to 
homogenize the water bill amounts from 2000’s pesetas (the former Spanish 
currency) to euros. To this end, we used the official exchange rate set by the 
monetary authorities at the beginning of the euro era: 166.386 pesetas/euro. 
However, many municipalities, when revising their tariffs, simplified instead the 
resulting amounts by rounding the result of the conversion to either the second or 
third place after the decimal point. By applying the correction mentioned above, 
we make sure that we offset the spurious effect of that rounding in those 
municipalities that have not suffered an actual increase in tariffs during the period.  
The immediately obvious way to model variable policychoice would be to use 
an ordered logit or ordered probit estimator. Ordered regression models rely on the 
assumption that, although the effect of a given explanatory variable on the 
probability of any given outcome is not constant (depending instead on the values 
of all explanatory variables), there is an overall direction of the effect of the 
explanatory variables and proportionality in the odds of choosing among different 
categories. This parallel regression assumption,57 more specifically, implies that the 
relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same.58  In other words, 
the ordered regression models assume that the coefficients that explain the choice 
between decreasing price escalation versus not changing it are the same as those 
that explain the choice between the latter and the choice to increase the degree of 
price escalation. Under these conditions, only one set of coefficients needs to be 
estimated to explain the probabilities of all outcomes. Otherwise, two different 
models would be needed to describe the relationship between the three possible 
outcomes.   
The assumption makes it possible to exploit a very elegant and parsimonious 
model from which a generic interpretation of coefficients is straightforward. 
However, the assumption is often violated in practice. In fact, a Likelihood-Ratio 
test of proportionality of odds across response categories showed that the parallel 
																																								 																				
57 See Long and Freese (2006, pp. 197-200) for further details. 
 
58 Expressed in terms of odds of choosing each of the categories, one can say that the proportional 
odds between two different categories are constant, independent of the categories considered. 
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regression assumption could be rejected at a 1% level, so less restrictive (and thus 
less parsimonious) models had to be considered. Generalized ordered models, such 
as the generalized ordered logit model obtained by Stata’s gologit routine (Kang Fu 
1997) or the “partial proportional odds” model (Peterson and Harrell 1990) are 
possible options but they can lead to interpretation issues and, if the notion of 
ordinality in the explained variable is preserved, problems of nonsensical predicted 
probabilities.59,60 Moreover, generalized ordered logit estimations of our model did 
not show convergence to a unique solution. 
In light of these difficulties, we chose to use a multinomial logit model, entirely 
giving up on the ordinal nature of the information and instead considering the three 
categories in the dependent variable as nominal outcomes. The multinomial logit 
model relies on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, which we 
also tested. 61 
The multinomial logit model allowed us also to conduct a test of the hypothesis 
that any two categories out of the three available (decreased price escalation, kept 
it unchanged, and increased it) could be combined. Both these tests suggested that 
it would be more efficient in our case to merge the categories indicating decreased 
and unchanged price escalation and model the dependent variable in its simplest 
form, namely as a binary variable. We, therefore, used a logit model to explain 
whether the municipalities’ decision to increase price escalation (rather than 




Table 20 displays the average marginal effect for all the variables included in 
the Logit model whose dependent variable is an indicator of whether the 
municipality increased price escalation instead of decreasing it or keeping it at the 
same level between 2000 and 2014. Unlike linear regression models, the coefficients 
from non-linear outcome models (such as logit) are not directly interpretable as 
																																								 																				
 
60 This is because the regression lines no longer forced to run parallel must cross at some point. 
When that issue affects a nontrivial number of cases in within-sample values of the explanatory 
variables, using a generalized ordered model is problematic (McCullagh and Nelder 1989, p. 
155). 
 
61 The Hausman test did not reject the null hypothesis of IIA. For some of the categories, χ2 
values of the test statistic displayed negative values. This is very common and has been found 
as evidence against violation of the IIA assumption (Hausman and McFadden 1984).  
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marginal effects. Traditionally, marginal effects are reported at the mean values of 
the variables included in the model, that is, for the “average individual” in the 
sample. Although computationally more demanding, the interpretation of average 
marginal effects (the average of partial changes over all observations) is preferred 
by many authors (Bartus 2005). With the development of new statistical packages 
and increasing computational capacity, average marginal effects have become 
increasingly used and the most common form to report and interpret discrete choice 
models. It is this second type of marginal effects that we report in Table 20. A 
Likelihood-Ratio test of the hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are 
zero is rejected at 1%, implying that the model is globally significant.  
 
Table 20: Average marginal effects from binary logit.	


































LR test  250.06*** 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The results of the logit model show that those municipalities that have 
experienced a larger growth in population along the period are more likely to have 
increased the degree of price escalation. It is reasonable that those municipalities 
whose population has increased more also have stronger incentives to promote water 
demand contention, as a means to avoid network overload or the need for further 
investments to meet the increasing demand. Municipalities under more water stress 
would be expected to respond to an increased pressure on their current and future 
availability of resources by increasing price escalation to adjust their demand to an 
expected reduction in supply. Our results suggest that municipalities that face 
higher temperatures or a higher reduction in the level of reservoir occupancy during 
the studied period have increased the price escalation embedded in their tariffs. 
However, it seems that those municipalities with less abundant rain have not been 
so inclined to maintaining or decreasing the degree of price escalation instead.  
Regarding political and ideological issues, those municipalities in which PP (the 
main right-wing party in Spain) has been ruling with a majority show a significantly 
higher probability of experiencing increases in price escalation. Although left wing 
parties might be expected to be more committed to social and environmental goals, 
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and thus more prone to increasing the level of price escalation in the tariffs, it is 
not the first time that a result of this type is found. In fact, previous research has 
found that, although left-wing parties usually increase public expenditures, it is 
right-wing parties that tend to set more progressive taxes and benefits (Padovano 
and Turati 2012; Bucciol et al. 2013). Finally, those municipalities that have 
increased price escalation also tend to present an increase in the number of blocks 
and the fixed component of the tariff. 
Conversely, we find that the impact of continuity in the type of ownership of 
the management during the period or a change from public to private management 
can decrease the probability of increasing price escalation in a 38.7% and 48.1% 
respectively. This is not surprising, as private managers should not be expected to 
be as committed to the environmental and equity benefits derived from an increased 
escalation in prices. Likewise, the continuity in the type of ownership provides 
companies with fewer incentives to improve management and efficiency in the use 
of water resources. Furthermore, a higher level of tourist activity is also related to 
lower probabilities of increasing price escalation. It should be noted that tourist 
activity in Spain is highly linked to the use of water, for filling pools or watering 
gardens and golf courses, for example. These uses for water could be regarded as a 
type of “luxury good” that would rely on the highest levels of consumption. Thus, 
it is to be expected that towns with a higher influx of tourists, local authorities try 
not to penalize this type of consumption by embedding a sharper level of escalation 
in the prices, as it could potentially harm the tourism industry. Finally, we find 
that municipalities with a higher average household size are less likely to have raised 
the degree of price escalation. This constitutes a positive fact, as otherwise price 
escalation would be penalizing larger families instead of promoting an efficient 




Water scarcity is expected to be one of the main challenges humanity will face 
in the coming years. Thus, the efficient and sustainable use of water resources is 
becoming increasingly relevant. Furthermore, water is a basic need, so universal 
access to at least a certain amount of water must be guaranteed at affordable prices. 
In the last decades, the use of economic tools has been fostered as the main tool for 
the achievement of these goals. In this line, a volumetric tariff with some degree of 
price escalation is usually recommended. The more the degree of price escalation in 
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the tariff the more substantial its expected contribution to a better allocation of 
resources. 
However, despite the widespread use of price escalation in water tariffs, no 
established procedure exists to measure its degree. In this paper, we propose a 
measure of the level of price escalation in water tariffs and demonstrate its 
usefulness by analysing the evolution of price escalation between 2000 and 2014 in 
residential water tariffs using a sample of 952 Spanish municipalities. We examine 
the factors influencing this evolution in the context of the guidelines included in 
the European Water Framework Directive (WFD), the main legislative body of 
reference in Spain. 
We find that, when only the variable component is considered, the tariffs 
exhibit, on average, a positive degree of price escalation both before and after the 
implementation of the WFD. However, when the fixed component is also considered 
in the analysis, tariffs are found to be regressive, on average, in both periods. 
Moreover, our results suggest that, despite the formal efforts made by local 
governments to increase price escalation after the coming into effect of the WFD 
by increasing prices more sharply at higher levels of consumption, the main 
increments actually affected those ranges of consumption with smaller proportions 
of consumers. Thus, once the distribution of consumers is considered through the 
use of our proposed measures of price escalation, our results show that, accounting 
for both the fixed and variable components, some progress has been made in terms 
of price escalation, while there has actually been a decrease in the degree of price 
escalation in the variable component of the tariffs between 2000 and 2014, contrary 
to what should have been expected from the implementation of the WFD. Besides, 
we find that some factors related to water stress, ideological factors, socioeconomic 
characteristics, issues related to tourist activity, and the ownership of the 
management may be affecting the probability of adopting tariffs with a higher level 
of escalation. 
The main policy recommendations that can be drawn from our results involves 
the need to improve the incorporation into national law and implementation of the 
WFD in Spain. As pointed out by Pinto and Marques (2015), the decentralization 
of price-setting decisions to the municipalities may be hindering the implementation 
of the WFD, as it leaves the determination of price structures to retail utilities that 
may lack the necessary technical capability to design tariffs that simultaneously 
fulfil the multiple objectives of cost recovery, efficiency, sustainability, and equity 
expected from water tariffs. Moreover, the decentralization of the design of water 
tariffs may lead to political interference in those price-setting strategies (Pinto and 
Marques 2015). Therefore, the creation of a regulatory body with the empowerment 
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to standardize the design of pricing policies as well as stablishing clear guidelines is 
highly encouraged. The reader should refer, for example, to the cases of the 
OFWAT in UK (Ofwat 2013), the ERSAR in Portugal (Martins et al. 2013b) or 
the CER in Ireland (CER, 2014) for case studies in this respect. 
In summary, our contribution with this paper is twofold. First, we suggest two 
synthetic indexes of the degree of the price escalation within water tariffs. Our 
intention is that these summary metrics assist policy makers in conducting sound 
policy analysis, when assessing efforts made by countries and/or municipalities to 
enhance the price escalation of tariffs or performing comparative analysis between 
jurisdictions. Additionally, our empirical application should help public 
administrators identify favourable scenarios for the implementation of the due 
improvements in pricing policies, thus directing their efforts towards generating 
those propitious conditions. Similar analyses could be conducted in other regions 






















Table 21: Variables: description and sources. 
	





See Section 2.3. Own 
construction 
ESCfixESCfix See Section 2.3. Own 
construction 




Blocks Number of blocks in the variable part 








Occup Proportion of occupancy of reservoirs 
in the municipality’s river basin. 
Average for 2000-13 (year 2014) and 









Pluv Annual rainfall per square metre.  
Average for 2000-13 (year 2014) and 





Temp Average of August temperatures.  
Average for 2000-13 (for year 2014) 



















All the variables included in this appendix were gathered with reference to both 2000 and 2014. The only 
exceptions are the variables related to weather (Pluv, Temp, Occup), which are means calculated over 
longer periods (see Table 21). It should also be noted that, following the description, in the case ideology 
and policy the variables related to 2014 reflect the situation during the last three four-year ruling periods 
(that is from 2002 to 2014), while the variable that makes reference to the year 2000 accounts for the 







Tourism Tourist activity index La Caixa (2014) 







Economic activity index La Caixa (2014) 
Householdsize 
 







Private Binary variable= 1 if private 
management and 0 in case of public 
management 
Water utilities 
IDEOLOGY PP Binary variable = 1 if PP has 
dominated the local government 
during at least 2 of the last three four-
year ruling periods and 0 otherwise 




PSOE Binary variable = 1 if PSOE has 
dominated the local government 
during at least two of the last three 
four-year ruling periods and 0 
otherwise 




IU Binary variable = 1 if IU has 
dominated the local government 
during at least two of the last three 
four-year ruling periods and 0 
otherwise 




POLICY Majority Binary variable = 1 if during the last 
three ruling periods the most voted 
party secured over 50% of the votes 
and 0 otherwise 
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Table 22: Variables in differences for the two periods considered, description and 
sources. 





Change in price escalation  along the period 
(Difference between ESCin 2014 and ESC in 2000). 
Water tariff variables 
DFixed 




Difference in the number of blocks between 2014 
and 2000 
Proxies for levels of 
water stress 
DOccup 
Change in occupation in reservoirs during the 




Change in average rainfall during the considered 




Change in average rainfall during the considered 




characteristics of the 
municipality 
DDensity 
Change in density of population during the 




Change in population during the considered period 




Change in tourist activity during the considered 




Change in unemployment rates during the 
considered period (Difference between 








Table 23: Summary statistics (variables in differences). 
	
 N Mean St.Dev Min Max 
      
DPopulation 1,001 3.485 13.76 -16.11 350.7 
DHsize 961 -0.292 0.233 -1.105 0.780 
DDensity 994 0.115 0.610 -1.798 17.55 
DOccup 1,001 12.43 9.106 -2.359 36.74 
DPluv 1,001 12.59 42.08 -91.07 143.6 
DTemp 988 0.236 0.483 -0.560 0.984 
DTourism 992 4.509 63.01 -455 1,615 
DUnemp 1,000 7.058 5.159 -8.400 22 
DBlocks 1,000 0.152 1.016 -11 5 
DFixed 1,001 0.432 2.055 -10.91 16.42 
DContinuity 1,001 0.825 0.380 0 1 
Dpubpriv 1,001 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Privthroughout 1,001 .2388 .4265 0 1 






Change in economic activity during the considered 





Change in household size during the considered 





Continuity in the type of ownership of the 
management along the period. The same manager 
has been managing the service along the period. 
Privthroughout 
Management was private throughout the considered 
period (2000-2014). 
Dpubpriv 
A change from public to private management 
occurred during the period (2000-2014) 
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Essay 3:                          
The Role of Environmental 
Attitudes on Averting 
Behaviors that Entail Negative 
Externalities: A Double-hurdle 




In this paper, we explore the effect of individual’s environmental attitudes on 
adopting mitigation actions that entail environmental negative externalities. 
Moreover, a double-hurdle approach is proposed to deal with the substantial 
number of zero consumption records in databases on averting behaviors. Using a 
dataset on bottled water consumption from two cities in southern Spain, we also 
explore the impact of several public policies related to residential water 
management that are being increasingly applied in many urban centers around the 
world. Our results suggest that some pricing and non-pricing water conservation 
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policies could result in environmentally undesirable effects derived from an increase 
in bottled water demand. We also find that fostering pro-environmental habits 
could prove very successful in curbing averting behaviors that pose environmental 
externalities. Additionally, we find that failing to properly address problems 
stemming from the large percentage of zero consumption records when modelling 




Averting behaviors have been a long-standing matter of study. The existence 
of consumer’s defensive responses to potential environmental or health impacts of 
pollution and other hazards has been long acknowledged. The term “averting 
behavior”, also usually referred to as defensive or mitigating behavior, contains a 
wide range of actions with the common feature of being undertaken with the 
objective of either preventing exposure to certain environmental risks or hazards, 
or mitigating and compensating for their effects after exposure (Dickie, 2017). Some 
preventive actions would include, for example, the use of home air cleaners or 
purifiers for air pollution (Dickie and Gerking, 1991), using sunscreen lotion in order 
to reduce the risk of skin cancer (Murdoch and Thayer 1990) or installing water 
filtration systems and purchasing bottled water in order to avoid water 
contamination (Harrington et al. 1989; Zivin, 2011).  
At an aggregate scale, the use of mitigating actions implies substantial costs 
for individuals and societies, which may involve monetary expenses, such as 
expenses on medical care for illnesses caused by air pollution (Gerking and Stanley, 
1986) or purchase and installation of certain devices (Abdalla et al. 1992); time 
costs, as they usually imply change in daily activities (Neidell, 2009); as well as 
facing certain deprivations, such as reductions in outdoor time to avoid ozone 
exposure (Mansfield, Johnson and van Houtven, 2006). Some of these averting 
behaviors also entail environmental negative externalities, leading to great 
environmental costs. This may include generating waste and residuals that are for 
the most part non-biodegradable, such as plastic bottles and active carbon filters 
for water or masks for air pollution; energy needs associated with transport and for 
the use of certain devices (Deschenes and Greenstone, 2011), heating and air 
conditioning (Isaac and Van Vuuren, 2009) or toxic substances released to the 
atmosphere and maritime ecosystems severely affecting their sustainability 
(Farbaim et al. 2016; US EPA, 1998; Tovar-Sánchez et al. 2013). Particularly in 
relation to the empirical implementation of this paper, the bottled water industry 
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is predicted to generate numerous environmental externalities. The amount of water 
needed to obtain one liter of bottled water amounts to 1.32 liters, contributing to 
the depletion of aquifers and spring waters (International Bottled Water 
Association, 2015).  In addition, most plastic bottles are discharged after use into 
landfills (Arnold and Larsen, 2006). And energy needs associated with bottling and 
transport of the water significantly add to the environmental footprint, with a range 
of 5.6 to 10.2 Megajoules per liter (MJ/l) of bottled water. 
The processes governing the decisions to undertake averting behaviors are 
complex and influenced by multiple objective and subjective factors that have been 
extensively studied. In this paper, we want to explore the role of environmental 
attitudes and behaviors. Given that, as mentioned earlier, some averting behaviors 
entail environmental negative externalities, it is to be expected that their choice 
over other more environmentally friendly alternatives would be influenced by 
individual’s attitudes towards the environment.  
Existing research claims that there exists a substantial gap between people’s 
attitudes towards the environment and their actual actions (Blake, 1999). Thus, we 
study separately the influence of environmental attitudes and behaviors. In 
addition, with respect to environmental behaviors the analysis is further 
disaggregated in order to account for the different levels of individual pro-
environmental involvement. Particularly, the two distinct classes of environmental 
behaviors the literature has usually identified as entailing different levels of sacrifice 
on the part of the individual are considered independently. Those include efficiency 
or one-shot behaviors such as installation of certain technologies addressed at saving 
resources, and curtailment behaviors including daily habits or sacrifices with the 
objective of preserving the environment (Stern and Gardner, 1981). This is 
important in terms of public policy, as policies aimed at fostering environmental 
concerns usually differ from the ones promoting behavioral change (Stern and 
Gardner, 1981). And the same applies to interventions tackling promotion of 
efficiency and curtailment actions. 
One important issue when dealing with averting expenditures is the substantial 
percentage of households that do not consume any amount. Zero consumption may 
arise for several reasons and econometric modelling strategies will vary according 
to the economic interpretation placed on those zeros. However, this fact has been 
usually neglected in the literature. In this paper, we propose an empirical strategy 
to deal with the existence of a substantial number of zero consumption records in 
databases on averting behavior consumption and expenditures. Particularly, we use 
a generic double hurdle approach that allows us to model averting behaviours 
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without departing from any particular hypothesis regarding the reasons why 
households do not adopt said behaviors –i.e. non-participation vs. corner solutions- 
and to test the underlying distributional assumptions in order to choose among 
specifications. 
To meet our objectives, we use data on bottled water consumption from a 2014 
household survey conducted in the towns of Baza and Guadix, in the province of 
Granada, Spain. Since bottled water is an averting behavior that poses a number 
of significant environmental negative externalities and can be substituted by other 
more environmentally friendly alternatives (e.g. filtering water), it can be expected 
that the decision to consume would be influenced by individual’s attitudes and 
behaviors towards the environment. We observe that a significant number of 
household do not use bottled water as an averting behavior, thus posing the 
abovementioned feature of a substantial proportion of zero consumption records. 
The fact that Spain is the fourth largest consumer of bottled water per capita in 
Europe and the ninth in the world (Beverage Marketing Company, 2013) also makes 
it an interesting setting for our study. In addition, Baza and Guadix are located in 
the Guadalquivir River basin, which is under extreme water stress according to the 
European Environmental Agency (2012). Thus, efficient and sustainable 
management of water resources gets special attention from policy-makers in this 
region, and numerous water conservation policies are being applied to residential 
water supply. Given that bottled water could be a substitute to drinking from the 
tap, we analyze whether several pricing and non-pricing policies that are currently 
being applied in many urban centers around the world could be affecting bottled 
water demand, so that the potential environmental effects are accounted for when 
considering among the different types of public policies for residential water 
conservation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 presents an 
overview of the state of the art on the determinants of the adoption of averting 
behaviors and bottled water consumption. Our model is then outlined in Section 
3.3. The data and methodological approach proposed for the empirical analysis are 
described in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the results and the pertaining 
robustness checks, and Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion and policy 
implications. 
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3.2. Literature review 
	
The existence of averting or mitigating behaviors was acknowledged earlier in 
the literature and since the first attempts to provide a consistent theoretical 
framework of averting behaviors (Courant and Porter, 1981; Harford, 1984; Gerking 
and Stanley, 1986; Smith and Desvouges, 1986; Bartik, 1988), numerous efforts 
have been made towards a more thorough understanding of the determinants of 
these decisions. 
The underlying idea is that households undertake averting behaviors to produce 
a certain level of quality of the environmental goods they consume, or as referred 
to by Bartik (1988) “the quality of their personal environment”. Thus, the decision 
to perform an environmental defensive behavior is expected to depend on the 
objective pre-existing quality of environmental conditions faced by consumers. 
Consequently, many studies use measures of objective quality in order to assess 
willingness to pay for improvements in environmental quality (Courant and Porter, 
1981; Bartik, 1988; Harrington et al. 1989; Abdalla et al. 1992; Laughland et al. 
1996). However, consumer judgement about environmental quality and harmful 
environmental risks has extensively been found to depart from rationality (Slovic, 
1987, Simon, 1955, Arrow, 1992, Kahneman 1982). Therefore, conventional models 
based on objective measures of quality have most of the times been found to be of 
limited relevance in explaining consumer actual averting choices. Conversely, choice 
of averting behaviors is expected to be made, instead, on the basis of perceived 
environmental quality (Um et al. 2002). 
As for health risks, they have also been long recognized as one of the main 
reasons for households undertaking defensive actions. However, given that, as with 
environmental quality, households may not be perfectly capable of assessing the 
importance of the risks they are exposed to (Slovic, 1987), subjective measures of 
health risks are usually employed in empirical works. Similarly, the presence of 
individuals belonging to vulnerable populations (e.g. young children, elderly people 
or individuals with poor health status) has been acknowledged to generate risk 
aversion, sometimes triggering the decision to undertake averting behaviors (Zivin 
et al 2011; Yoo and Yang, 2000; Abrahams et al. 2000). 
With respect to bottled water consumption, these and other factors seem to be 
affecting the decision to undertake it as an averting behavior. Although some 
studies have used objective quality of water as a means to assess willingness to pay 
for an increase in water quality (Harrington et al. 1989; Abdalla et al. 1992; 
Laughland et al. 1996), perceived measures have been proved to be more relevant 
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in explaining actual behavior (Um et al. 2002). However, evidence on its impact is 
mixed. While several studies find that households are more prone to consume 
bottled water the poorer the perceived quality of the water from the tap (Um et al. 
2002; Yoo, 2003; Janmaat, 2007), some other find no statistically significant 
influence of perceived water quality (Larson and Gnedenko 1999; Yoo and Yang, 
2000; Doria, 2009). With respect to perceived health risks, evidence is also 
inconclusive. Some empirical studies conclude that health risk perceptions do have 
an influence on the averting behaviors undertaken in response to hazardous 
substances on water (Bontemps and Nauges, 2015; Jakus, 2009). However, others 
do not find a significant effect (Janmaat, 2007).  
Other non-health related aspects of tap water quality are usually found to affect 
the demand for bottled water as an averting behavior within the household. Those 
involve mainly organoleptic (aesthetic) characteristics such as taste, odor (mainly 
chlorine), color and turbidity (i.e the extent to which water has particles in 
suspension). Research suggests that these sensorial characteristics are at least as 
important as consumer’s health risks perception when deciding on whether or not 
to undertake averting actions related to drinking water (Abrahams et al. 2000; 
Jakus et al. 2009). A poor perception about organoleptics has been systematically 
found to increase the likelihood of the household’s choice to consume bottled water 
(Abrahams et al 2000; Yoo, 2003; Doria, 2009; Jakus et al 2009; Johnstone and 
Serret, 2012).  
Additional consideration would deserve whether households have any previous 
experience with violations in health-related parameters involving water 
contamination (Abrahams et al 2000) or past unpleasant episodes with respect to 
organoleptic characteristics (Dupont et al. 2010, Janmaat, 2007, Um et al 2002). 
Finally, some aspects related to the perceived quality of the service have also been 
considered. For instance, Doria (2009) includes satisfaction with tap pressure, 
finding no significant influence on the propensity to consume bottled water. 
With respect to the socio-demographic variables, income is usually considered 
a determinant. Bottled water is expected to be a normal good, so higher-income 
households are predicted to both show higher probability of purchasing bottled 
water (Larson and Gnedenko, 1999; Johnstone and Serret, 2012; Bontemps and 
Nauges, 2015) and higher level of demand. However, some papers find no significant 
influence of the income variable (Smith and Desvouges, 1986). Similarly, education 
is usually included as a proxy for household’s knowledge and empirical evidence on 
its expected sign is mixed. While some find that bottled water consumption 
increases with education level (Jakus et al. 2009) others do find the opposite effect 
(Janmaat, 2007) and some elicit no significant relationship (Um et al. 2012). The 
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time that household members have been living in town (Janmaat, 2007; Johnstone 
and Serret, 2012) and the household size are also usually considered with mixed 
evidence (Johnstone and Serret, 2012; Yoo and Yang, 2000).  
 
3.3. Model specification 
	
3.3.1. Environmental attitudes and behaviors 
	
Departing from the existing literature, our model addresses several features 
that have not been sufficiently studied in previous work. First, we analyze the role 
of both environmental attitudes and behaviors on the decision to undertake averting 
behaviors that entail negative environmental externalities. Research on the 
relationship between environmental concerns and behaviors states that 
environmental concern does not always translate into the corresponding pro-
environmental actions (Blake, 1999). This gap between people’s attitudes towards 
the environment and their actual behavior, known as the “value-action gap” or 
“concern-action paradox,” has been long acknowledged and extensively studied 
(Blake, 1999; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). Furthermore, the literature has 
identified two differentiated categories of pro-environmental behaviors according to 
the different levels of sacrifice they impose on the individual, that is, efficiency and 
curtailment behaviors (Hayes, 1976). Efficiency, or one-shot behaviors refer to the 
adoption of technologies that conserve certain natural resources (e.g. water or 
energy) within the household. For example, some efficient behaviors related to 
water would involve the installation of water-saving devices on taps or the purchase 
of electrical appliances (i.e. dishwashers or washing machines) that optimize energy 
consumption. On the other hand, curtailment refers to frequently repeated actions 
or sacrificial habits that imply a modification in the way people use these resources. 
Some examples of this type of behaviors include trying to reduce the duration of 
the showers, or waiting until the dishwasher and washing machine are full before 
operating them. Therefore, the main difference between both types lies in the fact 
that while using water-saving technologies does not demand any sacrifice on behalf 
of the individual, apart from the initial economic cost of installing water-saving 
devices, having to renounce to a long shower or closing the tap when not in use 
while brushing teeth entails sacrifices in daily life (Stern and Gardner, 1981).  
Although promoting efficient behaviors within the household has usually 
proved to exhibit more potential for natural resource’s conservation than fostering 
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curtailment behaviors (Stern and Gardner, 1981), averting or mitigating actions 
that we are exploring in this paper are inherently a behavior of the curtailment 
type. There does not exist an efficient technology that allows households to reduce 
their consumption without reducing utility.  Thus, it is possible that even when 
environmental concern does not affect consumption habits, individuals that are 
already undertaking some environmental habits extend it to other pro-
environmental behaviors (e.g. restricting their bottled water consumption or using 
tap water filtration devices). In the same manner, individuals already undertaking 
a higher level of commitment or sacrifice may find it easier to carry out other 
behaviors implying similar levels of sacrifice.  This has important implications in 
terms of public policy, since interventions that promote respectively concern, 
efficiency and curtailment behaviors are rather dissimilar. As for concern, policies 
normally involve information campaigns aimed at raising household awareness. On 
the other hand, in the case of behaviors of the one-shot or efficiency class, policy 
interventions could range from subsides that reduce the cost of purchasing efficient 
technologies to the design of labeling systems that correctly signal appliance level 
of efficiency or improving the diffusion of innovation through social networks (Stern 
and Gardner, 1981; Darley, 1977). Contrary, encouraging the adoption of certain 
curtailment or sacrificial habits demands a substantially more complex approach 
involving factors such as generating commitment or leading to changes in social 
norms (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002).  As far as averting behaviors are concerned, 
to our knowledge only one attempt has been made in order to ascertain the impact 
of environmental concern (Johnstone and Serret, 2012)62 and neither the existence 
of the abovementioned paradox nor the distinction between different types of 
behaviors have been previously explored.  
 
3.3.2. Other pricing and non-pricing policies for water 
conservation. 
	
We explore the influence of several policies for residential water management 
that may potentially be affecting bottled water demand. These policies can be 
broadly classified in two categories: pricing and non-pricing (Olmstead and Stavins, 
																																								 																				
62 However, this attempt is limited to inclusion of a variable indicating the “how important solid 
waste issues are for them, relative to other eight environmental concerns” (Johnstone and Serret, 
2012: page 674). It only studies the influence of this variable on the propensity to consume 
bottled water, against both the decision and quantities purchased considered in this study. 
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2009). Pricing interventions are mainly directed to raising prices and designing tariff 
schemes that foster efficient water consumption, such as the ones in IBRs (Olmstead 
et al. 2007). On the other hand, non-pricing instruments include mainly imposing 
restrictions on water use and promoting efficient water consumption by either 
influencing individual’s attitudes and behaviors or fostering the installation of water 
saving technologies. In our model, we analyze the influence of both types of policies 
on the quantity of bottled water consumed.  
With respect to pricing, it could be expected that if households are charged a 
higher price for tap water, they decide to demand more bottled water. It could also 
be the case that perception of the tap water price63 by consumers, rather that the 
actual price, may be affecting bottled water demand. As for non-pricing 
instruments, the role of individual’s attitudes and behaviors have already been 
discussed previously in this section. Other policies within this category involve 
water rationing and supply cuts with the objective of reducing demand (Olmstead 
and Stavins, 2009). Since drinking water is a human necessity, the reliability of the 
service is very likely to affect the decision to consume bottled water, triggering the 
need to purchase and store bottled water. Thus, we also aim at exploring the 




Our model of bottled water consumption aims to reflect the nature of the 
decision-making process underlying the decision to purchase bottled water as an 
averting behavior without making any prior assumption on the process generating 
it.  
As mentioned above, one important issue when dealing with certain averting 
expenditures, and particularly bottled water consumption, is the high proportion 
of households that do not consume any amount. Zero consumption may be caused 
by several reasons. Infrequency of purchase is a usual one. However, given that 
drinking water is a necessity, it does not seem to apply to the consumption of this 
particular commodity. The two other common sources, non-participation and 
corner solutions are more likely to be occurring instead. It may be that some 
individuals are simply non-consumers of bottled water, that is, that they decide 
not to “participate” in the market for bottled water for several reasons, but if those 
reasons were not present (e.g. environmental beliefs explored in this paper), they 
																																								 																				
63 Whether or not it is perceived as expensive. 
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would consume a positive amount. Corner solutions, on the other hand, arise from 
the consumer’s utility-maximizing decision being not to consume at all, given their 
budget constraint.  
This is an important distinction, as econometric modeling strategies will vary 
according to the economic interpretation placed on those observed zeros. Until 
now, the majority of existing studies on this issue have focused only on studying 
the decision or probability to consume bottled water, treating it as a dichotomous 
variable, without modeling the actual quantity consumed. In the infrequent 
occasions in which expenditures have been explored, they usually have been 
investigated through the use of Heckman selection models (Jakus, 2009; Lloyd-
Smith et al. 2016) or similar approaches (Yoo and Yang, 2000), thus assuming a 
priori the non-participation hypothesis. However, the fact that zeros can also arise 
from corner solutions has been neglected. Within the context discussed above, our 
model departs from a generic double-hurdle approach (Jones, 1989) in which 
consumers are presumed to pass two hurdles before observing a positive 
consumption. First, they decide on whether or not to consume bottled water as an 
averting behavior and, second, they make a decision on how much bottled water 
to consume. 
Analytically speaking, a representative household is assumed to display a 
latent utility derived from drinking and using bottled water for household 
consumption purposes, instead of using water from the tap or other sources (i.e. 
installing or purchasing water filtration systems). If that utility is positive, they 
will decide to choose bottled water as an averting behavior, purchasing a certain 
amount in the market, otherwise they won’t. 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛:  𝑆 = 𝑓  (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑝, 𝑐)  (15) 
 
Once consumers have decided to consume bottled water, their next decision 
will be how much water to consume. Thus, the main equation of interest is: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛:     𝑌 ∗ = 𝑔(𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑝, 𝑐) (16) 
 
where S is a variable reflecting whether or not the household consumes bottled 
water as opposed to using water from the tap, and Y is the amount of bottled water 
consumed (quantities purchased). s is a vector of variables including socioeconomic 
variables and variables related to organoleptics and tap water quality, e includes 
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environmental variables concerning attitudes and behaviors, p is a vector of tap 
water price related variables, and c accounts for the variables related to 
interruptions in the service. The methodology used to model these decisions and all 
the variables incorporated in the study are explained in the next section. 
 
Our expectations with respect to the variables, based on previous work, are 
provided below. A bad perception on both organoleptic and quality is presumed to 
lead to a higher probability of consuming bottled water, while the effect on the 
quantities is not clear. Pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors should be 
expected to reduce the propensity to consume bottled water, and, when the 
households have decided to consume, based on any other circumstance, it is also 
expected that environmentally friendly households try to reduce their actual 
consumption as much as possible. With respect to price, price of tap water and 
household’s perception about that price could be expected to affect the decision on 
the consumed quantity. Interruptions in the service are expected to affect the 
decision to consume, since frequent cuts may trigger the need to purchase and store 
bottled water. The level of disruption caused should be more related to the length 
in time and other features of those cuts, and could affect both the decision to 
consume and the quantity to be consumed. 
 
3.4. Data, Variables and Empirical Methodology 
3.4.1. Data, Sample and Variables. 
	
We use data from a household survey conducted in the towns of Baza and 
Guadix, in the province of Granada (southern Spain). Baza and Guadix have a 
population of 20,668 and 18,928 inhabitants respectively (INE, 2015a), they are 
located nearly 50 km apart from each other and are served by two different utilities. 
Water supply originates mainly from snowmelt in the Sierra Nevada mountains, 
but part of the supply is abstracted from several local springs. In general, objective 
water quality parameters are rather good and above the official standards.64 
Violations of health related water parameters in this area are rare (only one episode 
in 2008 is recorded and it was due to torrential rains). However, service 
interruptions due to network overload are not so uncommon, taking place mainly 
in the summer, when nearly 28,000 and 23,000 additional tourist residents are added 
																																								 																				
64 Values of objective water quality parameters from the last chemical analysis performed can 
be provided by the authors upon request. 
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to the regular population of Baza and Guadix respectively (MHAP, 2016), creating 
excess demand. 
The region exhibits certain characteristics that make it an interesting setting 
for this study. In their last available study about the global market in 2014, the 
Beverage Marketing Corporation rated Spain as the 4th largest per capita consumer 
of bottled water in Europe and the 9th in the world in total consumption (Beverage 
Marketing Company, 2014). Moreover, Spain is a country subject to either water 
stress or severe water stress throughout the most part of its territory (European 
Environmental Agency, 2012). Particularly, the towns of Baza and Guadix are 
located in the Guadalquivir River Basin, a basin under severe water stress 
(European Environmental Agency, 2012), that has long suffered from water scarcity 
problems and whose situation is expected to worsen in the future. These 
circumstances have made water management a paramount issue of concern in the 
region. 
The survey was implemented by a consulting company (Ipsos) in 2014 and 
administered on a population of 10,062 households in Baza and 9,704 in Guadix 
(MHAP, 2016), from which a representative sample of 594 households (305 in Baza 
and 289 in Guadix) was extracted. Sampling was performed with proportional 
quotas to stratum size, according to gender and age. Questionnaire development 
included the use of several focus groups and a pilot pre-test. Interviewers were 
trained before the interview was launched and careful instructions were 
incorporated into the questionnaire on what information should be conveyed and 
how responses should be gathered. The survey was administered door-to-door with 
a response rate of 80%. According to interviewers, respondents had, on average, a 
very good attitude towards the interview.65 With respect to the information 
included in the survey, this database contains a broad set of perceived water quality 
indicators, as well as usual socioeconomic controls. In order to measure 
environmental attitudes, the individual had to respond to a series of statements 
which are able to accurately measure attitudinal factors, from which an aggregate 
index water built (See Appendix). In addition, a wide range of questions (Appendix 
1 in Suárez-Varela and Dinar, 2017) on environmental behaviors is included in order 
to account for the different levels of individual’s environmental involvement 
(efficiency and curtailment actions). Tap water consumption and prices paid by the 
household can also be obtained from the questionnaire, and a question on residential 
water price perception is included. In addition, information on household perception 
on interruptions of the service was gathered.  
																																								 																				
65 They were rated by the interviewers an average of 4.51 in a scale from 1 (Very bad 
attitude) to 5 (very good attitude) 
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In order to ascertain our main variables of interest, individuals were asked, 
respectively, whether or not the household reports using regularly bottled water as 
main source of drinking and in-house water (e.g. cooking) and the quantity in liters 
of bottled water consumed per week. It should be noted that when households were 
asked about bottled water consumption, particular emphasis was made on the fact 
that we were measuring the use of bottled water as an averting behavior and regular 
source of drinking water inside the household. Away-from-home or sporadic 
consumption was not considered. For a more thorough description of the variables, 
readers are refered to Suárez-Varela and Dinar (2017). 
 
3.4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics 
	
Table 24 depicts the definition and main descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in the analysis. 
 




Variable Description N Mean SD Min Max 
        
Dependent 
variables 
Bottledwater Household reports consuming 
bottled water on a regular 
basis (Dummy)  
 
528 0.322 0.468 0 1 
Quantity Bottled water consumption 
(in liters per week) 
 
528 4.333 7.748 0 48 
Socioecon. Municipio Household is located in Baza 
(Dummy) 
528 0.496 0.501 0 1 
HholdIncome Household income (Ordinal)  528 6.417 3.677 1 14 
NoEduc Respondent has not completed 
any formal education level 
(Dummy). 
528 0.047 0.213 0 1 



















Secondary_Educ Respondent has completed 
secondary education (Dummy). 
 
528 0.303 0.460 0 1 
HighEduc Respondent has completed 
university studies either 
degree, master or PhD 
(Dummy). 
528 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Length Length of time that the 
respondent has been living in 
the town (Years). 
528 35.55 19.85 1 86 
Hsize Household size   
(Number of members in the 
household). 
528 2.955 1.157 1 6 
Childrenlessthan2 The household reports having 










Quality Satisfaction with water quality 
1 (very unsatisfied) - 5 (very 
satisfied). 
528 4.027 1.109 1 5 
Serviceperc Satisfaction with wastewater 
service.   
1 (very unsatisfied) - 5 (very 
satisfied). 
508 3.415 1.178 1 5 
Organoleptics Color Respondent perceives that 
water is not clear 
1 (totally disagree) to 5 
(totally agree). 
528 1.509 0.893 1 5 
Smell Respondent perceives that 
water has some odor  
1 (totally disagree) - 5 
(totally agree). 
528 1.555 0.878 1 5 
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Taste Respondent perceives that 
water has some taste    1 
(totally disagree) - 5 (totally 
agree). 
523 1.740 1.064 1 5 
Interruptions Cutfreq Incidence of water supply cuts 
realized during 
the summer by the 
respondent   
0 (never) -  5 (very 
frequently, more than  10 
times) 
 
528 1.246 0.508 1 4 
Cutdisruption Supply cuts caused 
inconvenience to respondent   
1 (a few)-5 (a lot). 







Envconcernavg Respondent average value 
reported in a set of 
environmental attitudes 
(Suárez-Varela and Dinar, 
2017.). 
528 3.940 0.512 1.50 5 
Envworried Respondent environmental 
concern is over the mean of 
the sample (Dummy). 
 
528 0.540 0.499 0 1 
Watereff The household has installed 
some water saving devices on 
taps, showers or cisterns 
(Dummy). 
 
528 0.616 0.487 0 1 
filling_dishwasher Respondent reports waiting 
until the dish- washer and 
washing machine are full 
before operating them 
(Dummy). 
 
499 0.972 0.165 0 1 
Closing_taps Respondent reports closing the 
tap while brushing their teeth 
or shaving (Dummy). 
528 0.936 0.246 0 1 
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Reducing_shower Respondent reports trying to 





Waterhabitindex Index indicating number of 
water conservation habits held 
by the respondent (Count). 
528 2.78 0.48 0 3 
Price 
variables 
Priceperception Respondent’s perception of 
water tap price  
1 (very cheap) – 5 (very 
expensive). 
513 3.780 0.834 1 5 
Averageprice Average price per cubic meter 
of tap water at the mean point 
of the range in which the 
household reports to consume 
(€/m3). 
394 1.001 0.113 0.77 1.12 
 
With respect to our dependent variables, 32.2% of the households report 
purchasing bottled water on a regular basis. Mean bottled water consumption is 
4.33 liters per week, but this mean includes also households that do not consume 
bottled water at all. Among those households that purchase a positive amount of 
bottled water, a mean value of of water consumption is 13.7 liters per week. Figure 
4 presents the distribution of the consumption values for those households that 
report consuming bottled water.  
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of bottled water demand in liters per week 
Mean household size is 2.95 members, similar to the mean value of 2.51 for 
Spain (INE, 2015b). 7.2% of the households have at least one child in the household 
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that is younger than 2 years. Mean household income lies within the range of €1,801 
- 2,100 per month, slightly lower than the census mean of €2,174 for Spain (INE, 
2015b).66 
With respect to organoleptics, household perception is quite good. In a range 
of 1 to 5 (5 reflecting poor perception of organoleptics), color has the best perception 
(1.509); and the worst perception corresponds to taste (1.740). Smell would lie in 
the middle with a rating of 1.550. In the same vein, consumers are on average more 
than satisfied with the quality of tap water (4.027 out of 5). As for interruptions in 
the service, cuts are perceived to be relatively infrequent (between 0 and 3 during 
the summer), although the level of disruption caused by them is on average high 
(4.214 out of 5). 
The variables related to the environmental value-action gap deserve a more 
detailed discussion. With respect to environmental attitudes, individuals report, 
on average, being quite concerned about environmental degradation (3.9 out of 5). 
In particular, a high percentage of households report practicing water saving habits 
(curtailment behavior): 97.2% report waiting until the washing machine and 
dishwasher are full, before operating them; 93.6% try to turn off the tap when not 
in use while shaving or brushing their teeth, and 92.8% report reducing the 
duration  of their  showers. In fact, almost all the households in the survey put 
into practice at least one of these curtailment behaviors (99.6%).67 However, as 
depicted in Figure 5, the level of environmental concern does not seem to make a 
difference in relation to the involvement in water-saving habits.  Those households 
whose environmental concern is above average have similar values compared with 
the ones with values below average, and the correlation between environmental 
concern and the number of water-saving practices that the household performs is 
substantially low (12.8%).  
 
																																								 																				
66 This is not surprising as Andalucía, the region of Spain where Baza and Guadix are located, 
is one of the poorest Autonomous Communities in Spain. 
67 This holds even if we restrict more the definition of environmentally concern. For 
individuals that report more than 4.5 as average environmental concern, these 
percentages suffer only from little variation (slight increase). 
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Figure 5: Share of households whose concern is below (light grey) and above 
(dark grey) average that perform certain water saving behaviors. 
	
With respect to behaviors of the "one-time" or efficiency type, these 
percentages are relatively lower, with 61.6% of the households in the sample having 
water-saving technologies installed in the house. Correlation of this variable with 
the level of environmental concern is also very low (6.6%) and the percentage of 
households seems to be similar independently of whether the level of concern of 
the household is above the sample mean or not (Figure 5). As the ‘value-action’ 
gap literature asserts, the correlation between environmental concern and behavior 
in our sample seems weak. In addition, support for the different types of behaviors 
is substantially diverse, suggesting that the processes generating them may differ. 
In this context, a further level of disaggregation of the variables related to 
environmental attitudes and behaviors could improve our understanding of 
environmental related processes and thus yield more accurate policy 
recommendations. 
 
3.4.2. Empirical methodology 
	
In this section, we aim to empirically model the demand for bottled water. 
The first issue that we must deal with is the fact that the sample contains a high 
percentage of households reporting of not consuming bottled water (67.8%). As 
referred earlier in the ext, in order to model it, we depart from a generic double-
hurdle approach (Jones, 1989) in which consumers are presumed to pass two 












Watereff Filling_dishwasher Closing_tap Reducing_showers
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not to consume bottled water (choosing bottled water as their averting behavior) 
and, once they have decided to consume, they determine the quantity to be 
consumed. In econometric terms, these decisions can be expressed by the two 
following equations: 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛:  𝑆 = γZ +  ν   (17) 
  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛:     𝑌 ∗ = 𝛽𝑋 + 𝑢 (18) 
 
where ν and 𝑢 are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with zero 
means, standard deviations 𝜎_ and 𝜎`, and correlation 𝜌. Z and X are the 
covariates affecting each decision explained in the previous section. Because we do 
not observe utility, instead of S we can only observe whether they have actually 
participated or not in the market, reflected in a binary choice variable: 
 
𝐷 = 1, 𝑠 > 0 0 , 𝑠 ≤ 0 (19) 
 
As we will explain below, estimation methods will vary according to the 
assumptions placed on the relationship between the two decisions (joint 
distribution of the errors) and the process that generates the data (observability 
rule). 
When corner solutions are encountered, values within a certain range are 
observed as a single value (Greene, 2012).  Particularly for the case considered here, 
when a consumer’s underlying utility derived from consuming bottled water is 
negative (𝑌 ∗ ≤ 0), the utility-maximizing decision will be not to consume: 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑌 = 𝑌  ∗ 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑌 ∗ > 0 𝐷 = 1 , 𝑌 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (20) 
 
Estimation under this type of censoring of the dependent variable was 
addressed by Tobin (1958) using a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions. 
However, one drawback of the Tobit models (as they are usually referred to) is that 
they estimate only one set of coefficients, implying that the variables in the model 
affect both the decision to consume and the consumption choice in the same 
direction. In our setting, this premise may be too restrictive, as there are reasons 
to believe that the group of factors that influence the choice of bottled water over 
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other averting behaviors related to water consumption are different from the ones 
that determine the quantity eventually consumed.  In order to account for this 
possibility, we use a more flexible model proposed by Cragg (1971), which allows 
the participation and intensity equations to be independent and governed by 
different mechanisms, yielding two different sets of estimations. Thus, in Cragg’s 
models, independence of the disturbance terms (u and v) is assumed (𝜌 = 0) and 
the participation and consumption equations are estimated respectively by means 
of a Probit and a truncated regression.  
When 𝛾 = 𝛽/𝜎` and provided that the same set of regressors is used for both 
equations, Cragg’s specification will collapse to Tobit (Greene, 2012). A likelihood 
ratio (LR) test on this restriction proposed by Lin and Schmidt (1984), can be used 
to choose between Cragg’s and Tobit specifications. 
On the other hand, when non-participation is suspected as the underlying 
process generating zero consumption, Heckman selection models are to be applied. 
In this case, consumption will only be observed when the individuals pass the 
participation rule (𝐷 = 1), that is, once they have chosen bottled water as their 
averting behavior: 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛:  𝑌 = 𝐷 · 𝑌  ∗  (21) 
 
Under this scenario, the final observed consumption could be biased if there 
were unobserved factors affecting both the decision to consume and the quantity 
actually consumed. Therefore, under Heckman models, dependence of the 
disturbance terms (u and v) is presumed in order to account and correct for the 
possibility of the existence of selection bias. Parameters in the system can be 
estimated through either Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FILM) or two-
step estimation (Heckman, 1979) and, after estimation, the independence 
assumption can be tested by means of a LR test. In the event that both errors were 
found to be correlated, the existence of selection bias would be uncovered in our 
sample, and OLS would be yielding inconsistent estimates. However, in the case of 
𝜌 = 0, independence of the two decisions can be assumed and two-part models in 
which a Probit and OLS equations are estimated separately for each decision, have 
proved more efficient.  Moreover, when 𝜌 = 0, a Vuong test for non-nested models 
The role of environmental attitudes on averting behaviors. 
 165 
to test for the truncated normal against the lognormal specifications can be applied 
to discern between the Cragg’s and Heckman68 specifications (Wooldridge, 2010). 
In addition, when using Heckman selection models, in order for the system to 
be properly identified, Z must contain at least one regressor, also known as exclusion 
restriction, that must belong to the participation equation while being exogenous 
to the consumption decision, and thus not included in X.  
Finally, in order to determine the magnitude of the response of the variable of 
interest under a change in one of the independent variables, marginal effects should 
be obtained. Here, we are interested in predicting unconditional marginal effects, 
that is, the potential change in bottled water consumption that could be achieved 
through a public policy affecting one of the independent variables. In the case of 
Heckman models, unconditional partial effects can be interpreted directly from the 
estimation results. However, in Cragg’s approach, obtaining unconditional marginal 
effects requires some extra calculations of marginal impacts: 
 
𝜕𝐸 𝑦 𝑍, 𝑋
𝜕𝑥/
= 𝛾/𝜙 𝑍𝛾 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜎𝜆
𝑋𝛽
𝜎










where 𝜙 is the normal density function, Φ is the normal distribution function 








Another issue that should be addressed is that in our model two variables are 
suspected of being endogenous:  the index on water saving habits and the price 
structure. Water saving habits could be expected to be jointly determined with 
bottled water consumption if there are individual unobservable characteristics that 
foster both the decision to consume bottled water and to reduce tap water 
consumption by introducing certain saving habits. With respect to the price 
variable, the municipalities in our sample apply tariffs for tap water that takes the 
form of Increasing Block Rates (IBRs). In block pricing, simultaneity bias is 
expected to arise from the fact that price increases with the quantity consumed, 
																																								 																				
68 This is true when log(y) is effectively treated as the dependent variable. 
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which in turn is affected by prices (Olmstead and Stavins, 2007). Because bottled 
water demand is closely related to the household decision on tap water 
consumption, it is to be expected that tap water price will be endogenous to the 
decision on bottled water consumption. 
  In order to account for endogeneity in the framework of selection models, 
Wooldridge (2010) proposes a two-step approach in which a probit model is 
estimated for the selection indicator, including all exogenous variables (i.e. 
instruments for the endogenous regressor, exogenous regressors in the intensity 
equation and exclusion restrictions) and then the IMR is computed and included in 
a 2SLS estimate of the structural equation (equation of interest). Because standard 
errors are incorrect when the IMR coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
bootstrapping should be applied (Wooldridge, 2010).  
For corner solution models (Tobit and Cragg’s), a control function approach is 
used. In a first step, the endogenous variable is regressed on the exogenous 
regressors and the set of instruments and, after estimation, the residuals are 
retrieved. Estimated residuals are included in the models’ equations. The inclusion 
of this error term in the equations of interest corrects for endogeneity, the test for 
the significance of the error term becomes a test for endogeneity. Similarly as in the 
case of selection models, the inclusion of a generated regressor created in a previous 
estimation is addressed using bootstrapping. 
A final issue is finding valid and relevant instruments. As common practice, we 
use the set of all the possible marginal prices for each block as instruments for 
average price of tap water (Olmstead, 2009). With respect to the index reflecting 
water habits, we use several questions reflecting household’s concern and willingness 
to act related particularly with efficient and sustainable use of water resources and 
supply networks (see Appendix). These variables are expected to be correlated with 
the household’s decision on performing water saving habits while not affecting 
demand for bottled water. 
 
3.5. Results 
Results of the different estimated models are reported in Table 25. Since some 
households did not report their water bill, the variable averageprice suffers from a 
significant number of missing values (around 20%). For that reason, we first 
estimate a model with all the variables excluding averageprice, and then we model 
the relationship with the price variable (Table 30). 
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Table 25: Heckman selection (FILM), Two-part, Tobit and Cragg’s model 
estimations (N=493; Censored= 332). 
	





VARIABLES Participation Intensity Participation Intensity 
       
Municipio -0.225 0.0339 0.0816 -1.776 -0.228 2.518 
 (0.146) (0.100) (0.0965) (1.996) (0.145) (1.709) 
Childrenlessthan2 0.455*  -0.0669 4.160 0.435* -0.643 
 (0.245)  (0.135) (3.216) (0.254) (2.362) 
Length -0.0108*** -0.00425 -0.00257 -0.150*** -0.0109*** -0.0288 
 (0.00380) (0.00269) (0.00250) (0.0527) (0.00379) (0.0450) 
Hholdincome -0.00687 -0.00907 -0.00877 -0.230 -0.00707 -0.357 
 (0.0214) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.284) (0.0209) (0.246) 
Hsize -0.0417 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.817 -0.0360 3.405*** 
 (0.0600) (0.0365) (0.0380) (0.815) (0.0596) (0.720) 
BasicEduc 0.0254 0.129 0.167 -0.0632 -0.0105 3.283 
 (0.363) (0.263) (0.271) (5.115) (0.359) (5.076) 
SeconEduc 0.170 0.251 0.253 3.003 0.154 5.256 
 (0.374) (0.276) (0.289) (5.305) (0.370) (5.341) 
Higheducation 0.0818 0.104 0.130 1.624 0.0635 3.263 
 (0.386) (0.277) (0.286) (5.415) (0.380) (5.315) 
Color 0.159 -0.00158 -0.0255 1.862 0.148 -0.796 
 (0.0970) (0.0610) (0.0600) (1.279) (0.0963) (1.044) 
Smell 0.0842 0.00276 -0.00382 1.047 0.0872 0.729 
 (0.0989) (0.0536) (0.0548) (1.264) (0.0955) (0.965) 
Taste 0.141* 0.0768* 0.0518 2.144** 0.121 1.148 
 (0.0780) (0.0433) (0.0406) (0.990) (0.0753) (0.718) 
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Quality -0.317*** -0.112** -0.0558 -3.985*** -0.315*** -0.931 
 (0.0769) (0.0550) (0.0400) (0.983) (0.0761) (0.718) 
Serviceperc 0.102 0.00571 -0.0186 1.117 0.114* -0.328 
 (0.0647) (0.0410) (0.0373) (0.850) (0.0649) (0.666) 
Cutfreq 0.346** 0.0241 -0.0271 3.813** 0.381*** -0.760 
 (0.148) (0.0867) (0.0784) (1.844) (0.147) (1.376) 
Cutdisruption 0.0525 -0.00908 -0.0217 0.488 0.0541 -0.223 
 (0.0733) (0.0439) (0.0441) (0.987) (0.0731) (0.813) 
Envconcernavg 0.305 0.118 0.0433 3.925 0.303 0.250 
 (0.255) (0.180) (0.177) (3.458) (0.246) (3.169) 
Envworried -0.120 0.0361 0.0761 -0.373 -0.115 2.083 
 (0.231) (0.152) (0.157) (3.156) (0.227) (2.803) 
Watereff -0.0427 -0.000460 -0.000347 -0.123 -0.0465 0.226 
 (0.148) (0.0983) (0.102) (2.043) (0.148) (1.827) 
Waterhabitindex -0.429** -0.361** -0.299** -7.319** -0.422** -6.192** 
 (0.208) (0.144) (0.143) (2.852) (0.206) (2.599) 
Priceperception -0.0100 0.110** 0.118** 0.636 -0.00102 1.746* 
 (0.0860) (0.0522) (0.0536) (1.161) (0.0853) (0.969) 
Constant -1.363 1.006 1.527* -23.75 -1.433 -4.188 
 (0.276) (0.272) 1.527* 15.51*** (1.213) (15.60) 
𝜌 0.614     
 (0.439)     
Σ -0.672***   7.779963***    
(0.5984736)  (0.140)   
LR test of 
independent 
equations   
χ&#= 1.08     
(0.2977) a     
       
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
a P-value. 
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First, models with endogenity correction for waterhabitindex were run. Tests 
for validity, relevance of the instruments and endogeneity are reported in Table 26. 
In the Heckman model, since the second stage is a 2SLS, validity and relevance of 
the instruments are confirmed by a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and 
an F-test of excluded instruments (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995) respectively. 
However, Hausman test for endogeneity fails to be rejected, indicating that there is 
no need to instrument. In the case of the Cragg’s model, as proposed by Wooldridge 
(2010), an F-test of exclusion of instruments is performed,69 confirming instruments’ 
validity. Moreover, an F-test on the first stage regression indicates also relevance. 
Nevertheless, the t-test on the coefficient of the estimated residual is not rejected, 
also pointing out to endogeneity correction for this variable not being necessary in 
















69 After running the structural equation with the control function (residual from the first stage) 
included, instrumental variables should not belong to the structural equation. Under that logic, 
the structural equation with endogeneity correction is run (including all instruments except for 
one) and an F-test on those instruments is conducted.  In order for those instruments to be 
valid, they should not be jointly significant in an F-test of exclusion of instruments. The test is 
invariant to the choice of excluded instrument (Wooldridge, 2010) 
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Table 26: Tests for endogeneity, validity and relevance for Heckman selection 
(FILM) and Cragg’s model estimations with endogeneity correction for the 
variable waterhabitindex. 
	




   






    









     









    
p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
In the Heckman specification, Childrenlessthan2 is used as an exclusion 
restriction. Having children less than two years old has been found to impact the 
likelihood of purchasing bottled water (see literature review), but it should not 
necessarily affect the amount finally consumed. As expected, Table 25 shows that 
it is a significant determinant on the decision to consume (participation equation 
in Heckman model), while not affecting the quantity consumed in a separate OLS 
estimate of the intensity equation, thus posing an adequate exclusion restriction. 
Heckman model yields a ρ of 0.614. However, a direct test for the existence of 
the selection effect (ρ =0) cannot be rejected, implying independent errors. A 
likelihood ratio test for the independency of both equations also cannot be rejected, 
favoring the estimation of a separate probit model for the participation equation 
and a regression model on the intensity decision against the Heckman specification.
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Results for the Tobit and Cragg’s model are also reported (Table 25). A 
likehood ratio test (Lin and Schmidt, 1984) for the restriction of Tobit model yields 
a value of 28.7, rejecting the null hypothesis that γ = β/σv at a 1% level, and thus 
favoring Cragg’s more flexible specification against Tobit. Finally, a Vuong test for 
non-nested models to compare the lognormal and truncated specifications is 
performed. With a value of -0.146 and a p-value of 0.010, the Vuong test is rejected 
at the 1% level, implying that Cragg’s model should be preferred to its Heckman’s 
counterpart, and thus favoring the hypothesis of corner solution being the process 
governing observed zero consumption. Therefore, Cragg’s specification will be our 
final modeling choice. In any case, results are found to be very robust across the 
various econometric specifications (See Table 25). 
In order to study the magnitude of the effect of those variables on both the 
probability to consume and the quantity of bottled water consumed, marginal 
effects are computed. For the intensity equation, we report unconditional marginal 
effects (Table 27) accounting for the total potential effect (that is, both the direct 
effect on quantity and the indirect effect through the change in the probability to 
consume) on bottled water consumption that could be achieved through a change 
in each of the independent variables. For the standard errors to be valid, we 
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Table 27: Marginal Effects for the Cragg’s model estimations. 
 Marginal effects 
VARIABLES Participation Intensity 
(Unconditional) 
   
Municipio -0.0638819 -0.2073927 
 (0.0404749) (0.7594287) 
Childrenlessthan2 0.1219732* 1.417454 
 (0.0651619) (1.030329) 
Length -0.0030683*** -0.0466816*** 
 (0.0009935) (0.0180355) 
Hholdincome -0.0019846 -0.1132304 
 (0.0054422) (0.101826) 
Hsize -0.0100926 0.7046737** 
 (0.0171237) (0.3108281) 
BasicEduc -0.0029481 0.7668188 
 (0.0863704) (2.175619) 
SeconEduc 0.043138 1.845703 
 (0.1146203) (2.508469) 
Higheducation 0.0178282 1.030414 
 (0.1038933) (2.320931) 
Color 0.0416047 0.3420471 
 (0.0288384) (0.5051409) 
Smell 0.0244638 0.4946904 
 (0.0303447) (0.56174) 
Taste 0.0340424 0.7211814** 
 (0.0268369) (0.3493412) 
Quality -0.0883292*** -1.368968 
 (0.0297569) (0.3534333) 
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Serviceperc 0.0318698 0.3311705 
 (0.0207237) (0.2342998) 
Cutfreq 0.1069017* 1.194052 
 (0.0591058) (0.8170846) 
Cutdisruption 0.0151802 0.1412496 
 (0.0268184 (0.3591169) 
Envconcernavg 0.0849113 1.157794 
 (0.0731812) (1.155939) 
Envworried -0.0321705 0.0954011 
 (0.0640323) (0.9549162) 
Watereff -0.0130449 -0.1129135 
 (0.0382911) (0.617297) 
Waterhabitindex -0.1182606** -3.045422*** 
 (0.0487385) (1.009367) 
Priceperception -0.0002867 0.4243339 
 (0.0262441) (0.4545721) 
   
Standard errors in parenthesis are computed using bootstrapping with 100 iterations. 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
We find that, as expected, some factors such as lower quality perception of 
the water from the tap increase the probability of drinking bottled water, while 
not affecting the quantity eventually consumed. This suggests that characteristics 
related to water quality tend to affect the decision to use bottled water more than 
the amount consumed, once the individual decides to purchase bottled water as an 
averting behavior. Although perceived taste is not significant in any of the 
equations when estimated separately, the joint marginal effect on quantity is 
significant, suggesting that targeting this variable by policy intervention is also 
expected to affect bottled water consumption. 
We also find that households with children younger than two years report a 
higher probability (12.2%) of choosing to consume bottled water. This result is in 
line with previous literature (Yoo and Yang, 2000) and seems to indicate that when 
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households display a higher level of risk aversion, their propensity to consume 
bottled water is also higher. The length that the consumer has been living in the 
same town seems to lead to a decreased probability of purchasing bottled water. 
This is usually explained by the fact that familiarity leads to a reduction of risk 
perception (Slovic, 2000) and with time people get accustomed to the organoleptic 
characteristics of tap water (Doria, 2010). Quantity, however, seems to be better 
explained by household size, that is, as expected, bottled water consumption is 
predicted to increase with the number of members in the household. Finally, in 
relation to the perception of the quality of the service, contrary to what was 
expected a higher satisfaction with wastewater treatment is associated with a 
higher probability of consuming bottled water.  
With respect to the variables related to interruptions in the service, a 
perception by the household that supply cuts are more frequent is shown to lead 
to a higher probability to purchase bottled water, while not affecting the level of 
consumption. A marginal increase in this indicator, while holding all other 
indicators constant, is expected to increase the probability of purchasing bottled 
water by up to 10.7%. This result suggests that, as we expected, service 
interruptions could generate a need to keep bottled water to prevent lack of water 
supply. However, the length and frequency of disruption doesn’t seem to affect 
neither the probability to consume nor the quantity of bottled water to be 
consumed. 
As for the analysis of the environmental paradox, our results show that 
environmental concern does not translate into a reduction in either the probability 
to consume bottled water nor the quantity consumed. Likewise, the fact that 
individuals carry on behaviors of the "efficient" type, that is, one-time behaviors 
such as installing certain types of water saving devices, does not seem to affect 
bottled water consumption or the level of consumption.  However, we do observe 
that those individuals that consistently undertake a higher number of daily saving 
habits, also show both a lower probability of choosing to consume bottled water 
and a lower quantity consumed. Thus, our results seem to suggest that individuals 
showing a higher level of commitment towards environmental degradation in their 
daily lives are more prone to carry out other behaviors entailing similar levels of 
sacrifice in order to reduce their environmental impact. Moreover, the joint effect 
of this variable is found to be the most sizeable one, with a marginal increase in 
this indicator, while holding all other indicators constant, predicted to reduce 
consumption by up to a 22% of the current average consumption per week 
exhibited by the households in the sample.  
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Finally, price perception is found to affect bottled water consumption as well. 
Our results suggest that households that do perceive tap water as more expensive 
tend to consume more bottled water. Since it has been proved (Nieswiadomy and 
Molina, 1989; De Bartolome, 1995) that consumers have problems in understanding 
water tariffs, it may be that if water from the tap is perceived more expensive, 
consumers assess the relative cost of diverting to drinking bottled water as being 
smaller. 
 
3.5.1. Robustness Checks 
	
In order to show the robustness of the estimations, Table 28 and Table 29 
display respectively step-wise estimations by groups of variables for the 
participation and intensity equations of our final model choice (Cragg’s Tobit 
specification). Moreover, in a previous section, robustness across different 
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Table 28: Robustness checks. Participation equation of the final chosen model 
(Cragg’s Tobit) 
	
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES (Socioecon.) (+ Water 
quality) 
(+ Interruptions) (+Environ.) (+Price 
perception) 
      
Municipio -0.333*** -0.322** -0.293** -0.247* -0.228 
 (0.120) (0.134) (0.136) (0.143) (0.145) 
Childrenlessthan2 0.438** 0.538** 0.520** 0.462* 0.435* 
 (0.223) (0.246) (0.250) (0.249) (0.254) 
Length -0.0125*** -0.0102*** -0.00995*** -0.0106*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00364) (0.00366) (0.00373) (0.00379) 
Hholdincome -0.0294* -0.0222 -0.0114 -0.00631 -0.00707 
 (0.0172) (0.0191) (0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0209) 
Hsize -0.0124 -0.0332 -0.0471 -0.0422 -0.0360 
 (0.0520) (0.0573) (0.0580) (0.0592) (0.0596) 
BasicEduc 0.0653 0.0779 0.0847 -0.0209 -0.0105 
 (0.315) (0.357) (0.358) (0.356) (0.359) 
SeconEduc 0.217 0.231 0.225 0.112 0.154 
 (0.325) (0.365) (0.368) (0.366) (0.370) 
Higheducation 0.327 0.215 0.234 0.0861 0.0635 
 (0.331) (0.373) (0.375) (0.374) (0.380) 
Color  0.167* 0.144 0.153 0.148 
  (0.0916) (0.0936) (0.0954) (0.0963) 
Smell  0.0717 0.0633 0.0638 0.0872 
  (0.0933) (0.0937) (0.0938) (0.0955) 
Taste  0.134* 0.126* 0.124* 0.121 
  (0.0737) (0.0738) (0.0749) (0.0753) 
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Quality  -0.322*** -0.319*** -0.311*** -0.315*** 
  (0.0737) (0.0744) (0.0758) (0.0761) 
Serviceperc  0.0981 0.118* 0.116* 0.114* 
  (0.0615) (0.0628) (0.0637) (0.0649) 
Cutfreq   0.289** 0.331** 0.381*** 
   (0.140) (0.145) (0.147) 
Cutdisruption   0.0739 0.0674 0.0541 
   (0.0705) (0.0718) (0.0731) 
Envconcernavg    0.348 0.303 
    (0.243) (0.246) 
Envworried    -0.130 -0.115 
    (0.223) (0.227) 
Watereff    -0.0909 -0.0465 
    (0.147) (0.148) 
Waterhabitindex    -0.344* -0.422** 
    (0.193) (0.206) 
Priceperception     -0.00102 
     (0.0853) 
Constant 0.108 0.379 -0.368 -1.576 -1.433 
 (0.368) (0.559) (0.706) (1.159) (1.213) 
Observations 528 503 503 503 493 
Log-likelihood -865.12747 -783.29806 -780.59767 -772.90769 -762.65091 
Sigma 8.2275***    8.1389***  8.1170***   7.8541***  7.7799***   
 (0.63770) (0.6430) (0.63992) (0.60618) (0.59847) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 29: Robustness checks. Intensity equation of the final chosen model 
(Cragg’s Tobit). 
	
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 






      
Municipio 3.589** 3.754** 3.383** 2.769 2.518 
 (1.580) (1.621) (1.674) (1.716) (1.709) 
Childrenlessthan2 -1.399 -1.125 -0.805 -1.068 -0.643 
 (2.364) (2.421) (2.439) (2.367) (2.362) 
Length -0.0395 -0.0194 -0.0158 -0.0236 -0.0288 
 (0.0429) (0.0448) (0.0448) (0.0447) (0.0450) 
Hholdincome -0.158 -0.267 -0.290 -0.294 -0.357 
 (0.222) (0.243) (0.245) (0.244) (0.246) 
Hsize 3.296*** 3.298*** 3.388*** 3.623*** 3.405*** 
 (0.695) (0.728) (0.738) (0.723) (0.720) 
BasicEduc 2.854 4.804 4.353 2.756 3.283 
 (5.026) (5.283) (5.300) (5.107) (5.076) 
SeconEduc 3.051 5.900 5.680 3.920 5.256 
 (5.115) (5.457) (5.488) (5.328) (5.341) 
Higheducation 2.113 3.831 3.382 1.336 3.263 
 (5.137) (5.386) (5.392) (5.230) (5.315) 
Color  -0.542 -0.396 -0.569 -0.796 
  (1.054) (1.063) (1.051) (1.044) 
Smell  0.572 0.469 0.756 0.729 
  (0.987) (1.001) (0.982) (0.965) 
Taste  0.760 0.777 1.129 1.148 
  (0.723) (0.721) (0.723) (0.718) 
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Quality  -0.999 -1.033 -1.219* -0.931 
  (0.733) (0.734) (0.711) (0.718) 
Serviceperc  -0.333 -0.250 -0.321 -0.328 
  (0.691) (0.701) (0.674) (0.666) 
Cutfreq   -1.146 -1.122 -0.760 
   (1.381) (1.380) (1.376) 
Cutdisruption   0.138 -0.102 -0.223 
   (0.809) (0.819) (0.813) 
Envconcernavg    -0.414 0.250 
    (3.192) (3.169) 
Envworried    2.842 2.083 
    (2.804) (2.803) 
Watereff    -0.0183 0.226 
    (1.827) (1.827) 
Waterhabitindex    -6.108** -6.192** 
    (2.530) (2.599) 
Priceperception     1.746* 
     (0.969) 
Constant 0.520 1.048 5.267 5.267 -4.188 
 (5.675) (7.076) (14.83) (14.83) (15.60) 
      
      
Observations 528 503 503 503 493 
      
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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3.5.2. Models with Tap Water Price 
	
Results of the models including the price variable (averageprice) and 
addressing its likely endogeneity are reported in Table 30.  The estimated 
coefficient for the Inverse Mills Ratio is negative and significant in the intensity 
equation of the selection model, suggesting that the selection effect should be 
accounted for. In the presence of selection bias, independence of the disturbance 
terms should not be assumed, and therefore Heckman’s specification should be 
preferred to its Cragg’s counterpart. 
 As for endogeneity of the price variable, for it to be corrected the set of 
instruments must be valid and relevant. Because in a second step of the selection 
model we use 2SLS, a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is performed.  With 
a value of 0.26316 (p=0.8767), Sargan test cannot be rejected, indicating that the 
set of instruments is valid. Results for the first stage estimations are also included 
in Table 30. Following Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), relevance of the 
instruments is confirmed by the rejection of the F-test of excluded instruments on 
the set of instrumental variables. Finally, a Hausman test for endogeneity is also 
rejected at the 10% level, recommending the use of endogeneity correction. 
 With respect to our variable of interest, our results show that bottled water 
demand reacts to the price of tap water.  In order to understand the magnitude of 
the effect, elasticities are computed from the estimated coefficients, yielding a 
positive and significant cross-price elasticity of 10.72. That is, a 1% increase in the 
average price for tap water is expected to increase bottled water demand by up to 
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Table 30: Estimates of Heckman selection model with IV and Cragg’s model with 
control function approach to correct for price endogeneity (N=379. Censored= 
252). 
	
 Heckman with IV Cragg with CFA 







       
Municipio 4.778 0.129 -6.445** 0.110 -0.788 -13.86 
 (699.5) (0.164) (2.752) (0.0876) (0.738) (9.848) 
Childrenlessthan2 0.678**    0.654** 0.782 
 (0.287)    (0.288) (2.722) 
Length -0.0167*** 1.72e-05 -0.0628** 7.77e-05 -0.0162*** -0.0417 
 (0.00430) (0.000538) (0.0274) (0.0003) (0.00429) (0.0401) 
Hholdincome -0.0246 -0.000307 -0.126 -0.000227 -0.0117 -0.388* 
 (0.0256) (0.00184) (0.125) (0.00156) (0.0252) (0.221) 
Hsize -0.0787 0.00933* -0.144 0.00953** -0.165* 1.270 
 (0.0731) (0.00541) (0.372) (0.00445) (0.0920) (1.000) 
BasicEduc 0.217 -0.0397** 3.814** -0.0405 0.339 17.87** 
 (0.496) (0.0194) (1.845) (0.0279) (0.551) (6.939) 
SeconEduc 0.213 -0.0395** 4.441** -0.0402 0.392 19.18*** 
 (0.507) (0.0195) (1.968) (0.0288) (0.556) (6.938) 
Higheducation 0.211 -0.0290 3.267* -0.0297 0.315 14.43** 
 (0.516) (0.0214) (1.776) (0.0295) (0.550) (6.638) 
Color 0.0935 0.000245 0.514 1.02e-05 0.0960 -1.924* 
 (0.117) (0.00828) (0.826) (0.00757) (0.117) (1.065) 
Smell 0.150 0.00681 -0.0666 0.00625 0.105 0.870 
 (0.111) (0.00753) (0.963) (0.00733) (0.113) (0.992) 
Taste 0.0922 0.00292 0.126 0.00261 0.0905 0.628 
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 (0.0868) (0.00402) (0.631) (0.00575) (0.0870) (0.661) 
Quality -0.315*** -0.0133 -1.068* -0.0124** -0.302*** 0.000395 
 (0.0892) (0.0105) (0.595) (0.00560) (0.117) (1.133) 
Serviceperc 0.0829 0.00154 0.369 0.00130 0.0973 -0.707 
 (0.0760) (0.00542) (0.385) (0.00466) (0.0763) (0.595) 
Cutfreq 0.357** 0.0122 -0.00759 0.0110 0.286* -2.057 
 (0.170) (0.0144) (0.930) (0.0103) (0.164) (1.378) 
Cutdisruption 0.0938 0.0102 -0.410 0.00988* 0.0384 -1.851* 
 (0.0879) (0.00625) (0.500) (0.00535) (0.0984) (1.013) 
Envconcernavg 0.320 0.0182 -1.294 0.0169 0.226 -1.896 
 (0.310) (0.0241) (1.440) (0.0182) (0.325) (3.193) 
Envworried -0.0771 0.0246 -0.0613 0.0248 -0.213 0.698 
 (0.276) (0.0195) (1.411) (0.0169) (0.300) (3.215) 
Watereff 0.00535 0.0111 -0.747 0.0110 -0.0332 -2.612 
 (0.177) (0.0133) (0.878) (0.0106) (0.184) (1.769) 
Waterhabitindex -0.390 -0.0265 0.316 -0.0250* -0.333 0.173 
 (0.267) (0.0204) (1.303) (0.0135) (0.305) (3.708) 
Priceperception -0.0210 -0.000676 0.679 -0.000395 0.0277 2.140** 
 (0.0993) (0.00870) (0.535) (0.00607) (0.0984) (0.834) 
Averageprice -0.0854  47.01**  3.508 112.5 
 (0.943)  (20.83)  (5.747) (79.56) 
IV1 -57.66 -1.155  -0.936   
 (7,972) (1.864)  (1.081)   
IV2 17.99 -0.0633  -0.141   
 (1,056) (0.634)  (0.131)   
IV3 3.512* 0.273**  0.261***   
 (1.901) (0.114)  (0.0974)   
IMR  0.00490 -1.202***    
  (0.0407) (0.340)    
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Residual     -4.399 -97.18 
     (5.883) (78.44) 
Constant -5.010 0.841*** -31.30* 0.8615***    -4.537 -95.47 
 (1,015) (0.248) (17.82) (0.143155
3) 
(5.206) (68.12) 
Σ     6.280*** 
(0.488)      
Sargan test χ##= 0.26316    
 (0.8767)    




    
  (0.041)     
Hausman test.  χ&#= 3.40     
.  (0.0651)     
Standard errors in parenthesis are computed using bootstrapping with 100 iterations. 




Households tend to adopt averting behaviors in response to potential 
environmental hazards or an insufficient quality of their environmental conditions. 
Many of these averting behaviors, besides implying costs for individuals and 
societies, also lead to environmental externalities. Particularly, the undertaking of 
certain mitigating behaviors is expected to increase in the following decades with 
significant negative consequences for the environment (Estrada et al., 2017; Isaac 
and Van Vuuren, 2009). In order to design public policies that are able to contain 
the externalities, we want to explore the role of individual’s environmental 
attitudes and behaviors in the choice of averting behaviors that pose 
environmental negative externalities. An econometric strategy is proposed in order 
to deal with the substantial proportion of zero responses usually found in empirical 
studies on averting behaviors.  
Using a dataset on bottled water consumption from two cities in southern Spain 
facing severe water scarcity, we further extend the analysis to explore the impact 
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of some public policies related to residential water management. Our results reveal 
that neither environmental concern nor behaviors of the one-shot type are 
predictors of a reduced bottled water consumption. However, those individuals that 
more consistently maintain behaviors of curtailment type seem to show both a lower 
probability to divert to bottled water and lower levels of consumption, with the 
magnitude of this effect being the most sizable one among the variables considered 
in our study. We also find that a perception by the household on interruptions 
being more frequent increase the probability of diverting to bottled water 
consumption, while higher price paid for the water from the tap as well as the 
perception that it is more expensive are related to higher levels of consumption, 
with cross-price elasticity of bottled and tap water being positive and significant. 
We realize that some of the distributional methodological assumptions previously 
imposed in the literature prove to be restrictive and not always supported by our 
data.  
Therefore, our results suggest that public policies aimed at promoting 
environmental habits can prove very successful in containing averting behaviors 
that display substantial environmental negative externalities. They seem to indicate 
that some pricing and non-pricing policies related to the efficient management of 
water resources may result in environmentally undesirable effects derived from an 
increase in bottled water demand. Consequently, accounting for those 
environmental costs seems necessary for an accurate assessment of the 
environmental effects of certain water conservation policies. Likewise, an important 
conclusion is that, when the number of households that do not undertake the 
averting behavior is significant, special attention should be paid to the modeling 
strategy, as improper modeling of zero consumption would lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
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Appendix: Set of questions used as instruments for the 
index on water-saving habits. 
 
1. Do you think that, as it is proposed by EU Norms, your municipality should 
take steps towards a more efficient and sustainable use of water resources 
and, particularly, towards reducing network losses? [Yes/No] 
2. Do you have an approximate idea about the percentage of water network 
losses in your municipality? [Yes/No] 
3. Would you be willing to pay an extra amount in your water bill to act more 
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Essay 4: Ownership and 
performance in water services 
revisited: Does private 






Since the late 1970s, water services have been privatised in some developed 
countries in an attempt to improve performance. However, after three decades of 
privatisations the superiority of private management is being called into question 
and several cities are returning to public provision. In this paper we revisit the 
relationship between ownership and performance in urban water services 
management using directional distance functions, metafrontiers and Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques. The technical efficiency in the provision 
of water delivery services in a sample of Spanish municipalities is assessed at the 
level of the management of specific production factors; moreover, we discuss 
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whether differences in efficiency between private and public decision units are due 
to either different capabilities of managers (managerial efficiency) or different 
technological restrictions (ownership efficiency). Our main finding is that private 
management is more efficient in the use of labour input, mainly because of the 
technological restrictions faced by public management units, such as legal and 
institutional restrictions. Conversely, private management appears to be less 





The issue of the relationship between ownership and performance has long been 
at the core of the debate in the water industry. Water is a merit good that serves 
economic, environmental and social purposes (OECD, 2003), and displays 
important positive externalities. It is also a human need, so universal access should 
be guaranteed. Moreover, the water industry faces high fixed costs and is very 
capital intensive with high initial investment required, conditions which lead to a 
natural monopoly. Accordingly, thorough supervision and intervention on behalf of 
the public sector is justified as a means of preventing market failure, achieving an 
efficient allocation of resources and guaranteeing that welfare standards are met 
(Pigou, 1932). Out of a number of possible options, one of the leading forms of 
intervention is by means of public companies. In fact, over the years, public 
provision has been the most common form of water services provision (Thomas et 
al., 2012). 
However, following the wave of deregulation of economic activity that started 
in Anglo-Saxon economies in the late 1970s, private sector participation in the water 
industry became increasingly popular and nowadays it is widespread in some 
developed countries (see Pérard, 2009). Deregulation was based on the idea that, 
far from pursuing the general interest, public intervention works to satisfy political 
interests (Niskanen, 1971); accordingly, privatising water provision and introducing 
competition via tendering processes should promote efficiency and cost reduction. 
In addition, privatisation would allow the aggregation of demand, particularly in 
small-sized municipalities, thus achieving a more efficient scale of production 
(Donahue, 1989). Other strands of thought have highlighted, nonetheless, that the 
predicted improvements in efficiency resulting from privatisation and competition 
can be hampered by the existence of transaction costs (Coase, 1937), incomplete 
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information, incomplete contracts or high asset specificity (Williamson, 1976). Also, 
Donahue’s argument that privatisation allows for the aggregation of demand 
appears to neglect the fact that intermunicipal provision is possible and in fact often 
does take place under public ownership, e.g., in the form of intermunicipal consortia. 
Several papers have found that, although generalisations about the factors that 
explain privatisation in the urban water service should be drawn carefully (Ruíz-
Villaverde et al., 2015), in practice this decision is mainly motivated by pragmatic 
reasons, including budget restrictions or searching for cost reduction and efficiency 
gains, rather than ideological or political issues (Bel & Fageda, 2007; 2009). 
Furthermore, after more than three decades of research, empirical evidence as to 
the superiority of private management of urban water services over public is 
inconclusive, and several cities are moving back to public provision. Indeed, a 
number of municipalities in developed countries, including notable European cities 
such as Berlin and Paris, have remunicipalised the provision of urban water services 
in recent years (González-Gómez et al., 2009; Hall et al., 2013), while growing 
opposition to new privatisations is emerging from citizens’ movements and certain 
political parties (Hall et al., 2005; Lobina et al., 2014). Pigeon et al. (2012) analysed 
a series of case studies of water services remucipalisation from a comparative 
international perspective, concluding that back-to-public provision largely occurred 
in response to the failure of the preceding privatisation. 
On the other hand, as we have mentioned above and is detailed in Section 4.2 
below, an extensive literature has focused on a comparative assessment of the 
operational performance of public and private operators. However, the empirical 
evidence is not at all conclusive. In these papers, researchers have overwhelmingly 
tended to assume that both categories of management –public and private– share 
the same production technology. To our knowledge, there are only a few cases that 
consider the possibility that public and private managers could face different 
technological restrictions (see Mbuvi, 2012). However, as we argue in this paper, 
there are reasons to believe that the production technology might differ according 
to the nature of operator ownership; additionally, these differences might well have 
disparate effects on the management of particular production factors. 
Against this background, this paper revisits the relationship between ownership 
and performance in water utilities using a fresh methodological approach that 
combines directional distance functions, metafrontiers and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) techniques. Specifically, the performance of a sample of both public 
and private operators in the Spanish urban water industry is assessed through the 
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concept of technical efficiency, understood as their ability to reduce input usage for 
a given volume of output. 
Our contribution to existing literature in this field is twofold. First, using 
metafrontiers allows us to express technical efficiency as the result of managerial 
efficiency, which assesses the performance of operators in the sample as compared to 
best practices in their group, either public or private operators, and ownership 
efficiency that measures the closeness of the technology of each group to the joint 
technology. In this way, differences in technical efficiency between private and public 
operators can be attributed to either the different capabilities of their managers 
(managerial efficiency), or the different technological restrictions (i.e., legal and/or 
institutional restrictions) faced by these two types of management (ownership 
efficiency). Second, and more interestingly, directional distance functions allow us 
to evaluate performance at the level of the management of specific production 
factors, including labour and other operational costs. In our opinion, there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the technological constraints faced by public 
managers may differ from those faced by their private counterparts in terms of 
managing labour, which would not affect the management of other production 
factors. The combination of these two approaches has the potential to provide new 
insights into the relationship between ownership and performance in the water 
industry, as opposed to previous papers in which either metafrontiers or directional 
distance functions have been used separately. 
In our empirical analysis, we use information about the provision of water 
delivery services for a sample of Spanish municipalities. Our main finding is that 
private management is more efficient in the use of labour, mainly because of 
technological restrictions faced by public operators when managing this input. 
Conversely, private operators appear to be less efficient at managing operational 
costs, although this result is statistically less robust. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews 
the empirical literature on ownership and performance in the provision of water 
services. Section 4.3 presents the data and explains the methodology. Section 4.4 
describes and discusses the results, while the final section summarises and 
concludes. 
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4.2. Ownership and performance in water utilities: 
Some empirical evidence 
Research on the effects of privatisation on the efficiency of water services 
management dates back to the 1970s, with the seminal works by Mann & Mikesell 
(1976), Morgan (1977) and Crain & Zardkoohi (1978). Those first studies focused 
on the water industry in the Unites States and, since then, this issue has been the 
subject of increasing attention. By the end of the eighties only around thirty papers 
had been published, whereas in the nineties alone about forty studies were 
conducted, and by 2010 there were well over two hundred and fifty publications 
(Berg & Marques, 2011; Carvalho et al., 2012). Moreover, the initial geographical 
focus quickly spread to areas with markedly different contexts, so that case studies 
can now be found from the five continents, and from both developing and developed 
economies. 
Bel & Warner (2008) and Bel et al. (2010) carried out two meta-regression 
analyses of empirical studies finding little support for a link between privatisation 
and cost savings in solid waste and water services; in particular, cost savings are 
not found in water delivery, while they are not systematic in waste. Similarly, 
Lobina (2013) critically reviewed empirical literature on organisational choice and 
efficiency in the urban water sector, suggesting that institutional adaptability 
explains the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector relative to the private 
sector. For the purpose of our review, empirical studies addressing the issue of 
differences in efficiency between publicly and privately managed urban water 
services will be classified into two broad groups: efficiency assessments for the same 
operator(s) in function of changes in ownership (through time); and efficiency 
assessments comparing operators under different ownership regimes (at given points 
of time). 
Most studies in the first of the aforementioned groups focus on the massive 
privatisation of the water industry witnessed in the United Kingdom at the end of 
the 1980s, and they are in general agreement that privatisation did not lead to 
increased efficiency in urban water services. By way of example, Saal & Parker 
(2000) found no evidence supporting a relationship between privatisation and 
efficiency improvements in the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales. 
Likewise, Saal & Parker (2001) suggested that despite reduction in labour usage, 
total factor productivity growth in water and sewage companies did not improve 
following the privatisation of the industry; conversely, utilities’ economic profits 
increased. Other papers in this line are Ashton (2000), Saal & Parker (2004) and 
Chapter 4	
	200 
Saal et al. (2007).70 An exception is the paper by Estache & Trujillo (2003) that, 
using information from four utilities in Argentina between 1992 and 2001, found 
that privatisation led to important gains in total factor productivity. However, as 
pointed out by the authors, this result should be interpreted with caution given the 
small size of the sample employed. 
Conclusions from the second group of studies are more diverse and even 
contradictory. Without aiming to be exhaustive, Table 31 shows a selection of 
empirical studies. Among those papers that find public management of urban water 
services to be superior, several explanations are adduced, such as lower costs (Mann 
& Mikesell, 1976; Bruggink, 1982; Bhattacharyya et al., 1995a) or better results in 
a range of performance indicators (Chong et al., 2006; Benito et al., 2010; Romano 
& Guerrini, 2011; Guerrini, 2011; Da Cruz et al., 2012; Romano et al., 2013; Lannier 
& Porcher, 2014). Other studies find that public companies are also more efficient 
at achieving social and development goals (Lobina & Hall, 2000). Regarding 
analyses that found private management to be superior in terms of performance, 
reasons given also include lower costs (Morgan, 1977; Crain & Zardkoohi, 1978) 
and higher technical efficiency (Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009a, 2009b). In addition, 
some of these papers maintain that differences in efficiency are mainly related to 
labour management (Crain & Zardkoohi, 1978; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009a, 2009b; 
Gassner et al., 2009). Nevertheless, a majority of studies either find no significant 
difference between the performance of public and private water suppliers or reach 
no definite conclusion. Furthermore, some papers point out that once characteristics 
of the operating environment are accounted for, differences in efficiency diminish 






70 In addition, some papers have analysed the impact of changes in regulation on the performance 
of the privatised English and Welsh water industry (Erbetta & Cave, 2007; Maziotis et al., 
2016). 
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Table 31: Public versus private management of water services: Some empirical 
studies. 
	
Superiority of public 
management 
Superiority of private 
management 
No significant difference or 
inconclusive 
Mann & Mikesell (1976) Morgan (1977) Feigenbaum & Teeples (1983) 
Bruggink (1982) Crain & Zardkoohi (1978) Byrnes et al. (1986) 
Lambert et al. (1993) Bhattacharyya et al. 
(1995b) 
Ménard & Saussier (2000) 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1994) Estache & Kouassi (2002) Estache & Rossi (2002) 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1995a) Faria et al. (2005) Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) 
Lobina & Hall (2000) Picazo-Tadeo et al. 
(2009a;b) 
García-Sánchez (2006) 
Benito et al. (2010) Lo Storto (2013) Sabbioni (2008) 
Romano & Guerrini (2011)  Zschille & Walter (2012) 
Guerrini et al. (2011)  Peda et al. (2013) 
Da Cruz et al. (2012)  González-Gómez et al. (2013) 
Romano et al. (2013)  Hon et al. (2014) 
Lannier & Porcher (2014)   
 
Regarding the methodological approach employed to assess efficiency, until the 
beginning of the 21st century there was a predominance of parametric techniques 
using cost (Mann & Mikesell, 1976; Morgan, 1977; Bruggink, 1982; Feigenbaum & 
Teeples, 1983; Bhattacharyya et al., 1994) and production (Crain & Zardkoohi, 
1978) functions, and/or Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) (see Aigner et al., 1977, 
and Meeusen & van den Broeck, 1977 for details). However, most studies these days 
are based on estimates of non-parametric frontiers and performance indicators by 
means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques, with only a few studies 
using other techniques (Byrnes et al., 1986; Saal & Parker, 2001; Lobina & Hall, 
2000; Estache & Trujillo, 2003). DEA is a well-known non-parametric approach to 
efficiency measurement based on mathematical programming pioneered by Charnes 
et al. (1978) that has been used in hundreds of empirical papers (Cook & Seiford, 
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2009 and Liu et al., 2013 review this literature). This technique provides a simple 
way to measure the gap that separates individual producers’ behaviour from best 
productive practices, which are assessed from actual observations of efficient 
producers’ production processes. DEA offers an important advantage over the 
econometric approach to efficiency measurement, as it allows the technological 
frontier representing best-observed practices to be flexibly constructed without 
imposing a given functional form on either technology (e.g., the Cobb-Douglas or 
the translog production functions) or inefficiencies (e.g., distribution functions such 
as the half-normal). More details on DEA techniques can be found in Cooper et al. 
(2007). 
On the other hand, performance differences between public and private 
management units have been evaluated using two main methodological approaches. 
The first consists of using conventional ANOVA, Mann-Whitney, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov or Kruskal-Wallis tests, among others, to test for differences in efficiency 
scores obtained from either DEA-based analyses or cost and production function 
estimates with SFA. The second approach relies on directly including dummy 
variables reflecting ownership in the estimation of cost and production functions 
with SFA, or including them in second- or third-step regression analyses of DEA-
based efficiency scores. 
In summary, we believe that the lack of conclusive evidence in previous 
literature calls for fresh methodological and empirical approaches to assessing the 
relationship between efficiency and ownership in the water industry, and 
consequently we attempt such an approach in this paper. 
 
4.3. Data, variables and methodology 
	
4.3.1. Data and sample 
	
In this paper we use data relating to the provision of urban water delivery 
services71 in 70 Spanish municipalities of under 50,000 inhabitants. In 37 of these 
municipalities either the city council itself or a public utility manages water delivery 
																																								 																				
71 In addition to water delivery, some water utilities in Spain also provide sewage treatment 
services; however, this is not the case with the operators in our sample. 
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(public management units), while in the other 33 cases the service is privately 
managed by either a contractual public-private partnership (PPP) or an 
institutionalised PPP (private management units).72 The data are from 2013 and 
were collected, when available, from web pages of municipalities and utilities as 
well as by direct contact with city councils and utilities’ managers, in the framework 
of a wider project supported and financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness.73 
Two outputs and three inputs are used to characterise the productive process 
of both public and private operators. The two outputs are water delivered and 
population served. Of the three inputs, one is fixed –the length of the delivery 
network–, and two are variable –labour (full-time workers) and operational costs 
(measured in euros)74 (see Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008). Table 32 provides 
measurement units and some descriptive statistics for the data. 
																																								 																				
72 García-Valiñas et al. (2013) provides a detailed description of legal forms for the management 
of urban water services in Spain. Furthermore, following previous literature, institutionalised 
PPPs have been considered as private management units given that day-to-day management is 
carried out by the private partner (see García-Valiñas et al., 2013; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in compliance with Spanish law only the management of 
the urban water service can be privatised, while infrastructures always remain under public 
property. 
73 Spanish legislation prevents data on inputs and outputs of water suppliers from being made 
public. When creating our database, we submitted information requests to nearly 1,000 Spanish 
municipalities, either via web pages or directly to city councils and utilities. Of these, we received 
141 positive responses. After discarding observations with deficient or incomplete information, 
we selected 70 operators that are exclusively dedicated to water service delivery. Unfortunately, 
the aforementioned lack of publicly-available information makes it very difficult to obtain 
reliable and largely representative data on the production processes of Spanish water services 
operators. This is reflected in previous studies on Spanish water utilities, which make use of 
samples of similar size (Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2011; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009a; 2009b). 
74 Operational costs include all expenses required for day-to-day management of the service, e.g., 
raw water, chemicals employed to make water suitable for human consumption, energy and 
office expenses, among others. Conversely, wages and other labour costs are excluded. 
Furthermore, the fee paid by utilities to the local government when they are first awarded the 
service management contract is also excluded from operational costs. Finally, it is worth 
highlighting that operational costs are measured in euros, which means that computed technical 
efficiency might also include a component of allocative (price) efficiency. This is, however, a 
common problem in efficiency analyses that would have only a minor impact on the 
measurement of technical efficiency if production factor markets are assumed to be competitive 
with small price differences. 
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Table 32: Sample descriptive statistics. 
	
 Measurement unit Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Public management     
Water delivered Thousands of m3 510.4 526,6 2,365.3 55.0 
Population served Thousands 7.4 7.2 25.3 1,1 
Labour Full-time workers 4.5 2.7 11.0 0.5 
Operational costs Thousands of € 415.5 532.2 2,351.9 44.5 
Distribution network Kilometres 43.6 33.6 163.7 7.7 
Private management     
Water delivered Thousands of m3 1,561.0 1,120,0 3,475.5 113.4 
Population served Thousands 21.2 13.9 43.8 1.6 
Labour Full-time workers 12.6 10.5 43.0 1.6 
Operational costs Thousands of € 1,414.9 986.9 3,767.9 74.1 
Distribution network Kilometres 157.2 230.0 1,330.8 24.1 
 
 
4.4. Methodological issues 
	
4.4.1. The metatechnology and the group technology 
	
Our methodological approach is based on Sáez-Fernandez et al. (2012), which 
uses directional distance functions (Chambers et al., 1998) to extend the 
metafrontier approach by O’Donnell et al. (2008) to the measurement of 
technological differences in the management of specific inputs.75 In order to develop 
the main insights of this approach, let us assume that our k = 1…70 decision units 
(operators) use the set of inputs x = (xf, xv), where the fixed input xf is the length 
of the delivery network, and variable inputs xv are labour and operational costs, to 
produce the vector of outputs y, which includes water delivered and population 
served. 
																																								 																				
75 See Beltrán-Esteve (2013), Beltrán-Esteve et al. (2014) and Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2014) for 
recent empirical applications of this approach. 
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Transformation of inputs into outputs requires the use of a metatechnology that 
is represented by the short-run input requirement set. This set includes all 
combinations of variable inputs xv that, given a fixed input endowment xf, allow 
production of at least a level of outputs y. It is formally defined as: 
𝐿 (𝑥q , 𝑦 )  ≡  𝑥` | 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑇  (23) 
 
where T represents all combinations of inputs and outputs attainable with the 
present state of knowledge. It is assumed that the metatechnology satisfies the 
standard properties suggested by Shephard (1970). 
The instrument used to compare the production plan of each decision-making 
unit in our sample with respect to best available practices76 in the metatechnology, 
i.e., the technological frontier, is the directional metadistance function defined as 
(Färe & Grosskopf, 2000): 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝑥, 𝑦;   𝑔 = −𝑔uv ,  𝑔w =
= 𝑆𝑢𝑝 𝛿 | 𝑥` −  𝛿𝑔uv 𝜖 𝐿 𝑥q , 𝑦 + 𝛿𝑔w   
(24) 
 
With 𝑔 = (−𝑔u, 𝑔w)  being the so-called direction vector. 
This function has a lower bound of zero (other properties are in Chambers et 
al., 1998), and models inputs and outputs jointly by seeking the maximum 
attainable expansion of outputs in the gy direction and the largest feasible 
contraction of variable inputs in the –gxv direction. Furthermore, the directional 
metadistance function is a very flexible tool for assessing efficiency as it allows the 
technological frontier to be approached via alternative paths which focus on 
different facets of performance (Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012). 
These paths might represent the preferences of utilities’ managers and/or 
policymakers regarding performance. If we were interested in assessing the 
maximum proportional (radial) feasible reduction of variable inputs labour and 
																																								 																				
76 In this general setting, best practices are determined by those productive plans, either 
observed productive plans or resulting from their linear combinations, which obtain more 
outputs with fewer variable inputs usage, always for given endowment of the fixed input. 
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operational costs, given the endowment of the fixed input delivery network and also 
maintaining the level of outputs, the directional metadistance function would be: 
𝑀𝐷xyz.y{ = 𝑥, 𝑦;  𝑔xyz.y{ = −𝑥`, 0 =
= 𝑆𝑢𝑝 𝛿xyz.y{ | 1 −  𝛿xyz.y{  𝑥` 𝜖 𝐿 𝑥q , 𝑦   
(25) 
 
By way of example, a score of 0.1 for a particular operator in our sample would 
mean that, given the length of its delivery network, it could reduce both labour and 
operational costs by 10% without any decrease in the amount of water delivered or 
the population served. 
Furthermore, it might be of interest to assess the potential reduction of variable 
input i, either labour or operational costs, while maintaining the other input –i, 
always for given fixed input and outputs, i.e., assessing technical efficiency in the 
management of variable input i. In this scenario, the directional metadistance 
function becomes: 
𝑀𝐷. = 𝑥, 𝑦;  𝑔. = −𝑥`., 0`−1 , 0
= 𝑆𝑢𝑝 𝛿. | 1 −  𝛿.  𝑥`2 ,  𝑥`−2   𝜖 𝐿 𝑥q , 𝑦   
(26) 
 
In this case, a score of, say, 0.2 for the directional metadistance function and 
labour input would indicate that the number of full-time workers could be reduced 
by 20% without increasing operational costs and, importantly, while still 
maintaining the amount of water delivered and population served. 
The directional distance functions of expressions (3) and (4) can also be 
computed with respect to the technology of the two groups of operators considered 
in this research, namely, public and private. Accordingly, the technology of group 
h (with h = public, private) is based only on observations of decision units within 
this group, and can also be represented by the short-run input requirement set 
defined as: 
𝐿ℎ (𝑥q , 𝑦 )  ≡  𝑥` | 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑇 ℎ  (27) 
 
with Th representing all the combinations of inputs and outputs attainable by 
operators in group h, i.e., the state of knowledge for units in that group. The key 
issue here is that some productive plans, i.e., combinations of inputs and outputs, 
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included in the metatechnology may not be possible given the technology of a 
particular group. 
Formally, the directional distance functions computed with respect to the 
technology of group h in the case of radial and specific reduction of inputs are, 
respectively:77 
𝐷xyz.y{ℎ = 𝑥, 𝑦;  𝑔xyz.y{ = −𝑥`, 0






= 𝑥, 𝑦;  𝑔. = −𝑥`., 0`−1 , 0
= 𝑆𝑢𝑝 𝛿.
ℎ | 1 −  𝛿.
ℎ  𝑥`2 ,  𝑥`−2   𝜖 𝐿
ℎ 𝑥q , 𝑦   
(29) 
 
Figure 6 provides a graphical illustration of our directional functions. For the 
sake of simplicity, this is a hypothetical scenario in which we observe a set of four 
private management units represented by dots, and another set of six public 
management units identified by crosses. The short-run metatechnology or joint 
technology is represented by the lower envelope of all these observations regardless of 
their private or public character, i.e., the isoquant represented by the continuous line. 
Similarly, the technologies of private and public units are represented by the dotted 
and dashed isoquants, respectively. Projecting the inefficient public operator, i.e., the 
one located in the interior of the input requirement set, onto the metatechnology with 
a direction that reduces both labour and operational costs simultaneously yields point 
A; furthermore, projection onto the technology of the group of public units would 
yield point B. Accordingly, the segment BA measures the distance that separates the 
public technology from the metatechnology evaluated at this projection, i.e., the 
metatechnology ratio. Similarly, the segment DC measures the distance that separates 
the public technology from the metatechnology, assessed in a direction that reduces 
labour input whilst operational costs are maintained. 
																																								 																				
77 By construction, directional distance functions computed relative to the technology of group 
h will always be equal to or lower than directional metadistance functions computed with respect 
to the metatechnology. 
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Figure 6: Metatechnology, group technologies and metatechnology ratios. 
Source: authors 
 
4.4.2. Computation of the metatechnology ratios 
 
Using the directional distance/metadistance functions defined in Section 
4.3.2.1, we have computed the metatechnology ratios proposed by O’Donnell et al. 
(2008). In particular, the metatechnology ratio of group h can be defined as: 
𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 xyz.y{ℎ = 𝑥, 𝑦;  𝑔xyz.y{ = −𝑥`, 0
= 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦xyz.y{
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦xyz.y{ℎ
= 1 −  𝛿xyz.y{
1 −  𝛿xyz.y{ℎ
  (30) 
 
It is worth noting that the metatechnology ratio has been defined using 
technical efficiency scores with an upper bound of one –a score that indicates full 
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measures (Farrell, 1957).78,79 Furthermore, technical efficiency scores computed with 
respect to the technology of group h will be equal to or higher than those computed 
relative to the metatechnology. 
The metatechnology ratio provides a measure of how close the technology of group 
h is to the metatechnology, assessed in a direction that reduces all variable inputs 
proportionally. For example, a metatechnology ratio of 0.85 means that the efficient 
level of variable inputs usage needed to produce a given level of outputs relative to 
the joint technology is 85% of the efficient usage relative to the technology of the 
group h, i.e., either public or private management units. According to O’Donnell et 
al. (2008, p. 237), this approach provides a suitable decomposition of technical 
efficiency assessed with respect to the metafrontier (representing the existing state 
of knowledge), into the product of technical efficiency measured with respect to the 
frontier of group h (that represents the state of knowledge as well as physical, 
regulatory and other restrictions faced by units in that group) and the 
metatechnology ratio for group h (which measures how close the technology of this 
group is to the joint technology). Formally: 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦xyz.y{
= 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦xyz.y{ℎ · 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 xyz.y{ℎ   
(31) 
 
In less technical terms, this approach allows the decomposition of technical 
efficiency into managerial efficiency, which assesses the performance of operators in the 
sample as compared to best practices in their group, and ownership efficiency, which 
measures the closeness of the technology of group h to the joint technology. 
																																								 																				
78 The reason for this choice is that, although directional metadistance/distance functions can 
also be directly interpreted as measures of technical efficiency, distances for efficient 
management units are equal to zero and, thus, metatechnology ratios would not be defined for 
these operators (Sáez-Fernández et al., 2012). 
79 For example, a score for the directional distance function in the radial scenario of 0.1 would 
indicate, as already mentioned, that outputs could be maintained while reducing labour and 
operational costs by 10%. In this case, the technical efficiency score would be 0.9, indicating 
that it would be possible to maintain the same level of water delivered and population served 
with only 90% of observed inputs usage. 
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Similarly, the input-specific metatechnology ratio for variable input i and group 
h is: 
𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 .ℎ = 𝑥, 𝑦;  𝑔. = −𝑥`2 , 0 , 0
= 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦.
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦.ℎ
= 1 −  𝛿.
1 −  𝛿.ℎ
  (32) 
 
The interpretation of this metatechnology ratio is analogous to that in expression 
(8), with the difference that now the closeness of group h’s technology to the 
metafrontier is assessed in a direction that only reduces input i without increasing the 
usage of input –i and maintaining outputs. The abovementioned decomposition of 
technical efficiency also holds. 
Lastly, the directional metadistance/distance functions involved in our analysis 
have been computed with Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques, using the 
programs detailed in the Appendix. 
 
4.5.  Results and discussion 
	
In the conventional scenario that assesses potential proportional reductions of 
both variable inputs given the fixed input endowment and, also, maintaining 
outputs, the average for radial efficiency calculated with respect to the 
metatechnology or joint technology is 0.568 (Table 33).80 This score suggests that 
when all operators in our sample are compared with best available practices, labour 
and operational costs could both be proportionally reduced by an average of 
43.2%.81 For public and private units considered separately, averages of radial 
technical efficiency are 0.576 and 0.561, respectively, and the difference is not 
																																								 																				
80 Note that the exactness of the decomposition of technical efficiency presented in this table 
does not hold at the aggregate level due to the use of arithmetic means. 
81 This does not necessarily mean that all inefficient operators could adopt the best practices 
irrespective of the local context in which they develop their productive activity, or without 
undermining variables such as quality or sustainability. In this sense, research in this field has 
highlighted how the characteristics of operating environments can affect the technical efficiency 
of water utilities (Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009a; 2009b; Ménard & Saussier, 2000; González-Gómez 
et al., 2013); likewise, service quality also matters in measuring the performance of water utilities 
(Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008). 
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statistically significant at standard confidence levels, according to the results from 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests (Conover, 1999), 
and the Simar-Zelenyuk-Li test (Simar & Zelenyuk, 2006; Li, 1996). As for 
managerial efficiency scores, i.e., those computed with respect to the group 
technologies, averages are 0.669 and 0.682 for public and private operators, 
respectively. However, it is important to point out that these scores are not directly 
comparable to each other because they have been obtained with respect to different 
technological frontiers, and it is well known that efficiency is a relative concept 
(Färe et al., 1994). Lastly, averages for the metatechnology ratios of public and 
private units are 0.83382 and 0.838, respectively, and they are not statistically 
different according to the results from the tests included in Table 34. The Kernel 
density function represented in Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of this 
finding.83 
 





Technical efficiency with respect to the metafrontier 0.568 0.282 
Public management 0.576 0.317 
Private management 0.561 0.251 
Technical efficiency with respect to the group frontier 
(managerial efficiency) 
  
Public management 0.669 0.229 
Private management 0.682 0.312 
Metatechnology ratio (ownership efficiency)   
Public management 0.833 0.185 
Private management 0.838 0.199 
 
																																								 																				
82 This means, by way of example, that the efficient level of labour input usage needed to 
produce a given output vector relative to the joint technology is 83.3% of the efficient usage 
relative to the technology of the group of privately managed units. 
83 Table 34 and Figure 7 also include results and Kernel density functions obtained in the 
scenarios of input-specific performance assessment, which are discussed later; Kernels have been 
drawn directly using the metatechnology ratios obtained from expressions (8) and (10). 
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Radial technical efficiency 0.117 (0.937) 0.445 (0.656) -0.909 (0.818) 
Input-specific technical efficiency    
Labour 0.346 (0.021)** 2.442 (0.014)** 2.989 (0.001)*** 
Operational costs 0.322 (0.039)** -2.289 (0.022)** 0.729 (0.232) 
** and *** stands for statistical significance at 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. 
a The null hypothesis is that the distribution of the two samples is the same. 
b The null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn from the same population. 
c The null hypothesis is that the two samples have the same probability distribution function. 
d Exact p-values are provided. 
e Statistics are adjusted for ties. 
f Original estimates of the metatechnology ratio have been smoothed using Algorithm II in Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2006). 
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Figure 7: Kernel density estimation functions of metatechnology ratios: public 
(continuous line) versus private (dashed line) management. 
Radial 
 
Labour specific    Operational costs specific 
     
 
The abovementioned results are in line with most studies in this field, and 
suggest that there is no significant difference in technical efficiency between public 
and private management. Nonetheless, the picture is rather different when 
performance is evaluated at the level of the management of specific production 
factors, i.e., non-radial measures, which reinforces the relevance of our approach. 
In the scenario where only labour input is reduced, technical efficiency averages 
computed with respect to the metatechnology are 0.402 and 0.480 for public and 
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private decision units, respectively (Table 34); moreover, the difference is 
statistically significant pointing to the higher efficiency of private management. But 
what are the reasons for the better performance of private units at managing 
labour? On the one hand, managerial efficiency scores for public and private units 
are 0.598 and 0.613, respectively. Although, as mentioned above, these scores are 
not directly comparable to each other, private units seem to be slightly closer to 
their technological frontier, on average, than public ones are to theirs. On the other 
hand, and more interestingly, the metatechnology ratios for public and private units 
average 0.651 and 0.778, respectively, i.e., the technology of private management 
units is closer to the metatechnology than the technology of public units is. 
Moreover, the difference is statistically significant (see Table 35; see also the Kernel 
density functions in Figure 7). In less technical terms, the technology of private 
operators appears to be more efficient in the management of labour input.84 This 
result is in line with Gassner et al. (2009), which examined the impact of private 
sector participation in water distribution in more than 70 developing and transition 
economies. One of the main findings of that paper is that private participation is 
associated with gains in performance and labour productivity, which are linked to 
a reduction in staff numbers. Furthermore, the authors find that private sector also 
fares better than the public sector in terms of price efficiency. However, efficiency 
gains under private management are not followed by reduced prices or increased 
investments, suggesting that ‘…the private operator reaps all the gains through 
profits’ (Gassner et al., 2009, p. 5). Accordingly, efficiency gains from privatisation 
would not benefit citizens through lower water prices and/or better service quality 







84 Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2009b) also used a methodological approach based on the computation 
of input-specific scores of technical efficiency to provide evidence of the superiority of private 
utilities regarding the management of labour. However, here we go one step further by 
decomposing technical efficiency into managerial efficiency and ownership efficiency. 
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Table 35: Estimates of input-specific technical efficiency.	
 Labour Operational costs 














Public management 0.402 0.292 0.493 0.294 
Private management 0.480 0.358 0.505 0.361 
Technical efficiency with respect to the 
group frontier (managerial efficiency) 
    
Public management 0.598 0.264 0.539 0.305 
Private management 0.613 0.358 0.620 0.373 
Metatechnology ratio (ownership 
efficiency) 
    
Public management 0.651 0.220 0.920 0.134 
Private management 0.778 0.259 0.806 0.214 
 
The superiority of the technology used by private units in the management of 
labour might be due to certain regulatory and institutional restrictions faced by 
public management units that could reduce their flexibility in adjusting this 
production factor. In general, public managers are constrained by more stringent 
labour regulation which makes it more difficult to fire employees, and they also face 
higher levels of absenteeism (Meier & O’Toole, 2011). In addition, local 
governments, particularly those ruled by left-wing parties, tend to develop policies 
to promote employment stability (Botero et al., 2004; Emmenegger, 2011), as they 
consider the political costs of cutting jobs to be extremely high. Furthermore, public 
workers could also emerge as a lobby with a high negotiating power. Finally, 
creating overemployment when public services are delivered in-house might also 
form part of local politicians’ rent-seeking strategy (Hart et al., 1997). Nevertheless, 
our findings do not allow us to establish a direct causal relationship between these 
conjectural factors and the superiority of the private technology in managing 
labour. Nor are a number of further related issues addressed in our research, such 
as the potential impact of reducing labour usage on the quality of the service offered 
by private operators. It might, for example, be the case that public operators 
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employ more full-time workers simply because they are essential to delivering higher 
service quality, a variable that is omitted in our analysis.85 
Regarding the scenario where only operational costs are reduced, technical 
efficiency computed with respect to the metatechnology averages 0.493 and 0.505 
for public and private operators, respectively (see also Table 34); however, the 
difference is not statistically significant at the standard confidence levels. This 
outcome is, nonetheless, the consequence of two contrasting factors. On the one 
hand, private managers are operating, on average, closer to their own technological 
frontier than their public counterparts –average scores of managerial efficiency for 
public and private operators are 0.539 and 0.620, respectively. On the other hand, 
however, private technology is found to be less efficient at managing operational 
costs than the technology of public management units: metatechnology ratios for 
public and private decision units are 0.920 and 0.806, respectively, with the 
difference being statistically significant according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Mann-Whitney tests but not the Simar-Zelenyuk-Li test (see Table 35; also see 
Figure 7). 
This latter result is then less robust than that obtained in the case of the 
specific management of labour input and should thus be interpreted with caution. 
However, several factors could go some way to explaining this. In the first place, 
cost-sharing activities may take place, especially under in-house public provision. 
In other words, some operational costs such as administrative costs or energy 
consumption could be included in the budget item for general municipality 
expenses, and it would be very difficult to get accurate estimates of the share 
corresponding to water services. Secondly, it has been shown that there is a 
tendency to privatise water services operating in more complex environments 
(González-Gómez et al., 2011), which might imply higher operational costs. For 
example, some factors that could have an impact on operational costs include the 
																																								 																				
85 There is no consensus about the effect of privatisation on the quality of the urban water 
service, either. In this respect, Galiani et al. (2005) found that the privatisation of local water 
companies in Argentina lead to a significant reduction in child mortality from causes directly 
related to water conditions such as infectious and parasitic diseases; also Marin (2009) suggested 
that privatisation in developing countries leads to improved service quality, especially by 
reducing water rationing. Conversely, Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) showed that privatization in 
Colombia has strong negative effects on the access to water in rural areas. Furthermore, some 
papers suggest that privatisation has been followed by deterioration in service quality in the 
United Kingdom in such aspects as supply continuity and leakage control (Lobina & Hall, 2000; 
Lobina & Hall, 2001). 
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state of conservation of the delivery network, the source of raw water and its 
quality, and network efficiency.86 
 
4.6. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
	
Since the 1980s, a number of papers have studied the relationship between 
ownership and urban water operators’ performance, using a range of conceptual and 
methodological approaches. Nevertheless, after more than three decades of research, 
empirical evidence is still inconclusive. Our main contribution to this literature is 
the use of a fresh approach to assess technical efficiency in the management of water 
delivery, based on the use of directional distance functions, metafrontiers and Data 
Envelopment Analysis. Unlike extant research, which has used either metafrontiers 
or directional distance functions separately, combining the two approaches allows 
us to account for the possibility that public and private operators face different 
technological restrictions affecting the management of particular production factors. 
The main advantage of this combined approach is that it allows us to distinguish 
between managerial efficiency and ownership efficiency at the level of the 
management of specific inputs, with the latter representing the effect on 
performance of technological restrictions faced by either public or private ownership 
regimes. 
Furthermore, we focus our empirical analysis on urban water service provision 
in Spain. Regarding our results, in a conventional scenario based on assessing radial 
efficiency, as is the case with most previous research, we find no differences of 
performance between public and private operators; however, when performance is 
evaluated at the level of the management of specific production factors the picture 
is somewhat different. On the one hand, the technology of private operators is found 
to be more efficient in the management of labour, which might be due to certain 
institutional, regulatory and also political restrictions faced by public management 
units. Conversely, private operators’ technology appears to be less efficient in the 
management of operational costs, perhaps because they operate in more complex 
																																								 																				
86 These hypotheses would need, however, to be empirically tested. Using an indirect approach, 
we have found that private management is positively correlated with certain variables 
representing the complexity of operating environments, e.g., a dummy variable that 
characterises municipalities where intensive treatment is required to make raw water suitable 




environments, which probably leads to higher operational costs. However, this latter 
outcome is statistically less robust. In summary, our approach seems to be successful 
in uncovering new insights hidden to more conventional approaches based on the 
simple calculation of radial or overall measures of performance in the provision of 
the urban water service (some exceptions are, however, Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009b 
or the abovementioned paper by Gassner et al., 2009, which also evaluate the 
performance of water operators at the level of particular production factors). It is 
our belief that these results might be of interest to managers and policymakers 
responsible for policies aimed at regulating the water industry. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning some limitations of our approach that also 
constitute lines for future research. In the first place, it would be worth extending 
our methodology to incorporate non-controllable inputs and/or other environmental 
factors in order to attain more precise evaluations of performance. In this regard, 
it would be highly advisable to account for the quality dimension in urban water 
service provision; as mentioned above, if the analysis disregards quality it may 
overlook the fact that cutting the number of workers could result in lower service 
quality. Furthermore, it would also be worthwhile to integrate social aspects of 
water provision such as affordability into our analysis; e.g., it may be the case that 
if private operators reduce labour usage it could result in a less satisfactory 
achievement of social objectives such as affordability. A second interesting line for 
future research would be extending our approach to the analysis of both technical 
efficiency and price efficiency, e.g., it might be possible for a particular operator to 
score highly in terms of price efficiency but poorly for technical efficiency or vice-
versa, and also to the study of how supposed efficiency gains from privatisation are 
distributed. Third, our manuscript suggests some factors and/or institutional 
restrictions that could explain the superiority of the private technology in managing 
labour; testing these hypotheses empirically would provide managers and regulators 
with sound information helping them to improve both management and water 
policies. And finally, replicating our analyses with larger samples of Spanish water 
utilities as well as for other developed countries would also be very welcome addition 
to this field of research. 
  




Using DEA techniques, the mathematical program required to calculate the 
directional metadistance function of expression (3), where both labour and 
operational costs are proportionally reduced, for a decision unit k’ in the sample is: 
 
𝑀𝐷xyz.y{;




′ ≤ 𝑧;70;=1 𝑦
;                    m= water delivered, population served 
𝑥q;
′ ≥ 𝑧;70;=1 𝑥q
;                   f= delivery network 
(1 − 𝛿xyz.y{;
′ )𝑥`2
;′  ≥ 𝑧;70;=1 𝑥`2
;   i= labour, operational costs 







with zk representing the weighting of each management unit k in the sample 
making up the efficient metafrontier to which unit k’ is compared. 
Likewise, the DEA-based program needed to compute the directional 
metadistance function of expression (4) for decision unit k’ when only variable input 
i –either labour or operational costs– is reduced, while maintaining the other 
variable input –i and the vector of outputs is: 
 
𝑀𝐷.;




′ ≤ 𝑧;70;=1 𝑦
;                   m= water delivered, population served 
𝑥q;
′ ≥ 𝑧;70;=1 𝑥q
;                  f= delivery network 
(1 − 𝛿.;
′)𝑥`2
;′  ≥ 𝑧;70;=1 𝑥`2
;       i ϵ n = labour, operational costs; and i ∉ −i 
𝑥`−2
;′ ≥ 𝑧;70;=1 𝑥`−2
;                 −i ϵ n = labour, operational costs 









In programs (33) and (34) variable returns to scale have been imposed by 
restricting the sum of the elements of the intensities vector, i.e., the weightings of 
decision units in the sample in the composition of the efficient frontier, to be equal 
to one (Banker et al., 1984). The reason we do so is that we want to assess 
differences of efficiency specifically due to different managerial capabilities of public 
and private operators as well as differences between the two production 
technologies, but not differences due to the scale of operation. 
Finally, formulating the programs needed to calculate the directional 
metadistance and distance functions of operators in group h requires only a few 
changes in notation and the substitution of the whole sample of decision units with 
units in group h, either public or private management, which is left to readers. 
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In a context of increasing scarcity of water resources, the main objective of the 
present doctoral dissertation has been to add to the knowledge base on several 
aspects related to urban water management. In broad terms, the main conclusions 
derived from the essays included can be grouped around four issues: the implications 
for demand-side policies; recommendations for governance in urban water 
management; methodological contributions; and policy implications for water 
management in Spain. 
Demand-side policies 
As outlined in the introduction, demand-side policies, both pricing and non-
pricing, play an ever more essential role in addressing problems related to water 
scarcity, urban water sustainability and service continuity. Against this 
background, Essays 1 and 2 of this dissertation are aimed at contributing to the 
design and implementation of appropriate tariffs and pricing policies. In this 
respect, in Essay 1 we find that, contrary to widely-held assumptions in the 
residential water demand literature, water consumption is neither linear in income 
nor separable from the rest of the goods consumed in the household and taking 
those aspects into account may lead to more accurate estimates of demand patterns. 
This has important implications, as those estimates are the foundation for designing 
and predicting the effects of pricing policies. 
Likewise, our results in Essay 2 suggest that price-setting decisions in urban 
water services may often be influenced not only by economic issues and factors 
involving the environment in which the service is supplied, but also by political and 
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ideological factors, as well as rent-seeking strategies by decision-makers and 
politicians. As this may affect the capacity of policymakers to set prices that can 
ensure the simultaneous achievement of multiple water management objectives, 
such as efficiency, sustainability and affordability, mechanisms should be 
established in order to limit its interference in decision-making. Accordingly, in 
countries where they are not already in place, the establishment of supervisory 
bodies, as well as an adequate regulation, control and monitoring, emerge as key 
factors for the improvement of pricing policies. 
Finally, results from Essay 3 seemed to indicate that certain pricing and non-
pricing policies related to residential water management that are becoming more 
widely implemented around the world may affect other behaviours adopted by the 
household, with unintended environmental and economic consequences. Thus, a 
thorough cost-benefit analysis of the corresponding policies should incorporate those 
consequences. In addition, promoting pro-environmental habits was found to be an 
efficient means of preventing mitigating behaviours that generate negative 
environmental externalities. Furthermore, we found that an improvement in tap 
water quality may be an effective tool to reduce the use of bottled water. 
 
Efficiency and governance in urban water management. 
Residential water management also requires improved governance of urban 
water services, which can be achieved by designing more efficient management 
systems. In this sense, the type of ownership of the management of the service is 
usually acknowledged as playing an important role in explaining the efficiency of 
the operator. However, the literature has not reached a consensus as to which form 
of ownership performs better. In this context, our results seemed to suggest that 
each ownership type is best at managing one or several of the production factors. 
Likewise, the factor that is best managed may in turn depend on the particular 
institutional framework and technological restrictions faced by the different forms 
of ownership. In that case, synergies may be achieved by combining management 
systems and implementing the institutional and regulatory backgrounds behind the 
most efficient management of each production factor (Essay 4).  
Methodological contributions 
Policy making should be supported by the development of metrics and 
methodological approaches to inform the implemented policies. Therefore, this 
dissertation is also aimed at meeting that need. Particularly, in Essay 1 we 
implement a system of demand estimation that is novel in water demand analysis. 
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Furthermore, we found that it displays a better fit to the observed demand patterns 
for residential water consumption than the ones previously employed. Therefore, it 
seems to offer a more precise tool to determine price and income elasticities, and 
helps improve predictions of the welfare effects of pricing policies and taxes. 
Moreover, this new development can potentially be applied in a substantial number 
of countries that currently rely on country-representative Household Budget 
Surveys, and can thus inform national policies related to residential water. 
Essay 2 filled a gap in the literature by designing a metric that can be used to 
measure the level of escalation embedded in water tariffs and that permits full 
comparability among municipalities regardless of the specific tariff structure they 
use; i.e., regardless of the number and size of price blocks, the presence and size of 
fixed components, and price levels included in the tariffs. This measure can be of 
help when it comes to monitoring and controlling the impact of policies affecting 
the structure of the tariff.  
In Essay 3, a methodological strategy was proposed to deal with the substantial 
number of zero consumption records in databases on averting behaviours. We 
showed that failure to address this problem properly may lead to bias in the 
estimates of the effects of the policies aimed at controlling these behaviours.  
Finally, Essay 4, also added a methodological contribution, by proposing a 
novel methodological approach combining Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
metafrontiers and directional distance functions, which proved successful in 
providing new insights about the relationship between ownership of the service 
provider and efficiency in the urban water sector. We believe that this 
methodological approach can assist policy makers in making better decisions with 
respect to the choice of ownership type. Furthermore, it can help identify and 
implement the regulatory frameworks and technologies that prove to be most 
effective at efficiently managing the different production factors. Moreover, it could 
be extended to similar analyses that seek to compare the performance of two 
production technologies in relation to the efficiency of the service.  
 
Policy lessons for water management in Spain 
Finally, given that the empirical setting of this dissertation is Spain, some 
conclusions can be drawn that are specific to water management in this country. 
Particularly, we found that there is still plenty of room for improvement when it 
comes to pricing policies.  Following the stipulations set out in the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD), tariffs that reflect the full cost of the service (full-
cost recovery) as well as environmental and other costs related to resource use, 
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should be implemented. Moreover, pricing policies are expected to promote an 
efficient use of the resource. In order to simultaneously achieve the abovementioned 
objectives, the general recommendation is for tariffs in increasing block rates, which 
embed a certain level of escalation in prices. However, our results in Essay 2 seemed 
to indicate that following the implementation of the WFD, there has been a 
decrease in the degree of price escalation in the variable component of the tariff in 
Spain, contrary to what was expected. We also found that when we include the 
fixed component of the tariff in the analysis, tariffs in Spain are in fact regressive 
on consumption, albeit less so in the years after the entry into force of the WFD. 
Therefore, a more ambitious implementation of the WFD should be promoted, 
designing policies that ensure the continuity of the service through adequate funding 
and maintenance of the distribution networks, and tariffs that promote universal 
access, efficiency and sustainability of water resources. 
Moreover, in this dissertation we highlighted that the lack of a regulatory body 
that establishes common guidelines lead to failings in price-setting strategies, thus 
hindering the application of satisfactory water management solutions in a country 
suffering from water stress throughout most of its territory. More specifically, some 
concern is raised about the desirability of making decisions at the municipal level 
that can affect a wider region such as a river basin. Independently setting tariffs 
that promote a sustainable use of the resource cannot be effective if other agents 
that share the same source of abstraction do not align their policies in the same 
direction. Thus, some standards and controls should be established, at least at the 
watershed level. Moreover, we found that besides more pragmatic reasons related 
to the environment in which the service is supplied, other factors such as the 
ideology of the government or the ownership of the management also affect pricing 
decisions. We believe that a regulatory body such as the one described above would 























































En el contexto actual de creciente escasez de los recursos hídricos, el principal 
objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es contribuir a la mejora de las políticas urbanas de 
gestión del agua. En un sentido amplio, las conclusiones centrales derivadas de los 
ensayos incluidos en la misma se pueden agrupar en torno a cuatro aspectos. En 
concreto, implicaciones para las políticas de demanda y para la gobernanza en la 
gestión urbana del agua, contribuciones metodológicas, y lecciones de política 
pública para la gestión del agua en España. 
 
Políticas de demanda. 
Tal como se ha abordado de forma más detallada en la introducción, las 
políticas de demanda, tanto tarifarias como no tarifarias, juegan un papel cada vez 
más esencial a la hora de abordar los problemas relacionados con la escasez de 
recursos hídricos, la sostenibilidad del servicio urbano de agua y la continuidad en 
su provisión. En este contexto, el primer y segundo ensayo de esta disertación tienen 
por objeto realizar aportaciones al adecuado diseño e implementación de tarifas y 
políticas de demanda. A este respecto, los resultados del primer ensayo parecen 
sugerir que, contrariamente a lo que se ha venido asumiendo de forma habitual en 
la literatura de demanda residencial de agua, el consumo de agua no es ni lineal en 
el ingreso ni separable del resto de bienes consumidos en el hogar, y que la 
consideración de estos aspectos permitiría obtener estimaciones más precisas de los 
patrones de demanda observados. Esto tiene importantes implicaciones en términos 
de política pública, ya que estas estimaciones son la base para el diseño y predicción 
de los efectos de las políticas tarifarias. 
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En una línea similar, en el segundo ensayo se encuentra que en muchas 
ocasiones las decisiones de fijación de precios en los servicios urbanos de agua 
pueden estar influenciadas no únicamente por aspectos económicos o factores 
relacionados con las características ambientales en las que se presta el servicio, sino 
también por cuestiones políticas, ideológicas y otros factores relacionados con 
estrategias de captura de rentas por parte de políticos y responsables de la 
formulación de políticas públicas. Esto podría estar influenciando la capacidad de 
los responsables de la formulación de dichas políticas para fijar precios que sean 
capaces de asegurar que se alcancen de forma simultánea los múltiples objetivos a 
los que se espera que responda la gestión de los recursos hídricos, como eficiencia, 
sostenibilidad y asequibilidad. Por tanto, se deberían de establecer mecanismos que 
limiten su interferencia en la toma de este tipo de decisiones. Bajo estas 
circunstancias, la existencia de un órgano supervisor, así como una debida 
regulación, control y monitoreo, se revelan factores fundamentales para la mejora 
de las políticas tarifarias en aquellos países en los que aún no se hallen establecidos. 
Por último, los resultados del tercer ensayo parecen indicar que algunas 
políticas tarifarias y no tarifarias relacionadas con la gestión de los recursos hídricos 
a nivel residencial que se están aplicando cada vez con mayor frecuencia en muchas 
partes del mundo podrían estar afectando a otros comportamientos llevados a cabo 
en el hogar (e.g. consumo de agua embotellada), con consecuencias inesperadas en 
términos económicos y medioambientales. Por tanto, un análisis coste-beneficio 
exhaustivo de las correspondientes políticas debería incorporar dichas 
consecuencias. Además, se encuentra que promover hábitos pro-medioambientales 
podría prevenir de forma eficaz la realización de este tipo de comportamientos 
defensivos que implican externalidades medioambientales negativas. Asimismo, una 
mejora en la calidad del agua del grifo parece mostrarse efectiva como forma para 
reducir el uso del agua embotellada. 
 
Eficiencia y gobernanza en la gestión del agua urbana. 
La gestión del agua residencial exige asimismo mejoras en la gobernanza de los 
servicios urbanos de agua a través del diseño de sistemas más eficientes que se 
demuestren más resilientes a la cada vez más reducida disponibilidad del recurso. 
En este sentido, es habitualmente reconocido en la literatura que la titularidad del 
gestor del servicio juega un papel importante en cuanto a lo que la eficiencia del 
operador se refiere. Sin embargo, no ha sido posible alcanzar un consenso respecto 
a qué forma de propiedad se muestra superior en términos de desempeño. Bajo este 
contexto, nuestros resultados parecen sugerir que podría ser que cada tipo de 
propiedad del gestor sea capaz de gestionar mejor uno o varios de los factores 
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productivos. De igual modo, qué factor resulta mejor gestionado podría estar 
dependiendo del marco institucional y las restricciones tecnológicas afrontadas por 
cada forma de titularidad. En este caso, se podrían conseguir sinergias propiciando 
la combinación de varios sistemas de gestión e implementando aquellos marcos 
institucionales y regulatorios que se muestren más exitosos a la hora de gestionar 
cada factor de producción de forma eficiente (Ensayo 4). 
 
Contribuciones metodológicas. 
La formulación de políticas públicas debe apoyarse en el desarrollo de métricas 
y enfoques metodológicos que puedan informarlas adecuadamente. Por tanto, esta 
disertación trata de contribuir también a esta área. En concreto, en el primer ensayo 
se implementa un sistema de demanda que no ha sido utilizado con anterioridad en 
el análisis de la demanda de agua. Encontramos que este sistema ajusta mejor a los 
patrones observados de demanda para demanda de agua residencial que aquellos 
empleados de forma mayoritaria con anterioridad. De este modo, parece ofrecer una 
herramienta más precisa a la hora de determinar las elasticidades precio e ingreso 
y para la mejora de las predicciones de los efectos de las políticas tarifarias y de 
impuestos sobre el bienestar social. Asimismo, esta mejora podría ser aplicada de 
forma potencial a un elevado número de países que cuentan actualmente con 
Encuestas de Presupuestos Familiares representativas de la población como las 
utilizadas en este trabajo, con el objeto de informar de forma más precisa la toma 
de decisiones y políticas públicas relacionadas con la gestión de los recursos hídricos 
a nivel nacional. 
De igual modo, el segundo ensayo cubre un vacío existente en la literatura 
diseñando una métrica que permite medir el nivel de escalado de las tarifas de agua 
y comparar entre jurisdicciones independientemente de tipo de tarifa empleado –es 
decir, del número y tamaño de los bloques, presencia y tamaño del componente fijo, 
y niveles de precios generales del municipio. Esperamos que esta medida sea capaz 
de dar soporte a las labores de control y monitoreo de las políticas que afecten al 
diseño de estructuras tarifarias. En el tercer ensayo, se propone una estrategia 
metodológica que permite lidiar con la habitual aparición de una elevada proporción 
de respuestas nula (o cero) en la literatura de comportamientos defensivos. 
Mostramos que no abordar de forma adecuada este problema puede causar sesgo en 
las estimaciones de los efectos de las políticas que tienen por objeto controlarlos. 
Por último, el cuarto ensayo añade asimismo una contribución metodológica a 
través de una estrategia empírica novedosa en la medida de la eficiencia en el sector 
del agua que combina Análisis Envolvente de Datos (DEA), metafronteras y 
funciones de distancia direccionales, y que se muestra satisfactoria en ofrecer nuevas 
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perspectivas en lo referente a la relación entre propiedad del gestor y eficiencia en 
el servicio urbano del agua. Consideramos asimismo que este enfoque metodológico 
podría servir de soporte a los responsables de política pública para tomar mejores 
decisiones respecto a la elección de la titularidad del gestor, así como a detectar e 
implementar aquellos marcos regulatorios y tecnologías que se demuestren más 
efectivas en la gestión eficiente de los diferentes factores de producción. Además, 
esta metodología podría ser extendida a análisis similares en los que se pretenda 
comparar la superioridad de dos tecnologías de producción en relación con la 
eficiencia en la prestación del servicio.  
 
Lecciones de política pública para la gestión de los recursos 
hídricos en España. 
Por último, dado que el análisis empírico de esta disertación se basa en el caso 
español, algunas de las conclusiones derivadas de la misma son de aplicación 
específica para la gestión del agua en este país. Particularmente, se encuentra que 
las políticas de precios en España cuentan aún con un elevado margen de mejora. 
Siguiendo las indicaciones de la Directiva Marco del Agua (DMA), las tarifas 
deberían reflejar el coste total del servicio (recuperación de costes), así como los 
costes medioambientales y de uso del recurso. De igual modo, sería de esperar que 
las tarifas promovieran un uso eficiente del mismo. Para alcanzar de manera 
simultánea estos objetivos, habitualmente se recomienda la utilización de tarifas en 
bloques crecientes de consumo, que implícitamente introducen un cierto nivel de 
escalado en el precio. Sin embargo, los resultados obtenidos en el segundo ensayo 
parecen indicar que, tras la implementación de la DMA en España, contrariamente 
a lo que sería de esperar se ha producido una caída en el grado de escalado en el 
precio dentro de la parte variable de la tarifa. Se encuentra así mismo que cuando 
se considera también el componente fijo, las tarifas en España son regresivas en el 
consumo, aunque se observa que el nivel de regresividad se ha reducido en los años 
que han seguido a la implementación de la DMA. Por tanto, se debería promover 
una trasposición más ambiciosa de la DMA que permita el diseño de políticas que 
aseguren la continuidad del servicio mediante una financiación adecuada y 
mantenimiento de las redes de distribución, así como tarifas que promuevan acceso 
universal, eficiencia y sostenibilidad de los recursos hídricos. 
De igual modo, esta disertación pone en relieve que la ausencia de un organismo 
regulador que establezca unas directrices comunes puede estar causando 
disfunciones en la toma de decisiones relativas a la fijación de precios en el sector 
del agua. Esto, a su vez, podría estar dificultando la aplicación de soluciones que 
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resulten satisfactorias para gestionar adecuadamente el recurso, en un país que se 
halla sometido a estrés hídrico en la mayor parte de su territorio. En concreto, 
cabría cuestionar si es razonable que decisiones que afectan en última instancia a 
un área mucho más amplia como es la cuenca hidrográfica sean tomadas a nivel 
municipal. Fijar de forma aislada tarifas que promuevan un uso sostenible del 
recurso puede ser de poca utilidad si el resto de agentes que comparten la misma 
fuente de captación del recurso no aplican políticas en la misma dirección. Por 
tanto, sería aconsejable establecer ciertos estándares y controles, al menos a nivel 
de la cuenca hidrográfica. Por otra parte, se encuentra que al margen de razones de 
corte pragmático relacionadas con el entorno en el que se provee el servicio, otros 
factores como la ideología del partido en el gobierno o la titularidad del gestor 
también pueden afectar a las decisiones tarifarias. Un organismo regulatorio como 
el descrito anteriormente podría mostrarse muy efectivo a la hora de evitar la 
existencia de injerencia política y arbitrariedad en las estrategias de fijación de 
precios en los servicios de agua urbana. 
 
